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ABSTRACT
EMOTIONAL RATIONALITY AND THE FEAR OF DEATH
FEBRUARY 2007
KRISTEN ANNE HINE, B.A., FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
In this dissertation I discuss emotional rationality generally, and the fear of
death specifically. I argue that the intentional ity of emotion is one source of difficulty
for philosophers who defend the view that the fear of death is irrational. I suggest that
since there are several things we can fear when we fear death, the acceptability of some
arguments will vary depending on the objects the arguments presuppose. I also argue
that philosophers (contemporary and historical) often employed inappropriate
conceptions of emotional rationality. If the conceptual framework in which these
philosophers were working is unacceptable, then perhaps their arguments are
unacceptable as well. I ultimately develop a view of emotional rationality that takes its
inspiration from externalist accounts of beliefjustification. I try to show that, even if
the fear of death (as the fear of death's deprivations) is not a ‘true” emotion, it is
nonetheless justified.
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CHAPTER 1
DEATH AND THE EMOTIONS
When I began this project four years ago, I was primarily interested in the
disvalue of death; 1 focused my research on whether and to what extent death can be a
harm for the person who dies. Working through the philosophical literature on the
disvalue of death exposed me to a second, and equally puzzling, question: Is it ever
rational to fear one's own death? For some, particularly the Epicureans, the irrationality
of the fear of death followed directly from the supposed fact that death can never be a
harm for the person who dies (plus some subsidiary principles). For others, the
rationality of the fear of death was unrelated to the disvalue of death.
My interests again shifted, and what began as a philosophical study of the
rationality of the fear of death quickly turned into a large-scale investigation into
emotional rationality, generally: What is the nature of emotion? How are we to criticize
emotions? What role does the object play in emotional criticism?
My overall strategy in this dissertation is to deal with some of these questions,
and to reconsider the rationality of the fear of death in light of their answers. I
ultimately try to show that the ways in which philosophers have often thought about the
fear of death are wrong-headed. They have employed the wrong evaluative concept in
their criticisms, and have, perhaps, presupposed an uninteresting object.
While I do believe that I have brought some novel considerations to bear on
rationality of the fear of death, I do not believe that this is the final word. Rather, my
hope was to contribute something new to a debate that has been in the literature for
centuries.
Organization of Chapters
It is commonplace to think that emotions can be subject to rational criticism.
Some may have said that your fearing the wildly ferocious dog is rational your
emotion is constituted in part by the highly plausible belief that the dog will harm you;
others may have warned that extreme sadness over a cheating boyfriend is irrationa/
since your main objective is to move on from the tumultuous relationship; and others
still may have agreed that happiness about your book’s success is rationa/seeing as
such success merits a positive emotional response. Notice that the considerations
brought to bear on the rationality of these emotions differ from case to case. Your fear
is rational in virtue of its constitutive beliefs rationality; your sadness is irrational in
virtue of its disutility; and your happiness is appropriate in virtue of its correct
representation of its object. Everyday emotional criticisms, then, make use of notions
such as epistemic rationality, prudential rationality, and, what has typically been called
’appropriateness.’
One of the central goals of this dissertation is to better understand the criticism
of emotion. In an effort to achieve this end, one must first be familiar with the theories
of emotion that are presupposed by accounts of emotional rationality. Thus I begin in
Chapter 2 by investigating the nature of emotion. The philosophical and psychological
literature on the nature of emotion is abundant and cluttered with technical terminology.
Presenting a complete survey of the literature is impossible in this small space.
Therefore, I focus my efforts on two views that appear several times throughout this
dissertation: the cognitive theory of emotion, and the perceptual theory of emotion.
According to the cognitive theory, emotions are, or necessarily involve,
evaluative beliefs about the object of the emotion. My fearing the ferocious dog just is
(in part) my believing that the dog may be dangerous. This theory has garnered serious
support in the philosophical literature over the past twenty years, but it is now starting
to fall from its position of popularity. Many philosophers have argued that the theory
cannot account for “recalcitrant emotions.” An emotion is recalcitrant when it exists
despite the fact that one’s beliefs are in tension with it. As many philosophers have
pointed out, we often fear something and positively believe that it is perfectly safe.
This is impossible according to the cognitive theory. For according to the cognitive
theory, our fearing some state of affairs requires our believing it to be harmful for us.
1 ultimately argue that, although several attempts have been made to salvage the
cognitive theory, it is unacceptable. Since this theory appears in both the contemporary
and classical discussions of the fear of death, however, understanding it is central to
understanding some of the argumentation in this dissertation.
I next turn my attention to the perceptual theory of emotion, according to which
emotions are perceptions of value. The nature of perception presupposed by these
theories is most naturally described by the intentionalist theory of perception. On this
theory, perceptions are representations of their objects. And, since the perceptual
theory is meant to be a genuine alternative to the cognitive theory, the kind of
representation involved in perception is not belief.
In this section I look closely at two different versions of the perceptual theory,
one advanced by Ronald de Sousa, and the other by Jesse Prinz. De Sousa's theory will
be of particular importance as it plays a central role in his theory of emotional
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rationality. For de Sousa, emotions are (or are analogous to) perceptions. Roughly, his
view is that emotions are defined by reference to paradigm scenarios, which are fixed
by biology and later by culture. When a state of affairs brings to mind a specific
paradigm, we respond in ways determined by said paradigm. For de Sousa, though, we
not only see the eliciting situations as resembling the paradigm in terms of their “lower-
level” properties, but also in terms of their “higher-level” properties. Thus, we fear a
barking dog because it resembles our paradigm of fear insofar as the paradigm has
barking dogs in addition to the property of be/ng dangerous. De Sousa calls this higher-
level property theforma/ objectof an emotion.
Prinz, whose theory is a descendent of the James-Lange theory of emotion,
argues that de Sousa’s theory is not genuinely perceptual. According to Prinz, a theory
is perceptual when it (1) is in a dedicated input system, and (2) is a representational
state. According to Prinz, de Sousa’s view does not satisfy the first condition. Prinz
ultimately defends the view that emotions are “embodied appraisals.” They are
perceptions of changes in the body that result from the detection of a relevant stimulus
in the environment. The bodily changes, moreover, represent how well or poorly we
are faring with respect to the environment (he calls these ‘core relational themes’). We
actually feel personal offenses coursing through our bodies.
While I do agree that de Sousa’s theory is not genuinely perceptual, I am
unwilling to adopt Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory. I suggest that emotions follow
directly from eliciting stimulus in the environment, where the stimulus will often be an
evaluative property. Prinz agrees with this, but for him the emotion is the perception of
the bodily change, for me, it is the perception of the value m rbe wor/d.
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In Chapter 3, 1 turn my attention towards the intentionality of emotion. I begin
by explicating what 1 take to be basic conceptual assumptions about the objects of
emotions. In this section I consider issues such as the nature and accessibility of our
emotions' objects. I then go on to discuss the fear of death in particular. I try to show
there are several things that one can fear when she fears death, so it is essential to be
clear about what one fears when she fears death. Is it one’s own nonexistence? Is it the
state of affairs that consists of one's being deprived of life’s goods through a premature
death? Or is it something else all together?
I suggest that the reasons for being interested in the object are two. First, some
arguments designed to show that the fear of death is irrational presuppose a specific
object; if, when we fear death, we do not fear that object, those arguments do not
address the fears we actually have. I argue that this is in fact true of the classical
arguments against the fear of death. Second, I believe that the object plays a key role in
our assessment of an emotion for its rationality. For some, emotions are appropriate
when their objects have the evaluative properties the emotions represent them as
having. For others, emotions are justified when they are causally connected to their
objects in the correct way. Therefore, when one is trying to determine whether and to
what extent an emotion is rational (according to almost any theory of emotional
rationality), it will be important to specify the object.
In Chapter 4, 1 begin a close study of “reductive” accounts of emotional
rationality. According to these accounts, emotional rationality is to be understood in
terms of more familiar accounts of rationality: epistemic and instrumental rationality.
Let us suppose that an emotion is epistemically rational when its constitutive belief is
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epistemically rational, and that an emotion is instrumentally rational when it provides
the most efficient means to an agent-relative end. In this chapter I pay particular
attention to Amelie Rorty’s work on the fear of death, which I think provides a
paradigm case of understanding emotional rationality in the ways just described. Rorty
claims that the fear of death (as the fear of annihilation) is epistemically irrational
insofar as it presupposes a false belief about death, but instrumentally rational insofar as
it necessarily leads to other, very efficient, fears. Not an outright paradox, but an
interesting thesis. I argue, pace Rorty, that there is good reason to think that reductive
accounts of emotional rationality are unacceptable. If I am right about this, then the
considerations that she has brought to bear on the rationality of the fear of death are the
wrong considerations.
I defend the view that one should defend a unf/iedaccount of emotional
rationality. An account is a unified account when it can yield a verdict about all (rather
than just some) emotions. As the cognitive theory of emotion is false, not all emotions
can be criticized for their epistemic rationality. The epistemic approach to emotional
rationality will not do. With respect to instrumental rationality, I try to show that
emotions, like beliefs, are not the right kinds of things to criticize from the instrumental
perspective.
In this section I also look closely at Ronald de Sousa's arguments against the
reduction of emotional rationality to paradigm cases of rationality. While I agree with
his conclusions, that the reduction is unacceptable, I do not agree with his reasoning:
He concludes that emotions are not to be criticized for their epistemic and instrumental
rationality from the premise that emotions are not beliefs and not the right kind of
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desires. He is right to point out that emotions are not beliefs and desires, but this alone
does not show that emotional rationality is not to be reduced to other kinds of
rationality.
Having argued that reductive accounts of emotional rationality' are unacceptable,
I turn my attention to non-reductive accounts in Chapter 5. The accounts I look at fall
squarely into one of two camps: those that treat emotional rationality as an analog of
true belief, and those that treat emotional rationality as an analog ofjustified belief.
Justin D'Arms and Dan Jacobson provide what I take to be one of the best accounts of
emotional “truth.” According to their view, emotions are appropriate (true) when the
evaluative properties emotions represent their objects as having are indeed had by their
objects, and the emotions are neither an over nor an underreaction.
I also look at the view developed by Ronald de Sousa in The Eat/ona//tyof
Emotion (de Sousa 1987). According to this view, our emotion concepts are fixed by
paradigm scenarios, which are first determined by our biology, and later informed by
our culture. According to de Sousa, when we experience an emotion we see the object
of our emotion as having certain features in common with a suitable paradigm. The
paradigm is brought to mind, and we then react in specific ways (ways that are
congruent with the paradigm). The emotion is rational when the object that invoked the
paradigm objectively resembles the paradigm.
While I think that de Sousa’s view is novel, and that the whole project of
investigating the “truth” of an emotion is interesting, I am skeptical of its overall value.
I believe that emotions play a special motivational role, so it is unwise to put them up to
such a high standard (the standard of truth). Emotions do not have to “get it right”
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(unlike beliefs, say, which in some sense aim at truth). Emotions, it might be thought,
are not responsible for accurately representing their object in the same way that beliefs
are responsible. For, at least some emotions are set up to push us to react quickly. If
this is the case, then I believe we should focus our efforts on developing a view of
emotional justification rather than emotional truth.
I close Chapter 5 by developing a view of emotional justification that takes its
inspiration from externalist accounts of beliefjustification. Emotions are justified when
they are produced by reliable emotion producing mechanisms. In some cases,
emotional mechanisms will be triggered by stimuli that do not in fact have the
properties the emotion represents them as having. In these cases the emotion may well
be untrue, but nonetheless justified.
In the final chapter I bring all of these considerations to bear on the question of
whether the fear of death is rational. As I have shown that reductive accounts of
emotional rationality are unacceptable, I argue that philosophers who make use of these
concepts in their discussions of the fear of death have employed the wrong evaluative
concepts. For example, even though the extant writings of the Epicureans do not
provide us with a very robust philosophy of mind, it seems as if Epicurus and Lucretius
defend something like the cognitive theory of emotion. Emotions are irrational (they
prefer to describe them as ‘empty' ) when they presuppose a false and dangerous belief.
As I do not think that this is the best way to criticize emotions, I suggest that the
Epicurean arguments are unsuccessful.
In the remainder of Chapter 6, I focus my efforts on non-reductive views of
emotional rationality. While I do think that emotional justification is a more interesting
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concept than emotional truth, evaluating emotions for their truth is an endeavor that we
often undertake, so 1 think it is worthwhile to investigate the verdict that s?//non-
reductive views yield about the rationality of the fear of death.
Not only do I consider different evaluative concepts in this section, but I also
consider different objects. The two objects that I discuss are what I take to be the most
commonly discussed objects in the philosophical literature on the fear of death: the fear
of death as the fear of one's own nonexistence, and the fear of death as the fear of
death’s deprivations.
I will show that, even on more reasonable accounts of emotional rationality, the
fear of the state of affairs that consists of our own nonexistence is irrational. It is false,
and it is unjustified. After having established that position, I turn my attention to the
state of affairs that consists in our being deprived of the goods of life. My reasons for
turning my attention to this object are two: first, I think that some people who fear death
fear this object. It will be worthwhile to see whether it is irrational. Second, many
philosophers have defended the deprivation approach to the evil of death. According to
this view, death is extrinsically harmful provided it makes the person who died
intrinsically worse off than she otherwise would have been. If death’s deprivations are
indeed a harm, then perhaps fearing death’s deprivations is a true (or at least justified)
emotion.
I argue, however, that even if death is a harm, fearing death is not thereby true.
I suggest that fear is a true emotion if and only if its object is harmful, dangerous,
threatening, and so forth. Death's deprivations may well be harmful, but I do not
9
believe that they are dangerous or threatening. It seems, then, that fearing death's
deprivations is a false emotion.
For those who are unwilling to abandon the thought that the fear of death is
rational, at least according to some kind of rationality, I believe that there is room to
accommodate that position. And, I believe that this room is created by the very theory
of emotional justification that 1 presented in Chapter 5. According to this theory
emotions are justified if they are produced by reliable emotion producing mechanisms.
These mechanisms are sometimes triggered by states of affairs that do not have the
properties that our emotions represent them as having. The emotions are false, but
nonetheless justified insofar as they are the product of reliable mechanisms. I believe
that, at least in some instances, the fear of death's deprivations may be like this. We
sometimes perceive our own premature death as a harm, and do so because we can
imagine how things could have otherwise gone. Perceiving some state of affairs as a
future harm is, I suspect, one stimulus that activates the fear producing mechanism in
the brain. That the mechanism has been triggered in this way does not guarantee that
the resulting emotion is an accurate representation of its object, but I do think that it
guarantees that the emotion is justified. The reason for this is that fears that are
triggered by future potential harms are more likely to be true than not. Thus, in some
cases the fear of death will be justified, even if untrue.
As I noted at the outset, I do not believe that this dissertation will be the final
word on the rationality of the fear of death. I do think, however, that it is interesting to
reconsider the debate in light of some of the advances that have been made in the
philosophical and psychological literature on the emotions.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NATURE OF EMOTION
Introduction
A survey of the philosophical literature on emotion will illustrate two very
important features of the work done on the nature of emotion: (1) it is abundant; and (2) it
is bursting with disagreement. Even within certain camps, there is substantial
disagreement about what aspects are essential to emotions, and what are merely
accidental. Some have even argued that emotions are so diverse that they do not
represent a kind, and so theorizing about them is a fruitless endeavor (Griffiths, 1997).
Leaving this last issue aside, I will proceed in this chapter under the assumption that we
can talk meaningfully about the nature of emotion. I will present and critically discuss
(what I take to be) two of the leading theories in the literature today: the cognitive theory,
and the perceptual theory.
My goal in this chapter is not only to familiarize the reader with certain theories
about the nature of emotion, but also to point out that these theories have been
presupposed by philosophers who work on the rationality of emotion. Specific accounts
of emotional rationality are most naturally coupled with specific theories of emotion. If
we have reason to doubt the acceptability of specific theories about the nature of emotion,
then I believe that that casts doubt on the acceptability of certain accounts of emotional
rationality.
The overall structure of this chapter is as follows. I begin with some conceptual
background that is, for the most part, widely accepted among philosophers who work on
the emotions. In section 2, 1 present the cognitive theory and discuss various objections
to it. I also argue that a modified version of the theory, defended by Robert Solomon, is
unacceptable. In section 3, 1 turn to the perceptual theory of emotion, which seems better
equipped at dealing with the worries that were raised against the cognitive theory. In this
section I look closely at two versions: Ronald de Sousa's and Jesse Prinz's. While I am
unwilling to outright endorse any of these theories, I am inclined to agree that something
like the perceptual theory of emotion is true.
Conceptual Background
Before I discuss the three main theories, I will present two conceptual
assumptions under which I operate. I do not think that I am advancing anything too
controversial in this section, so I will not devote considerable space to defending the two
claims.
Moods and Emotions
It is widely accepted that emotions are to be distinguished from moods. 1 Moods
are more akin to generalized anxieties and upsets. Consider an everyday example: you
get up in the morning and are happy, but about nothing in particular. Your positive mood
is not of, at, or about anything. In this case, it seems unusual to say of you that you are
experiencing an emotion. It is odd to say that you are experiencing the same type of
thing that you experience when, for instance, you see an old friend whom you have not
seen in years. Although your good mood may be like a positive emotion in many
respects, particularly with respect to the way that it feels (though perhaps the mood
Many philosophers also wish to distinguish between emotions and mere startles.
Startles, it might be argued, are not rich enough to constitute a genuine emotional
experience. In opposition to this view, Jennifer Robinson (Robinson 2003) argues that
the startle response provides a nice model for understanding emotions generally.
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differs in its intensity), many think (and I agree) that moods are sufficiently dissimilar
from emotions so as to constitute their own category.
The reason why the state of affairs that consists ofyour beingp/easedabout
nothing inparticular s properly called a mood and not an emotion is that it is aimed at
nothing in particular. There is no object that your feeling is of, at, or about. Ronald de
Sousa makes the distinction between moods and emotions on the same grounds. He says,
“Objectless emotions share many properties with other emotions, especially in their
physiological and motivational aspects, but they might properly be classified as moods
rather than full-fledged emotions'’ (de Sousa 2003). Robert Roberts says something
very similar: “Exuberant delight, if it is so generalized as not to be “about”
anything. . .will not fit the account (of emotion), but it seems to me useful to distinguish
this kind of state of mind from emotions proper and call it ‘mood’” (Roberts 2003, 64).
My first assumption, then, concerns the intentionality of emotion-- all emotions are about
something.
I realize that my defense of this is somewhat weak: it is based on the (plausible)
intuition that the kind of thing one experiences when one is pleased about nothing in
particular is different from the kind of thing one experiences when one is pleased about
something. If you dislike this distinction, if you think that emotions and moods are of the
same kind, then I encourage you to understand this chapter’s discussion to be about the
nature of object directed emotions.
The Nature of Objects
Supposing that all emotions take objects, it might be useful to say something
about the nature of these objects. Giving an account of their nature, however, is
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somewhat difficult. Some have claimed that emotions such as love, hate, or fear take
people or other non-propositional entities as their objects. 2 In opposition to this view,
one might claim that the object of an emotion will always be propositional in nature.
There are compelling reasons in favor of each of the views. But the reasons for one are
different from the reasons for the other. When you love a person, for example, the object
of your love seems not to be a proposition or a set of propositions about that person.
Rather, it is the actual person. On the other hand, there are cases in which the object of
an emotion is fictional or imaginary. A child’s fear of the boogeyman, for example,
points to an imaginary being. If we claim that emotions always take material entities and
not propositions (or some other abstract entity) as their object, then our theory of
emotions will imply that imaginary or fictional entities are real.
How are we to resolve this difficulty? Overall, I find no problem with accepting
some hybrid view according to which emotions sometimes take abstract entities as their
objects, and they sometimes take material entities as their objects. This issue is one that
arises several times throughout this dissertation, particularly in Chapter 3. Rather than
lingering, then, I will now proceed to my discussion of the first theory: the cognitive
theory of emotion.
The Cognitive Theory' of Emotion
One of the central divides in the philosophical literature on the nature of emotion
concerns the issue of whether every emotion has a belief or some other relevantly similar
cognition as a necessary constituent. The cognitive theory of emotion answers this
question in the affirmative. This theory (or, rather, cluster of theories) maintains that
“ See Solomon (2003); Greenspan (1988); Roberts (2003).
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cognitions are central to all emotional experiences. ' On some versions of the theory, each
token emotion is one evaluative belief; on others, experiencing an emotion entails
forming an evaluative belief.
4
Roughly speaking, my believing that the large black dog is
dangerous to me is central to my fearing him, and my believing that my friend is
inconsiderate is central to my being angry with her.
Most defenders of the cognitive theory advance a second thesis, according to
which emotions are type-identified by their constitutive beliefs. Thus, that I believe the
large black dog to be dangerous, rather than undeserving of some good, explains why I
fear rather than resent it.
It should also be noted that the role that the evaluative beliefs have played in these
theories has varied widely. Some advance a rather simple version of the theory,
according to which an evaluative belief is both necessary and sufficient for emotion; 5
some have modified the theory to include desires;6 and others have added physiological
changes that are caused by the constitutive cognition.
7 On some versions of the theory,
then, my anger at my friend for revealing my secrets just is my judgment that my friend
was inconsiderate; on others it is my judgment plus the desire that my friends not treat me
in this way; and on others it is my judgment plus some abnormal physiological changes
that are caused by the judgment.
3
The word ‘cognition' is not well defined. In this chapter, I will use it to refer to mental
states such as belief or judgment.
4
See Kenny (1963); Solomon (1977); Lyons (1980); Greenspan (1988); Neu (2000);
Nussbaum (2001) Roberts (2003); and Solomon (2003) for variants of this theory.
5 Kenny (1963) is commonly thought to have started the movement; see also Solomon
(1977) and Neu (2000).
6
See Marks (1982) and Taylor (1984).
7
See Lyons (1980) and Davis (1988).
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Cognitive theories, which are sometimes referred to as ‘propositional attitude
O Q
theories,’ or ‘appraisal theories,’ grew in popularity as a result of mounting
dissatisfaction with feeling theories of emotion. Emotions, according to feeling theories,
are events that are characterized by feelings of varying intensities and qualities, and it is
by appeal to the feels of the emotions that we identify the types that they are. Thus fear
just is an introspective feeling with some intensity, and it is distinguished from anger
insofar as it does not feel the way that anger feels.
One problem with feeling theories is that they imply that emotions are immune
from rational criticism: feelings are not the right sort of thing to criticize for their
rationality. The cognitive theory does provide adequate structure for rational criticism.
Emotions involve beliefs on this theory, and beliefs, unlike feelings, are the right kind of
thing to evaluate for their rationality.
Some have also argued against the feeling theory (and in favor of the cognitive
theory) on the grounds that different emotions can be produced by the same kinds of non-
cognitive physiological changes in the body. Individuals who advance this objection
maintain that the kind of emotion one experiences depends on the ways in which the
physiological changes are i/iferpreted. If the feeling theory is true, then this is
impossible. There is a well-known study by Schachter and Singer (Schachter and Singer,
1962) that is often used to support the view that non-cognitive physiological changes are
insufficient for distinguishing among various kinds of emotional responses. In this
experiment subjects were asked to sit in a waiting room at an eye doctor’s office and
were (unbeknownst to some) artificially stimulated by adrenaline. While they were
8 See Griffiths (1997).
9
See LeDoux (1996).
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waiting, some of the subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire that had inquiries
about their own mother's infidelities. A confederate, who acted agitated and annoyed by
the questionnaire, was placed among these individuals. In a second group, there was no
questionnaire, and these subjects were in the presence of a jovial confederate. While
subjects in both groups ingested the same amount of adrenaline, and so experienced
identical physiological changes, the first group exhibited signs of anger, and the second
signs of euphoria. The results of the study were interpreted as showing that the type of
emotion one had depended on the beliefs they had formed based on the situations they
were in, and not some introspective feeling. Jesse Prinz describes the results of the study
as follows:
Schachter and Singer use these results to argue that emotion depends on
interpretation of bodily states. They say that bodily states produced by the
injection are the same for all subjects, but they are interpreted as signs of
anger by some, as signs of euphoria by others, and as mere drug side
effects by others. Context and background knowledge are used to label
bodily sates, and the labeling process is presumed to be cognitive (Prinz
13
,
2004 ).
There is good reason to believe, however, that the subjects were assigning a label to their
feeling based on their surroundings, and they were not really experiencing the emotions
they reported. This phenomenon is called ‘confabulation.’ When we do not know what
emotion we are experiencing, only that we are aroused, we typically assign an emotion
based on what is going on around us in an effort to explain our arousal. In these cases
we are not genuinely experiencing the emotions; we are just labeling our arousals. Thus
very few philosophers and psychologists today believe that the Schachter/Singer
experiments do in fact establish what cognitive theorists often claim it has established.
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While this experiment is widely thought not to establish the truth of the cognitive
theory, the theory has nonetheless garnered significant support from philosophers in the
last twenty years. Moreover, the Epicureans, who are key figures in philosophical
discussions on death, seem to presuppose something like the cognitive theory in their
arguments. It will be worthwhile, then, to consider what this theory implies about the
nature of fear.
According to the cognitive version of fear, whenever one experiences fear one
has the belief (or makes the judgment) that something is harmful, dangerous,
threatening, and so on. While the cognitive theorist may grant that there are other
aspects involved, such as the desire not to be harmed, or special non-cognitive
physiological changes, he is committed to one essential feature: the emotion is
constituted by the belief that the object is frightening, dangerous, and/or harmful.
I am operating under the plausible assumption that the judgment (belief) that is a
constituent of fear is one in a range of evaluations associated with fear. Other
judgments that fall in this range may include the judgment that something is mean, cruel,
terrifying, and so forth. This suggestion, which I do not think is made by cognitive
theorists, must be accepted if the theory is going to be at all plausible. Consider: you are
out running on a deserted country road when a ferocious dog approaches you. You are
afraid of the dog. According to the cognitive theory, your fear involves (at least) an
evaluative belief about the dog. Let us suppose that you believed that it might be a
threat to your well-being, but nothing more. Surely you could have just as easily
believed that the dog was terrifying. If you had, would it have been the case that your
emotion was of a different type? I suspect not. It is more reasonable to suppose, then.
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that you can judge the dog to be terrifying, or a threat to your well-being, and still
experience fear in both cases. It is for this reason that the evaluative judgments that are
a constituent of the emotion must be one (or several, 1 suppose) in a range of
judgments. 10
Some of the remarks I have made about fear apply equally well to other
emotions. For example, when 1 saw my sister after months of separation, I believed that
it was wonderful to see her. and 1 felt happy to see her. According to the cognitive
theorist, my experience of happiness on that occasion was necessarily constituted by a
belief about the state of affairs that consisted ofmy sister's much awaited return.
Perhaps I believed that it was wonderful to see her. Furthermore, this belief is a belief
that falls in the range of beliefs associated with happiness. Perhaps the belief that
something is good, delightful, beautiful, and so forth, also fall within this range.
Objections to the Cognitive Theory
I will now turn to problems for the cognitive theory. According to the first
objection, cognitive theories cannot account for the non-cognitive physiological changes
that are necessary constituents of emotional experiences. Joseph LeDoux (LeDoux 1996)
argues that “...appraisal theories overemphasized the contribution of cognitive processes
in emotion, thereby diminishing the distinction between emotion and cognition... in
emphasizing cognition as the explanation of emotion the unique aspects of emotion that
have traditionally distinguished it from cognition are left behind" (LeDoux 1996, 52). In
other words, if the cognitive theory (or any other “appraisal theory”) is true, then there is
10
It is important to notice that the judgments in the range are somewhat related—they all
seem to make reference to the concept of harm. So, although fear admits various
judgments, not any judgment will do.
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no difference between emotion and cognition. But there is a difference: emotions are
constituted in part by non-cognitive physiological aspects that are absent in mere
cognition. This leads one to conclude that cognitive theories do not provide a sufficient
account of emotional experience. It makes emotions “too intellectual.”
My second objection, which I take from D’Arms and Dan Jacobson (D'Arms and
Jacobson 2003), is that cognitive theories cannot explain the possibility of “recalcitrant
emotions.” Suppose that emotion, E, typically has evaluative belief, B, associated with it.
An emotion is recalcitrant when an agent has E but believes ~B. D’Arms and Jacobson
characterize this phenomenon as follows:
The objection is that judgmentalism does not permit one’s emotions to
conflict with one’s considered judgment; yet such a conflict is a familiar
psychological phenomenon. We will say that such an emotion is
reca/a/ran/vjhzn it exists despite the agent’s making a judgment that is in
tension with it...A recalcitrant bout of fear, for example, is one where the
agent is afraid of something despite believing that it poses little or no
danger. Anger, guilt, shame, and jealousy also supply familiar examples
of emotional recalcitrance, since one can seemingly feel any of these
emotions while sincerely rejecting the judgments typically associated with
them (D'Arms and Jacobson 2003, 129).
According to the cognitive theory, each emotional episode involves a judgment
about the object of the emotion. When I fear something, this at least requires that I
believe that the object of my emotion is dangerous. D'Arms and Jacobson’s point is that,
in some cases, when I experience fear 1 do not endorse the judgments that are required for
my fear. For example, 1 may fear a tiny spider even though I positively believe the spider
to be harmless. If the phenomenon described by D’Arms and Jacobson is a genuine
possibility, then we can have an emotion even though we do not make the judgments that
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are implied by, or constitutive of, our emotions. If this is a possibility, then the cognitive
theory is false.
Even ifwe could give a satisfying response to the objection from emotional
recalcitrance (I believe that we cannot), there is a third problem for cognitive theorists.
Some philosophers and psychologists claim that emotional experiences could occur
without the formation of ^wj'beliefs about the object of the emotion. Consider Joseph
LeDoux's theory, according to which conscious emotional experiences are the result of a
number of mechanisms operating in response to a stimulus in the environment. He
includes the following in his system: (1) an emotion-specific mechanism in the brain that
produces “behavioral, autonomic, and hormonal responses,” (2) “cortical sensory buffers
that hold on to information about the currently present stimuli,” (3) a working memory
that keeps track of the short-term buffers and interprets the content by comparing it with
data in the long-term memory, and (4) some bodily feedback
—
“somatic and visceral
information that returns to the brain during an act of emotional responding” (LeDoux
1996, 296). LeDoux also maintains that it is only after we become aware that our
“emotion producing mechanism” is engaged that we have a conscious emotional
experience.
For LeDoux, these components are necessary and jointly sufficient for the
conscious experience of an emotion. However, notice that at no point does an individual
have to form a be/ie/about the object of his emotion in order for these mechanisms to
engage. If Le Doux is correct about this, then we can not only have emotions that are in
tension with our commonly held beliefs, but also have conscious emotional experiences
without any belief at all.
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Some Solutions and Solomon’s Theory
In this section I address some of the objections raised above. I begin by
responding to the first objection, that cognitive theories ignore the non-cognitive
physiological aspect of emotions, by arguing that very few philosophers have ever
endorsed the theory at which the first objection is raised. It is a straw man objection.
This provides a nice transition into the second part of this section: Robert Solomon’s
modified version of the cognitive theory. His theory was designed to respond to this very
objection. Solomon agrees that emotions are judgments, but in his effort to pay attention
to bodily aspect of emotion, he makes use of a very unique concept ofjudgment. I close
by discussing objections two and three in greater detail. I maintain that, although there is
some room available to the cognitive theorist, these objections are ultimately devastating.
With respect to the first objection, I believe that it is aimed at a very specific, and
extremely implausible, version of the cognitive theory. It is aimed at the version that
maintains that beliefs are necessary andsufficient for emotional experiences. There are
several versions of the theory that admit feelings and desires, and these theories can
easily accommodate the view that non-cognitive physiological changes are essential parts
of emotional experiences. They can do so, in fact, without losing the spirit of the
cognitive theory.
Robert Solomon (Solomon 2003), for instance, develops a cognitive theory of
emotion that does not identify emotions with beliefs. Solomon states that, “Belief isn’t
the right sort of psychological entity to consr/fure emotion. Beliefs are necessarily
dispositions, but an emotion is, at least in part, an experience. A belief as such is not ever
experienced” (Solomon 2003, 4). Later he says, “Thus emotions are like judgments, and
emotions necessarily involve judgments. Does this entitle me to say that emotions are
judgments? Well, not by logic alone... but as a heuristic analysis and a way of
understanding the peculiarities of emotion, 1 think so” (Solomon 2003, 1 1). Solomon
essentially reconfigures the concept of a judgment in an effort to explain the non-
cognitive physiological changes that take place during emotional episodes without
abandoning judgmentalism.
Spelling-out Solomon’s account of ‘judgment,’ however, is no easy task.
Nowhere does he give a formal definition of ‘judgment.’ In an effort to give the most
charitable explication of Solomon’s account, I will provide a number of passages in
which he discusses judgments, and then offer an analysis based on these passages.
I find the following to be essential features of emotion and judgment: they
are episodic but possibly long-term as well. They must span the bridge
between conscious and non-conscious awareness. They must accept as
their ‘objects’ both propositions and perceptions. They must be
appropriate both in the presence of their objects and in their absence.
They must involve appraisals and evaluations without necessarily
involving (or excluding) reflective appraisals and evaluations. They must
stimulate thought and encourage beliefs (as well as being founded on
beliefs) without themselves being nothing more than a thought or belief
(Solomon 2003, 1 1).
Thus the judgments that 1 claim are constitutive of emotion may be non-
propositional and bodily as well as propositional and articulate...There are
feelings, ‘affects’ if you like, critical to emotion. But they are not distinct
from cognition or judgment and they are not mere ‘read-outs’ of processes
going on in the body. They are judgments ofihQ body and this is the
‘missing' element in the cognitive theory of emotions (Solomon 2003, 16).
We make non-reflective, non-deliberative, inarticulate judgments, for
instance, kinesthetic judgments, all the time (Solomon 2003, 10).
Elsewhere he says.
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...A great deal of what is unhelpfully called 'affect' and ‘affectivity’ and
is supposedly missing from cognitive accounts can be identified with the
body, or what I will call (no doubt to howls of indignation) theJudgments
ofthe body "(Solomon 2003, 14).
Perhaps Solomon has the following analysis in mind: S judges that X is f if and only if S
appraises X as being f. It is important to realize that S can appraise X as being f either
consciously or unconsciously, with her mind or with her body, and in the absence of X.
This means that judgments can be made either consciously or unconsciously, with the
mind or with the body, and in the absence of the object about which S is making a
judgment. On this analysis, when S fears the dog, S judges that the dog is ferocious; S
can make this judgment consciously or unconsciously, with her mind or with her body,
and in the absence of the dog.
Making this move provides Solomon with the tools to respond to both objections
levied by LeDoux. Solomon, who is unfortunately not entirely clear about what
constitutes a bodily judgment, could respond to the third objection by saying that his
bodily judgments just are the activation of, for example, the fear producing mechanisms.
Beliefs are not the right kind of thing to play the cognitive role, according to Solomon, so
he would surely agree with LeDoux that beliefs are not necessary for emotions. Solomon
could also argue that his theory has indeed paid attention to the non-cognitive
physiological changes, such as accelerated heart rate and changes in body temperature,
because such alterations are themselves judgments.
Unfortunately, these replies come at a cost. Solomon expands to notion of
judgment well beyond its typically understood boundaries. To suggest that our bodies
make judgments is serious misuse of the concept ofjudgment. On a related point.
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Solomon's account of what counts as a judgment is so vague that it is useless. He has
defined 'judgment' is such a loose way that it can accommodate any intuition, and any
empirical discovery, that might be made about emotions.
Solomon's theory is no more successful in its treatment of the objection from
recalcitrant emotions. In response to the objection from recalcitrant emotions, Solomon
would likely maintain that, in some cases, the bodymakes an evaluative judgment, and
bodies can do so without having any accompanying beliefs about the object of the
emotion, or while holding beliefs that are in tension with the bodily judgment. This
response, however, is just as dissatisfying as his earlier response. There is no reason to
think our bodies make judgments. So if he were to respond in this way, he would make
his theory ad hoc.
Finally, it seems to me that Solomon has abandoned the spirit of the cognitive
theory entirely. Solomon claims that emotions sometimes involve some bod//yjudgment,
and that this judgment can take place in the absence of a mental cognition like be/ief. If
this is so, Solomon will be hard pressed to explain how his theory is a descendent of the
cognitive tradition. For Solomon essentially leaves the cognitive theory in favor of some
sort of “body-judgmentalism.”
Although Solomon’s theory was ultimately unsuccessful, perhaps there are other
strategies that the cognitive theorist could employ in an effort to save her theory. Perhaps
she could respond to the objection from emotional recalcitrance by saying that the reason
this objection seems successful is that the cases are under-described. When they are
correctly described, it is not at all obvious that emotional recalcitrance is a genuine
possibility.
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Consider again a case commonly put forth by defenders of emotional
recalcitrance: a person has a fear of flying but believes that flying is the safest method of
transportation.
1
1
If it were the case that the person had a recalcitrant emotion, his mental
landscape would look something like this: he believes that this flight was not going to
crash, that this flight was not going to experience technical difficulties, that this flight
harbored no terrorists, that this flight is not dangerous, and, in spite of these beliefs, he
still experiences fear on that occasion. When the case is re-described in this way, it is not
at all obvious that this is a genuine possibility. For, surely it is reasonable to suppose that
he believes that this flight may crash, and also to suppose that he believes that flying in
genera/'vt, the safest method of transportation. Just so long as he believes that this flight
may be in trouble, his emotion is not recalcitrant.
Although I cannot prove this, I believe that when we adequately explain many of
the cases, we can see that the agent experiencing the emotion did, in fact, make the
appropriate evaluative judgments. While I do think that the defender of the cognitive
theory can make use of this move, I still believe that there is at least one case of
emotional recalcitrance, and that is all that is necessary to show that the cognitive theory
is false.
12
Perhaps I am deathly afraid of ghosts whenever I wander around my attic, but
since 1 am not a substance dualist, I do not believe that there are substances in addition to
material substances (and I believe that if there were any ghosts, they would be
immaterial). 1 go into my attic one evening, 1 am terrified of the ghosts, and yet I do not
believe in ghosts. Surely my fear of ghosts is a recalcitrant emotion.
1
1
D'Arms and Jacobson (2003).
12
1 explain this point in greater detail in Chapter 3.
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The third objection, which states that we sometimes experience emotions
without any evaluative belief about the object of the emotion, may initially seem to be no
great threat when we admit the possibility of non-conscious beliefs. The cognitive
theorist can argue that, in cases where we seem not to have formed any evaluative beliefs
about the objects of our emotions, we have in fact formed them, but have done so
i/nconscious(v. We have a very rich and varied stock of unconscious beliefs, and these
beliefs satisfy the cognitive component of the emotion just as well as conscious beliefs
do. Therefore, the fact that we do not have an occurent belief about the object of our
emotion does not show that there is no belief at all.
I agree that it is likely that there are numerous cases in which an agent has an
emotion and also has an unconscious belief about the object of his emotion. However,
the appeal to unconscious beliefs will not always be a very satisfying response. In some
cases, it will be highly implausible to suppose that the belief, even an unconscious belief,
is present. Consider: you are firmly convinced that little black bugs will not harm you,
and your behavior in your day to day life reflects this conviction. Nonetheless, when the
little black bug was crawling on your arm you were terrified. Why think that you still
hold the (unconscious) belief that little black bugs will harm you? Without evidence for
the presence of unconscious beliefs in cases such as this, I see no reason to suppose that
they are present.
Even though there are some resources available to the cognitive theorist, I believe
that the theory is unsalvageable. This is an important point, for I later discuss a theory of
emotional rationality that presupposes the truth of the cognitive theory. As the cognitive
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theory is false, perhaps that gives us reason to think that the theory of emotional
rationality that presupposes the cognitive theory is also false.
Perceptual Theory' of Emotion
For those who are dissatisfied with the cognitive theory, there is a second theory,
the perceptual theory, which seems better equipped at dealing with some of the troubles
that confronted the cognitive theory. In this section, I first present a very standard version
of this theory, and I explain how that version is not susceptible to the objections raised
against the cognitive theory. I then go on to discuss two more developed versions, one of
which is defended by Ronald de Sousa, and the other by Jesse Prinz. While I am not
convinced that any of these theories (as they are currently stated) are correct, I do think
that they are able to provide a better account of the nature of emotion than cognitive
theories.
Christine Tappolet (Tappolet 2005) provides the most straightforward statement
of the perceptual theory of emotion: “Recently, there has been more and more support of
a perceptual account of emotions, accordingto which emotions can de la/cen lo he
percepf/ons ofva/ues. . .On this account, an emotion like fear has correctness conditions
that are similar to the correctness conditions of perceptual states. Fear is correct or
appropriate in so far as its object really is dangerous” (Tappolet 2005, 229 [my italics]).
This is a good starting point. Emotions are perceptions of value. However, a clear
understanding of this view requires an account of perception. Unfortunately, this is a
very difficult question. Rather than delve too deeply into the nature of perception, I will
instead discuss one view that is most naturally presupposed by the perceptual theory of
emotion.
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The most obvious candidate, 1 believe, is what has been called the Tntentionalist
Theory.' In (Crane 2005) Tim Crane explains this theory as follows, “The intentional
theory of perception treats perceptual experience as a form of intentionality or mental
representation...An intentional state is normally understood... as one which is about, or
represents, something in the world” (Crane 2005, 14). Perceptions are mental states that
are representations of whatever it is that one perceives. If a defender of the perceptual
theory were to adopt this view of perception, emotions would be intentional states (they
would be representations), and what they represent would be va/ue.
What, now, is meant by representation? How do perceptions represent their
objects? One suggestion discussed by Crane is that the representation comes in the form
of a be/tef. According to this view of perception, having a perception is just acquiring a
belief. However, philosophers interested in defending the perceptual theory of emotion
should be reluctant to endorse the belief theory of perception. There are two reasons for
this. First, in order for the perceptual theory of emotion to be a genuine alternative to the
cognitive theory, it must be the case that perceptions are not beliefs. If the belief theory
of perception is employed in the perceptual theory of emotion, it seems as if the
perceptual theory and the cognitive theory of emotion are equivalent. Second, and more
substantive, the belief theory of perception cannot explain the tensions that sometimes
arise between perceptions and beliefs. About this second worry, Crane says the
following:
The belief theory of perception... is a specific version of the intentional
theory. But it is not the most widely accepted version. Everyone will
agree that perception does give rise to beliefs about the environment. But
this does not mean that perception simply is the acquisition of belief. One
obvious reason why it isn't, discussed by Armstrong, is that one can have
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perceptual illusion that things are a certain way even when one knows they
are not (Crane 1 5, 2005).
The belief theory of perception is unable to account for the existence of perceptions that
are in tension with firmly held beliefs. To adopt the language used earlier, these
perceptions are reca/ci/ranfperceptions. Since the belief theory of perception falls victim
to the objection from recalcitrant perceptions, it is not the “most widely accepted version”
of the intentional theory. I am not here going to state what kind of representation is the
kind of representation involved in perception; I believe that it is sufficient for the purpose
of this project merely to say that it is not belief. I will now move to the question of
content.
Since a perception just is a representation—an intentional state—it has content.
According to standard views of intentionality, all intentional states are propositional
attitudes. They are mental attitudes whose content is a proposition with a definitive truth-
value. On this view, perceiving the red apple just is the having of a propositional
attitude, perceiving, whose content is the proposition fhaf /here is an app/e de/ore me.
But must it be the case that perceptions, and therefore emotions, are merely propositional
attitudes? That is, if we adopt the intentional theory of perception, and thereby assume
that emotions are representations, must it be the case that emotions are essentially
propositional attitudes? Or, does it make sense to talk of intentional states that are not
propositional attitudes?
I believe that it does. 1 believe that perceptions can be intentional states without
being propositional attitudes. Crane agrees with my characterization, and uses intentional
states such as love and hate to defend his position. He says, “For one thing, it is
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controversial whether all intentional states are propositional attitudes...Among the
intentional phenomena there are relations like love and hate which do not have
propositional content; and there are also non-relational states expressed by the so-called
“intensional transitive" verbs like seek,/ear, expect. ..All of these states of mind have
contents which are not, on the face of it, assessable as true or false" (Crane 2005, 16).
How this applies to the perceptual theory of emotion is as follows: according to
the perceptual theory (or, at least one version of the theory), emotions are perceptions of
value. Perceptions, I have suggested, should be understood according to the intentional
theory of perception. On this view, perceptions are representations. I have said that,
while some philosophers are inclined to think that the relevant representation here is
be/te/ it does not have to be. 1 have also said that, even though some philosophers treat
all intentional states as propositional attitudes (a mental state that has content assessable
for truth-value), there is reason to think that some intentional states are not propositional
attitudes. Emotions, if they are perceptions, may be one such example. On the version of
the perceptual theory of emotion that I have presented here, emotions are intentional
states whose contents can be, but need not be, propositional in nature.
There is one final feature of the perceptual theory that requires further
elaboration. According to the theory 1 have been developing, emotions are perceptions of
va/ue. With respect to the va/ue that we are meant to perceive, I suspect that defenders of
the perceptual theory of emotion believe that there are evaluative properties that attach to
states of affairs, such as the properties of being dangerous, being disgusting, being
joyous. Perhaps these properties somehow supervene on lower-level properties. I am not
in a position to say much about the nature of these properties. 1 will assume, however.
31
that most defenders of the perceptual theory maintain that they are mind independent. 13
My fearing the snake in the grass just is my perceiving the state of affairs that consists in
the snake's being in the grass as having the property of being dangerous.
This feature of the perceptual theory is, perhaps, the theory’s most problematic.
We cannot see the property of being dangerous, we can only see sharp teeth and
slithering bodies. How, then, are we to represent these values if they are unobservable?
In the last two sections of this chapter I discuss two theories, one of which provides a
rather interesting solution to this problem. Before I address that problem, however, I
will attempt to explain the ways in which the perceptual theory deals with the objections
raised against the cognitive theory.
Perceptual Theory vs. Cognitive Theory
If one were to employ the non-belief version of the intentional view of perception
in her perceptual theory of emotion, she has an obvious response to the objection from
emotional recalcitrance. Emotions are perceptions—representations—but not beliefs.
Individuals can have emotions that are in tension with firmly held beliefs. By way of
illustration consider the well-known Muller-Lyer illusion. This illusion is a paradigm
illustration of the possibility of one’s having a perceptual experience that is inconsistent
with one’s beliefs:
> <
Our perceptual experience in this case indicates that the top line with the inward pointing
arrows is longer than the bottom line with the outward pointing arrows. Moreover, this
13 De Sousa is one exception to this characterization. I discuss his view later.
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perception persists even though we have the belief that the two lines are the same length.
If this tension is acceptable, then the perceptual theory of emotion can easily explain how
we could have emotions in the face of beliefs that are contrary to the emotion. Suppose,
for example, that I feared a tiny bug despite the fact that I believed it to be harmless. The
reason that this is possible is that we can represent the spider as being dangerous without
the representation coming in the form of a belief. As you recall, the cognitive theory
insisted that the representation came in the form of the belief, and was, for that reason,
refuted by the objection from emotional recalcitrance . 14
This explanation also provides defenders of the perceptual theory with the tools to
respond to the third objection, that emotions can occur without the formation of any
beliefs. If one tried to raise this objection against the perceptual theory of emotion, the
perceptual theorist can easily account for the possibility of emotions without beliefs.
Emotions are perceptions, and perceptions are suigeuerus. That is, they do not reduce to,
or are explained in terms of beliefs. And, with respect to the worry that emotional
theories must pay heed to the non-cognitive physiological changes, I believe that the
perceptual theory can easily accommodate this worry. The perception of value is like any
other perception— it is felt. Since these feelings typically involve the activation of non-
cognitive physiological systems, these aspects of emotional situations are not ignored. It
seems, then, that the perceptual theorist is able to respond to the objections raised against
the cognitive theorist.
In the final two sections I will look closely at two different versions of the
perceptual theory. The first, advanced by Ronald de Sousa, will be of particular
14
This fact about emotion also seems to suggest that emotions are encapsulated in the
sense that beliefs cannot easily penetrate the representation.
33
importance as I discuss his theory of emotional rationality at great length in Chapter 4 of
this dissertation. The second, developed by Jesse Prinz, provides an insightful and
extremely well developed account of the perceptual theory of emotion.
Ronald de Sousa’s Perceptual Theory
In (de Sousa 1987) de Sousa seems reluctant to outright endorse a perceptual
theory of emotion, while in (de Sousa 2003) we see a marked departure from that original
position. In this section I discuss both views: the first because it is in de Sousa’s 1987
work that we find a very developed view of emotional rationality, the second because it
is, of course, the more recent of the two.
De Sousa, rather then offering an analysis of the nature of emotion, prefers to
understand emotions by way of analogies with beliefs, desires, and perceptions. He says,
“I concede that I am unable to give a definition of emotion...my strategy will be to try as
much as possible to understand emotions in terms of analogies with belief, want, and
especially perception” (de Sousa 1987, 19). He later says that, “The thesis I am driving
at is this. The ways in which emotions are subjective do not sufficiently undermine the
analogy of perception to exclude a significant claim to objectivity. Emotions can indeed
be viewed as providing genuine information. But the ana/og}' is notso c/ose as to
warrant the ass/mt/ation ofemot/ons toperception, any more than to he/tefs or c/esire
^
(de Sousa 1987, 149 [my italics]). For the sake of simplicity, I will focus my attention on
his discussion of the analogy with perception in this chapter.
His reluctance to identify emotions with perceptions is explained by the fact that
he sees emotions as being more subjective than perceptions. Emotions, unlike ordinary
sensory perceptions, are sensitive to one's current beliefs and desires, as well as one's
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social and ideological factors (de Sousa 1987. 152). That they are sensitive in this way is
directly connected with the fact that there is no "emotion specific organ" that gives rise to
emotions. De Sousa says. “The consequence of our having no organ of emotion can now
be seen more clearly: emotions are typically susceptible to the whole gamut of factors
ranging form (1) to (5). At first sight, all this would certainly seem to make the case for
emotional subjectivity in the sense of relativity" (de Sousa 1987, 153). The factors to
which he refers are used to explain (or, can explain) variations in sensations. They are,
“(1) variations in (some subset of) the intrinsic or primary properties of the object, but
also from (2) environmental factors (conditions of light, temperature, and so forth), (3)
your physiological apparatus and its condition, (4) your experiential history and current
beliefs and desires, and even (5) social and ideological factors” (de Sousa 1987, 152). De
Sousa maintains that, under ordinary conditions, factors (2) to (5) do not impact
sensations. Since all factors contribute to one’s emotional experiences, emotions are
more subjective than ordinary perceptual experiences, such as visual experiences.
While he agrees that emotions are more subjective, he admits, on the other hand,
that emotions are like perceptions in that they are perspect/va/and, unlike beliefs, cannot
be bypotbet/cadv adopted. He says, “I now want to argue that emotions belong to a
broader class of att/tudes, which share with beliefs a lack of specific organs and
consequent encapsulation but share with perception the feature that they must be in some
sense essentially perspectival. Like perception, but unlike belief, an attitude is something
one cannot hypothetically adopt” (de Sousa 1987, 156).
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While it is clear that he is unwilling to accept an outright assimilation of emotion
to perception in his 1987 work, in a later paper (de Sousa 2002) it appears as if de Sousa
is more willing to endorse the perceptual theory of emotion:
Take, for example, the classic thought experiment in Mencius: you see a
child about to fall into a well, and your apprehension of the situation
immediately moves you, and you want to save the child. In this instance,
what is apprehendedis /he needio in/eri’ene. Or better it is the nature of
the total situation, in which the need io in/ervene roughly sums up the
supervenient valence. Yet it is not impossible to witness the scene without
being moved thus. Anyone whose experience lacks the appropriate
valence, however, may be said to have an objectively false emotion. This
way of describing the situation avoids simple projectionism, insofar as
what /perceive is not merely /he shadow ofmy own response, hut
something in the character of the situation (de Sousa 2002, 255 [my
italics]).
In this passage, de Sousa seems to defend the type of perceptual theory that I introduced
at the start of this section. He says that I “apprehend” some feature of the situation, and
maintains that what I “perceive” is not merely a “shadow ofmy own response” but rather
“something in the character of the situation” that is a part of “multidimensional landscape
of values.”
The feature of the situation that one apprehends is what de Sousa calls the formal
property (or sometimes formal object) of the target (the actual particular at which the
emotion is directed). The property of being disgusting is the formal object of disgust, and
the property of being frightening is the formal object of fear. On this view, when we
experience an emotion such as fear or disgust, we “apprehend” the situations that give
rise to these emotions as having these properties. Moreover, de Sousa maintains that the
reason we experience fear (rather than, say, disgust) is that we apprehend the situation as
resembling the paradigm of fear. For de Sousa, emotion terms are defined by reference
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to a paradigm scenario: when we "see” a situation that resembles a paradigm, we
experience the emotion whose paradigm the situation brought to mind.
In Chapter 5 I say more about de Sousa's use of paradigm scenarios, which is
central to his theory of emotional rationality. For the purposes of this chapter, I believe I
have said enough to roughly grasp de Sousa's view about the nature of emotion. In
summary, de Sousa defends the view that emotions are perceptions of value (formal
properties). When we have an emotion we apprehend the situation that elicits the
emotion as being relevantly similar to a suitable paradigm scenario. Fearing the wild dog
just is seeing the dog's properties as resembling the paradigm of fear in terms of its
evaluative properties.
Jesse Prinz’s Embodied Appraisal Theory
Jesse Prinz (Prinz 2004) charges de Sousa with defending an inauthentic
perceptual theory of emotion. Prinz maintains that in order for a theory to be genuinely
perceptual, it must be the case that emotions, like other perceptions, are in perceptual
systems. He says,
But de Sousa’s theory fails to qualify as perceptual, because it does not
implicate activity in perceptual input systems.... De Sousa calls emotions
modes of perceiving. But “modes of perceiving” is best interpreted as a
metaphor on de Sousa's account (Prinz 2004, 223).’
5
If emotions are perceptions, literal perceptions, then it must be the case that they are
states in perceptual systems. For Prinz, perceptual states are states in “dedicated input
systems,” where “A dedicated input system is a mental system that has the function of
15
In all fairness to de Sousa, the view Prinz attacks was the view that appeared in 1987.
According to the earlier view, emotions are perceptions, not identical with
perceptions.
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receiving informationfrom the body orthe wor/d\ ia some priority class of transducers
and internal representations... If emotions are literally perceptual, they must reside in
such a system” (Prinz 2004, 222 [my italics]).
As Prinz defends a modem day version of the James-Lange theory of emotion, his
view satisfies the condition just outlined. According to the James-Lange theory, our
bodies register the presence of some relevant object in our environment and then undergo
specific physiological changes are a result of this registering; an emotionJust is the
recognition ofthe change in our bodies. Prinz says, “The embodied appraisal theory that
I have been defending descends from the writings of James and Lange. It qualifies as
perceptual for exactly the same reasons. Emotions are states within systems that are
dedicated to detecting bodily changes” (Prinz 2004, 224). Emotions, then, are states in
somatosensory systems in the body—that is, they are states in input systems that are
meant to register changes in the body.
That emotions must be in input systems is one way to make sense of the claim
that emotions are perceptions. As Prinz points out, however, perceptions can be defined
in two different ways. They can be in perceptual states, and they can be the kind of thing
that picks up on information. He thinks he has addressed the first aspect of perception by
implicating the somatosensory system in emotional experiences. With respect to the
second, he says “The second question also seems trivial on one reading: according to
somatic theories, emotions are ways of perceiving bodily changes. But the embodied
appraisal theory raises a further question. I claim that emotions represent core re/ationai
themes. Changes in the body are the nominal contents of emotions, and core relational
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themes are their real contents... Emotions are perceptions, and they are used to perceive
our relationship to the world” (Prinz 2004, 225 [my italics]).
Prinz takes the notion of core relational themes from Richard Lazarus. A core
relational theme is a “relation that pertains to well-being...they capture basic situations
that emotions are designed to discriminate. Core relational themes encapsulate collection
of more specific appraisals that are explicitly represented” (Prinz 2004, 15). The core
relational theme of anger, according to Lazarus, is a demeaning offense against me and
mine, the core relational theme of fright isfacingan immediate, concrete, and
overwhelmingphysicaldanger. Core relational themes are shorthand appraisals for how
well we are faring. According to Prinz’s view, then, emotions represent how well or
poorly we are doing with respect to our own environment.
The fundamental assumption working behind all of this is that the changes in our
body, the changes that are detected by the somatosensory systems, are reliably caused by
suitable stimuli in the environment. That is, our bodies undergo specific physiological
changes when they are put in danger, and undergo different physiological changes when
in the presence of something disgusting. Prinz says.
Consider the chain of events leading to fear. Something dangerous occurs.
That thing is perceived by the mind. This perception triggers a
constellation of bodily changes. These changes are registered by a further
state: a bodily function. The bodily perception is directly caused by the
bodily changes, but is indirectly caused by danger that started the whole
chain of events. That further state is fear... If this proposal is right, it
shows that emotions can represent core relational themes without
explicitly describing them. Emotions track bodily states that reliably
cooccur with important organism-environment relations (Prinz 2004, 69).
On Prinz's view, then, our minds perceive the presence of something dangerous in our
environment and this sets off a series of physiological changes that are meant to represent
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how well we are faring with respect to our environment. The somatosensory system,
which is an input system meant to register the changes in our body, alerts the mind that
some changes are taking place. Thus individuals perceive, via the somatosensory system,
how well off they are since physiological changes in the body represent (are reliably
caused by) core relational themes. 16
As I mentioned earlier, one of the major problems with the perceptual theory is
that it supposes that evaluative properties, or for Prinz core relational themes, are
observable. Prinz addresses this objection by considering and answering several different
versions of the objection. He notes that one might object that observable properties are
properties that we c/etecl without inference, but detecting core relational themes requires a
lot of mental work, so core relational themes cannot be observable properties. In
response Prinz says, “paradigm cases of perception require a lot of mental work too. On
our best theories of vision, for example, multiple inferences are needed to go from
luminance arrays provided by the eyes to the three-dimensional structural descriptions
provided by higher-level vision” (Prinz 2004, 226).
A second objection that he considers is that the properties one observes when she
experiences an emotion are not really out there insofar as they depend on us. Something
is a loss only if it is a loss to aperson. Since they are not out there, how can we say that
we observe these properties when we experience an emotion? Prinz responds by saying
that many relational properties can be perceived. He gives the example of being about 10
16
It is important to understand that Prinz adopts Dretske’s account of representation
according to which, “a mental representation is a mental state that is reliably caused by
something and has been set in place by learning or evolution to detect that thing...
a
mental representation is a mental state that has been set up \o be setojftby something”
(Prinz 54, 2004).
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feet away. This is a relational property, and it is surely observable. Prinz concludes that
there is no obvious reason why core relational themes are not observable. “If core
relational themes are represented by states in our perceptual systems, as 1 have
maintained, then we should conclude that they are observable properties. We can feel the
offensiveness of external events resonating through our flesh” (Prinz 2004, 227).
In summary, Prinz's view is a version of the perceptual theory in that it implicates
a dedicated input system (the somatosensory system) in emotional experiences, and the
content of our emotional experiences are evaluative properties (core relational themes).
Our minds perceive an offense, and sets off a series of physiological changes that
represent that offense. Being angry just is perceiving (via the somatosensory system)
those physiological changes. Since the changes represent the offense, I perceive an
offense when I have this emotion.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked at two major theories about the nature of emotion:
the cognitive theory and the perceptual theory. I have tried to show that the perceptual
theory has obvious advantages over the cognitive theory. While I think that the
perceptual theory is more appealing than the cognitive theory, and that Prinz' s theory is
particularly interesting, there are still some lingering questions. First, I am not
convinced, as is Prinz, that emotions are states in the somatosensory systems. If our mind
can detect the presence of danger via some perceptual apparatus, then why is it not the
case that ///^/perception is the relevant perception? Prinz is convinced that the embodied
appraisal theory is correct, and develops a very rich theory on the basis of that
assumption. However, as Craig DeLancey correctly points out,
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Prinz has no compelling evidence that emotions are embodied appraisals.
His direct defense of the claim includes reviving the long-disputed
arguments of William James and Karl Lange, and reviewing the
conflicting evidence regarding emotion intensity among subjects with
spinal injury. However, with no clear evidence ruling against the James-
Lange theory, Prinz's fecund use of the theory is its best and most
compelling defense” (DeLancey 2005, 2).
1 agree with DeLancey' s assessment, and would be more inclined to reject the embodied
appraisal aspect of Prinz's view, and retain what seems very compelling about it: that we
are hardwired to react to certain stimuli in the environment, and that reaction is set off by
our mind's perceiving the presence of something meaningful in the environment. Our
emotions, whatever it is that constitutes the emotions, represents the presence of the
meaningful object. I agree with Prinz in some respects, but just cannot accept his
disembodied appraisal account of emotions.
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, I return to the thought that emotions are hard-
wired responses to stimuli in the environment. I make use of this view about the nature
of emotion in order to justify my account of emotional rationality. The idea I am
interested in defending is that we have emotion specific modules in the brain that, when
activated by the right stimuli, produce justified emotions. Obviously, this is a very
speculative claim. Some psychologists have defended the view that there are actual
neural programs that control our emotional responses. Ekman offers an argument in
defense of this position in (Ekman 1972, 1973, and 1980). According to Ekman, positing
such neural programs is the most reasonable hypothesis in light of the fact that our
emotional responses are often coordinated, complex, and do not require conscious
attention. In a series of animal studies by J.P. Flynn (Flynn 1967, 1969), it was
demonstrated that neural stimulation in one kind of aggression behavior, and stimulation
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in a second site elicited a different kind of aggression behavior. Such results suggest that
specific neural pathways give rise to specific emotional responses. And in a 1982 study
(Panskepp 1982), it was argued that the hypothalamus housed four pathways that gave
rise to the fear, anger, expectancy, and panic responses. While these experiments have
not decisively shown that there are emotion specific mechanisms, I do think that they
give us some reason to think that such a hypothesis is plausible.
CHAPTER 3
EMOTIONS AND THEIR OBJECTS
Introduction
It is widely thought that all emotions are object directed: you are fearful of the
wild bear, saddened by the death of a loved one, disgusted by the rotting apple, happy to
see your old friend, and angry about the fact that your student plagiarized her paper.
Roughly, the object of an emotion is whatever the emotion is of, at, or about. The fear
of death is no exception to this. It is an emotion—fear—and it is object directed. The
object of this fear is, obviously, deaf/i. The fear of death, however, may be unique in
that there are many things that one could fear when he fears death. He could fear his
own non-being, the fact that death will deprive him of goods, the fact his family will be
left to struggle without him, and so on.
In this chapter, I show that arguments addressing the fear of death may be more
or less interesting depending on the object employed in the arguments. I begin by
clarifying several conceptual assumptions that philosophers make about the
intentionality of emotion. This section includes discussions about the nature of objects,
the difference between causes and objects, the introspective access of objects, and the
things that deserve the title ‘object.’
With the conceptual worries put aside, I turn to the primary concern of the
chapter: the object presupposed by arguments designed to show that the fear of death is
irrational. Here I look closely at historical and contemporary arguments, and I show
that, while they may give us reasons to reconsider some fears of death, they do not
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address all fears of death. If I am right about this, then perhaps these philosophers have
not done enough to convince us that we have reason to expunge our fear of death.
Conceptual Background
Nature of Objects
Recall the list of emotions I mentioned at the outset of the chapter. Notice that
the objects specified by these emotions are dissimilar in kind. In some cases the objects
are abstract entities such as propositions or state of affairs. This is true of my fear,
hope, and anger. In other cases, the objects are real things out there in the world; my
friend is the object of my happiness, and the rotting apple is the object ofmy disgust. If
you are not convinced that concrete entities can be the objects of emotions, then
consider the emotion /ove. When you love your partner, you love the person, not a set
of propositions that are true of that person. It is widely thought that the object of one's
love is their beloved, not a set of propositions that are true of their partner.
17
One might argue that emotions cannot be like this. Emotions must either take
only concrete entities or only abstract entities, but not both. And if you think otherwise,
then the onus is on you to provide a principled way of distinguishing cases in which an
emotion takes an abstract object from cases in which it takes a concrete object. That is,
you must show why some emotions take abstract objects, while other emotions take
concrete objects, and why some types of emotions sometimes take abstract objects and
other times take concrete objects. Without answers to these questions, the hypothesis
that emotions can take different kinds of objects is unacceptable.
17
See Kraut (1986) for an interesting discussion of this issue.
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It could be argued that these charges are misguided. One reason one might think
that the objection is unconvincing is that the verb ‘knows’ seems to function in a similar
manner. I know Mary, and I also know that 2+2=4. In the first case, the intentional
object of the verb is a concrete particular. It is the person, Mary. In the second case,
the object is the proposition /ha/2+2=4. If this is unproblematic, then that gives us
reason to think that emotions can reasonably do the same. Unfortunately, I am not
entirely convinced that this line of reasoning is successful. One might argue that this is
just an artifact of the English language, and ‘knows’ is actually ambiguous. The sense
of ‘knows’ in the expression “I know Mary” is different from ‘knows’ in “I know that
2+2=4.” Perhaps, then, we have reason to believe that emotion terms are themselves
ambiguous. ‘Fear’ in “I fear that the dog will attack me” does not mean the same thing
as the word ‘fear’ in the sentence “I fear the dog.” If so, then emotions do not take
different kinds of objects.
I am inclined to think that ‘fears’ is not like ‘knows,’ in which case very little
can be learned about ‘fears’ from ‘knows.’ If one disagrees, then I believe that the
burden of proof is on the objector—why think that emotion terms function in the same
way that the verb ‘knows’ functions? Moreover, why be worried about the view that
emotions can take both abstract and concrete entities as their objects? I see no reason
1 6
barring emotions from taking both.
Cause and Object
If we assume, as may initially seem plausible, that the object of an emotion just
is its cause, then identifying the object is simply a matter of identifying the cause.
IS
I agree that this is a weak treatment of this issue. It is too complex for the confines of
this paper, so I will have to leave it as is.
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When I am angry at my dog for destroying the newly upholstered couch. 1 need look no
further than the cause of my emotion to determine the object. The object and the cause
of my emotion is the state of affairs that consisted of my dog's disobedient behavior.
This, 1 believe, holds true in the standard case. To suppose that this is true of all cases,
however, is mistaken. There are emotional episodes in which the cause of the emotion
is distinct from the object. Consider: while out at a bar drinking with your spouse, you
become angry with him for some trivial matter: He forgot to put the trash outside before
you left the house, and he is only now remembering his mistake. Although the object of
your anger is the trivial matter-forgetting to bring the trash out is no terrible error-the
cause is not. The cause is the alcohol. You wouldn’t have been angry with him if you
had not been drinking (the matter was trivial). In this case, the cause and the object pull
apart.
If you do not find this example very convincing, consider a second case: you are
abducted by a mad scientist and hooked up to an emotion-experience machine that
causes you to experience happiness. The happiness that you experience when hooked
up to the machine is, by hypothesis, caused by the machine. The machine, however, is
not what your happiness is of, at, or about. Even though the machine is the cause, it is
not the object.
A second interesting feature about objects and causes is that, in cases where the
object is some future state of affairs, the cause cannot be the object. Suppose I fear that
my flight to Seattle will be delayed. The object in this case is the future state of affairs
that consists of my flight's being delayed. Unless we are willing to accept backwards
causation, the cause cannot be the very same state of affairs. My flight's being delayed
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has not yet occurred. Thus, all future directed emotions (that is, emotions that take
future objects) have something that is distinct from their object as their cause. Notice,
also, that in cases where the object is imaginary, the cause and the object will pull apart.
Thus, when your child fears the bogyman, or some other imaginary entity, the cause is
not the object. Surely imaginary entities are not suitable relata in the causal relation.
Something other than the bogyman must be playing the causal role in this case. It is
most likely the child's over-active imagination.
Although the cause and the object pull apart in the cases I described here, I do
not mean to suggest that they pull apart in all or even most cases. The reason I mention
that the cause and the object sometimes pull apart is that this fact generates some
interesting philosophical questions relating to the fear of death. Suppose when we fear
death what we fear is the state of being dead; if so, then surely the object and the cause
are distinct. Again, under the assumption that backward causation is impossible, the
future state of one's own non-being cannot cause one to now fear it.
Other objects are slightly more difficult to assess. If the object is the proposition
thatone may be deprivedofthegoods ofhfe by one ’s own death, and if one thinks that
future-tensed propositions are causally efficacious, then perhaps the object and the
cause are identical However, if one thinks that tensed propositions are causally inert,
then the proposition cannot also be the cause. It seems to me that the most natural
candidate to play the causal role in either case is the very same candidate was used to
explain the cause of the child's fear. It is one's own imaginings that tend to stir
unhappy feelings towards one’s own death. I suspect though, no matter what the cause
in the fear of death, we should be more concerned about the object of our fear.
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Introspection and Emotion
It has been well documented that there may be little or no introspective access to
higher-order reasoning.
IQ
Thus, how I come to form a preference, make a judgment, or
solve a problem may not be accessible to me through introspection. If we assume, as
some do, that emotions are cognitions in the same way that coming to form preferences
or making judgments are cognitions, then we have reason to think that introspection will
not be a very reliable method for understanding how our emotions came about. 20
Strong empirical evidence for this claim comes from a 1974 study by Dutton
and Aron. In this study, the investigators had a woman (a confederate) with a
questionnaire approach men in a park in two different circumstances. In one, men were
approached as they were walking across a wobbly suspension bridge. In another, they
were approached while sitting on a park bench. After the men completed the
questionnaire, the woman told them that she would like to discuss the study in greater
detail. She would then tear a piece of paper from the questionnaire and give them her
number. The results of the study showed that a larger proportion of the men from the
bridge scenario called the woman, while a smaller proportion of men from the bench
scenario called. According to the authors of the study, the difference is explained by
the fact the men on the bridge were aroused when the woman approached them. These
men, according to Dutton and Aron, assumed (mistakenly) that the cause of their
arousal was their attraction to the woman. If you are convinced by the conclusion of
See Nisbett and Wilson (1977).
" u
Arnson, Wilson, and Akert make a very similar claim, “This is not to say that we are
thinkers without a clue—we are usually aware of the final result of our thought
processes (e.g., that we are in love) but often unaware of the cognitive processing that
led to that result”(Amson, Wilson, and Akert 2004, 151).
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this study, then you have good reason to believe that we have very little introspective
access to the cause of our emotions (or, at least very little introspective access to the
cause of our attraction to people, which is like an emotion).
Is the same true of the objects of emotions? Is it the case that we have very little
introspective access to the object of our emotion, and are, therefore, likely to get the
object wrong? Under the supposition that the cause and the object are sometimes
distinct, this claim is rather difficult to evaluate. For, it might be the case that when it
looks like we are mistaken about the object, what we are mistaken about is the cause.
Consider, for example, Ronald de Sousa’s story (originally told by Elizabeth
Anscombe) designed to show that we are sometimes mistaken about the object of our
emotion:
A man went to sleep while leisurely making love. He dreamed he was
shoveling coal and taking great pleasure in that activity. Then he woke up
and discovered what he was really doing. ‘Good heavens,’ said the man, T
was mistaken in the object of my pleasure.’ If this story is intelligible, then
it shows, at least prima facie, that it is possible to be mistaken about some
objects of emotion” (de Sousa 1987, 1 10).
In this case, it is not clear to me that de Sousa’s conclusions are correct. We can
easily re-describe the story in such a way so that the agent is mistaken about cause
rather than the objecr. The object of the man’s pleasure is, in fact, his coal-shoveling.
The reason that this is the object is that this is the object that he decided his pleasure
was aimed at. And, although the objects of our emotions are subjective in this way, the
causes are not. If this is so, then his love-making is not the object, but the cause. Thus,
in cases where it seems as if we are getting the object wrong, what we are really doing
is getting the cause wrong. When we explain the story in this way, we can still account
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for the fact that the man is mistaken about something, but what he is mistaken about is
the cause not the object.
Perhaps, then, a different case would provide better evidence for the view that
we are sometimes mistaken about the object of our emotion: You and your spouse are at
a bar, and you have had a lot to drink. You get angry with your husband for what you
think is some trivial matter. The cause of your anger was the alcohol, the object (or so
you thought) was the trivial matter. However, the actual object was, as you later
discovered through conversation with a friend, the fact that your spouse was watching
the baseball game and not attending to your conversation. If you believe that this story
is at all coherent, then you have reason to doubt that introspection is a reliable method
9
1
for coming to have knowledge of the object of our emotions.
The point of this exercise is to establish the claim that what people sometimes
think that their emotions are about, may not be what, in fact, their emotions are about.
This may have some important implications for the fear of death. If a person fears
death, and if he bases his reports of this fear on introspection, then we might have
reason to doubt the reliability of these reports. It might be the case that he is either
experiencing a different emotion, or that his fear is not about what he takes it to be
*'
I must confess that I am not sure that I am convinced by this case. It seems unlikely
that the cause is really the drunkenness. In fact, it is more likely that the cause is the
drunkenness compounded by the fact that the spouse was watching the ballgame. If so,
then we have another case in which a person is wrong about something, but he was
wrong about the cause and not the object. Now, even though these cases have not
established the claim that we are sometimes mistaken about the object of our emotion, I
am not willing to accept the alternative hypothesis, that the object of our emotion is
whatever we believe it to be. Objects, it seems, are not subjective in this way.
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about.“ Moreover, if defenders of the view that the fear of death is irrational justify
their choice of object by appeal to testimony or introspection, we may have reason to
doubt that the object presupposed by the argument is at all relevant.
De Sousa’s List of Objects
In The Eat/ona/ityofEmotion, Ronald de Sousa says that, “I have called seven
types of factors having some claim to be called “objects” of emotions (plus some
glosses and variants): target (ostensible or proper), focus and focal property, motivating
aspect, cause, aim, proposition, and formal object” (de Sousa 1987, 123). While I will
not go into the details, I will mention enough about each so that the reader has some
sense of what he means by these terms. The target is the actual object out there in the
world at which an emotion is directed. The target is the “proper target” if and only if
the target is unchanged when the subject is in full possession of the relevant
information. Thus, the venomous snake is the target oi my fear, and if, after having
complete knowledge of the relevant facts of the situation, the snake is still the object of
my fear, then the snake is theproper targetofmy emotion.
The focal property is the property of the target, which can be either real or
illusory, that is the focus of the agent. The snake’s being poisonous, for example, may
be the focal property of my emotion. The motivating aspect is the feature of the target
that motivates the emotion. De Sousa claims that in most cases the motivating aspect is
the same as the focal property.
The formal object is a supervenient property of the target, “...it is a second-
order property in the sense that it is supervenient on some other property or properties:
" Ronald de Sousa (2003) argues that we are always mistaken about the object of our
fear when we fear death. I discuss this argument in Chapter 6 of this disseration.
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something is frightening by virtue of its being dangerous, for example” (de Sousa 1987,
122). In other places, de Sousa talks about the formal object as the property we
implicitly ascribe to the target of our emotion, in virtue of which the emotion makes
sense. I ascribe the property of being dangerous to the snake, and it is in virtue of this
that my fear is sensible. This is an important feature of de Sousa’s view, and I discuss it
in greater detail in Chapter 5.
I think that de Sousa has satisfactorily explained all of the different things we
intend to refer to when we talk about the objects of our emotions. I do not have
anything to add to his list, and so I will not dwell on this point for very long. I will
make the point, though, that I think that discussions of the objects of the fear of death
will fall nicely into one of the seven categories that he has provided. It will not be
important to state, exactly, which category it falls into, but rather it will be more
important to note that several things deserve the title ‘object’ of the fear of death.
The Object of Fear When We Fear Death
In this section of the paper I will focus my attention on arguments designed to
show that the fear of death is irrational. I contend that many of these arguments may be
unconvincing. The reason they may be unconvincing is explained by the fact that they
presuppose a specific (and, perhaps irrelevant) object. I want to make clear that my aim
in this section is not to defend the claim that it is rational to fear death; rather, I am
casting doubt on the persuasiveness of some arguments, where the object presupposed
by the arguments is the source of the doubt.
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This makes for an interesting situation: The arguments are sound, so they do
show what they are supposed to show, but what they show is unimportant. In other
words, I am not persuaded to give up on mv fear of death simply because these
arguments successfully show that some fears of death are irrational.
Epicurean Arguments
In this section of the paper I will discuss two classical arguments —Lucretius’
Symmetry Argument in De fierumNatura (DRJVJ and Epicurus’ argument in the Letter
to A/enoeceus AA/en.J—in an attempt to show that (1) both presuppose the same object:
our own nonexistence, and (2) both may be unconvincing as a result of (1). I begin with
these arguments because the influence that they have had on the philosophical literature
on the fear of death is considerable; much of the contemporary work done today is, in
some way, in response to the arguments first raised by Epicurus and Lucretius.
Moreover, several of the current day defenders of these arguments presuppose many of
the same assumptions made by Epicurus and Lucretius. If I can show that we have
reason to doubt their presuppositions, then we have reason to doubt others as well.
Symmetry Argument
In DRA\ Lucretius presents two (and possibly three) versions of the Symmetry
Argument. Here I will focus on the final version of the argument, contained in the
following passage:
Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that
elapsed before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in
which nature shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see
anything fearful in it? Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not
appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep? (Lucretius DRN~b.973-7).
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Lucretius claims that the times prior to our births and after our deaths are both
times at which we do not exist; the states are intrinsically identical. Since it is now
irrational for us to fear our pre-natal nonexistence, and it is rational to fear our
posthumous nonexistence and not fear our pre-natal nonexistence only ifwe justifiably
believe that the two are not relevantly similar (which, of course, we do not), it follows
that it is irrational for us to fear our posthumous nonexistence:
1 . It is irrational for one to now fear the state prior to his birth.
2. It is reasonable for one to now fear the state after his death and not now the state
before his birth only if he is justified in believing that the two states are
relevantly different.
3. No one is justified in believing that the two states are relevantly different.
4. Therefore, it is not the case that it is reasonable for one to now fear the state
after his death and not now fear the state before his birth.
5. Therefore, it is not the case that it is reasonable for one to now fear the state
after his death.
24
Although this argument is not the most obvious reconstruction of the Symmetry
Argument, I believe that it is the strongest version.^ PI is an evaluative claim about
one's present attitude towards his pre-natal nonexistence: it is irrational for him to now
fear the time before his birth. I will grant, for the sake of argument, the truth of this first
premise. P2 is a statement of the central principle of the argument. According to p2, it
is necessary that one be justified in believing that the state before his birth and the state
'
I grant that this first premise appears nowhere in DR
\
r
. However, one must start with
the premise that it is irrational to fear the state prior to our birth to generate the
conclusion that it is now irrational to fear the period after our death. For without such
an assumption, one could generate the following parallel argument: 1 do not now fear
thieves; thieves are relevantly similar to murders; it is rational to fear one state of affairs
and not another only if they are relevantly different; therefore, it is rational to not fear
murders. This is, obviously, an undesirable conclusion.
" 4
For an interesting and controversial discussion of this argument see Warren (2001).
" 5
1 base parts of this reconstruction on Steven Rosenbaum's interpretation of the
argument in Rosenbaum (1989).
55
after his death are relevantly different in order for it to be the case that it is reasonable
for him to now fear the state after his death and not fear the state prior to his birth. This
seems like an intuitively plausible thesis—if one can reasonably take two different
attitudes towards two states of affairs, then one must be justified in believing that the
two states are importantly different.
P3 seems true. The state prior to our birth is a state of nonexistence and the state
after our death is a state of nonexistence. The two are intrinsically identical; no one is
justified in believing that the two are relevantly different. P4 is an application of the
principle in conjunction with p3. P5 follows from p3 and p4.
I have given a fair and charitable reconstruction of Lucretius’ Symmetry
Argument, and I believe that all of the premises are true. I am convinced that it is
indeed irrational for me to fear my own state of nonexistence. However, I am not
certain that his conclusion has addressed my fear of death. While I agree that the fear of
our own annihilation is one, among many, of the things we can fear when we fear death,
the thing that I suspect I may be worried about with respect to my death is not the state
of being dead.
26
To return to de Sousa’s discussion of the various entities that deserve the title
‘object* of emotion, 1 will suggest that that there are different things that merit the title
26
It could be objected that I do not know what I fear when I fear death, so how could I
know that I do not fear the state of nonexistence? While I agree that we sometimes do
not know the objects of our fears, I am fairly confident that the object of my fear is not
the state of nonexistence. If you are still convinced that I do not know the object ofmy
fear, I believe that the remarks I make in this section will be of interest to you if you can
at least agree that there are other objects we can fear in addition to the state of
nonexistence, and that it might be worthwhile to investigate the rationality of fearing
those objects.
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the 'object' of our fear of death.'
7 Some of these objects are states of affairs, such as
the state of affairs that consists in my no longer being able to participate in the activities
that gave my life value, and the fact that 1 am deprived of the goods of life that I would
have had if 1 had not died then, and the fact that my family will be left to struggle on
without me. If you agree with this, that there are several things that merit the title
‘object of the fear of death,' then it is possible that Lucretius has simply missed the
point in his argument. That is, he has discussed the object that does not address our
fears. To use de Sousa’s terminology, it appears as if Lucretius presented an argument
that employed the targe/ of our fear (the actual particular at which our emotion was
aimed), when he should have instead focused on something else altogether. Thus, while
the Symmetry Argument is sound, I believe that it does very little to persuade me that I
have reason to reconsider my own fear of death.*
If we were to reflect on other emotions, I believe that my diagnosis of the
Symmetry Argument will become far more convincing. Suppose, for example, you are
scheduled to go to the dentist for a root canal. You, like most people, fear the dentist.
Perhaps a friend attempts to soothe your fears by pointing out that the dentist is a nice
woman with good credentials. You might ponder your friend's advice for just a
moment, and then realize that he has missed the point. It might well be the case that
there is nothing fearful about the person who is the dentist, but that is not what you
feared when you said that you feared the dentist. What is more likely is that you fear
' 7 A second way to generate the conclusion that there are many objects we fear when we
fear death is to say that 'death' is ambiguous. I believe that either approach is equally
good.
' 8
For alternative solutions to the Symmetry Argument see Nagel ( 1 978); Parfit ( 1 984);
and Kamm (1993).
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the bad things that typically accompany a trip to the dentist. As this is the real object of
your fear, your friend's attempt at easing your fear is futile.
I can give a number of other examples, but I think that they will all point to the
same conclusion. When we say that we love, hate, fear, or take some other emotional
response toward things, it is sometimes best to assume that the objects of our emotions
are /a?/the actual entity picked out by the words we use to describe the objects (again,
the “target” of the emotion). Rather, in some cases, the most relevant object is
something else all together.
What reason, then, would we have to think that we are concerned with the state
of being dead rather than the fact that we have died and will lose out on the goods of
life? I suspect that we may have very little reason to think this. If you agree, then
Lucretius' argument has not shown that the fear of death, that is, the fear of the fact that
I will die and not see my important project through to competition, and thus lose out on
the goods of life, is irrational.
It might be argued that I (and not Lucretius) have missed the point. For
example, Rosenbaum claims that, “...I believe that Epicurean ideas about the fear of
death, although directed against the fear of an afterlife or of nonbeing, can be applied to
other forms of death anxiety. I cannot show this now, but I urge that a thorough
examination of Epicurean arguments, including the Symmetry Argument, is
fundamental for a finished treatment of death anxiety” (Rosenbaum 1989, 355). Perhaps
he is suggesting that the Symmetry Argument can be re-cast so that its conclusion
addresses the fear that death deprives us of goods we otherwise would have had.
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If one were to reformulate the argument, he might reason that a late birth would
result in one's missing out on goods that he otherwise would have had, and yet he is not
troubled by this possibility. It seems unreasonable, then, for him to be troubled by the
fact that death may deprive him of goods that he otherwise would have had.
While there are several solutions to this second argument, I will focus on two.
First, I find Nagel's response, that we have our births, but not our deaths, essentially,
unconvincing (Nagel 1979). The counterfactual claim, “I would have been thirty this
year if I had been bom in 1975” is surely true. Thus, my being bom when I was is not
essential to me. There is a second response, put forth by F.M. Kamm, which explains
away this asymmetry by pointing out that death represents the end of all possibilities
w hile prenatal nonexistence represents the beginning. Even if a late birth deprives us of
goods, we should not be troubled by this fact because there are many more goods in
store.
I am not sure that an Epicurean would be convinced by this line of reasoning, for
he might object that it still involves an unacceptable asymmetry. He might argue that,
although prenatal nonexistence represents the beginning, it is nonetheless intrinsically
identical to posthumous nonexistence. As it is irrational to fear one, it is likewise
irrational to fear the other.
I will attempt one final answer, then. It could be argued that it is rational to fear
only those events that are to occur in the present and future. The reason it is irrational
to fear my prenatal nonexistence, then, is that it is, temporally speaking, in the wrong
place. Death, however, is in the future. Merely because it is irrational to fear your
prenatal nonexistence, it does not thereby follow that it is likewise irrational to fear your
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posthumous nonexistence. This explanation amounts to denying the claim that the two
states are relevantly similar.
Depending on your view about fear, you will find this more or less acceptable.
Some people are of the view that you can fear states that have occurred in the past, but
that you cannot fear states about which you are utterly certain. I am not so willing to
accept that, however. I think that I would be more inclined to accept the view that you
can fear only future and present states; negative emotional responses towards past states
are not fears.
I have tried to show that the original version of the symmetry argument may be
unconvincing insofar as it presupposes an inappropriate object. I then re-cast the
argument so that it employed an object that I have suggested is more to the point.
While some philosophers have attempted to respond to this second argument, I am not
certain that their responses are acceptable. I have proposed my own response: Fear is
essentially a future directed emotion. We can fear our posthumous nonexistence, but
not our prenatal nonexistence. The two states, then, are in fact relevantly different. I
deny p3 of the original argument.
Epicurus’ Argument
I will now leave Lucretius and turn my attention to a second argument that
appears in the Letter to Afenoeceus t'Afen.J 124-125. In this passage we find Epicurus
arguing that the fear of death is irrational from the premise that death is never a harm
for the person who dies. According to Epicurus, all good and evil involve sensation,
and since death is the absence of sensation, death can be neither a good nor an evil for
the person who dies. To reach the desired conclusion, that the fear of death is irrational.
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Epicurus appeals to a principle describing the rationality of our present attitudes
towards future states of non-harm. “For that which while present causes no distress
causes unnecessary pain when merely anticipated”(Epicurus Men 125). In other words,
it is rational to fear some future state only if one suffers in that future state when that
state is present. Call this the 'Future-Distress Principle.’ Given the subsidiary
conclusion plus the Future-distress Principle, Epicurus draws the conclusion that it is
irrational to fear death. A more formalized version of the argument is as follows:
1. All things that are good and evil involve sensation.
2. Death is the absence of sensation.
3. Therefore, death is neither good nor evil for the person who dies.
4. It is rational to fear some future state only if one suffers in that future state
when that state is present.
5. If death is neither harmful nor good when present, then it is irrational to fear
death.
6. Therefore, it is irrational to fear death.
In my discussion of Lucretius I claimed that his argument presupposes the
wrong object. It warns us against fearing death, where ‘death’ picks out the object, the
stale ofaffairs that consists o/tnvown nonexistence. I tried to argue that we have
reason to be skeptical of this choice of object as it is mistaken; it is mistaken in the same
way that my friend is mistaken in supposing that the dentist is the object of my fear
when I say that I fear the dentist. If you found that this was a good reason to not be
moved by Lucretius' argument, then you should find it to be an equally good reason to
not be persuaded by Epicurus’ argument. For Epicurus, like Lucretius, assumes that the
object of the fear is the state of affairs that consists of our own nonexistence.
w
Gisela Striker makes a similar remark in her discussion of this argument when she
says that, “For what we fear is not the state of nonexistence, but the loss of our life, and
the curtailment of all our plans and projects.” (Striker 1989, 323)
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Rather than linger on this point, I would like to formulate a modified version of
the argument. This argument is designed to show that it is irrational to fear the fact that
death deprives us of future goods. David Furley (Furley 1986) discusses this very
option in the following quotation:
We must first distinguish two possible reasons why one might be afraid
of dying: (1) because what may follow a man’s death may be unpleasant
or in some other way bad for him; (2) because although nothing follows
upon death, death will deprive him of the good things of life. The
Epicurean case against the first seems very strong...The question we
have to examine is whether being deprived of the good things of life is a
good reason for man’s feeling fear or anger at the prospect of death.
Epicurus tries to conflate (2) with (1), on the ground that deprivation is
nothing if it is not felt as pain, and hence case (2) like case (1),
presupposes an experiencing subject after death (Furley 1986, 85).
In this passage Furley attributes the following principle to Epicurus: it is necessary that
a deprivation be a/e/r deprivation for it to count as a harm for the person. Even if death
does deprive us of goods, they are unfelt deprivations. Since there is no subject to
experience the deprivation, they do not constitute genuine harms. Unfelt deprivations
are, therefore, unreasonable to fear.
In light of this new understanding of Epicurus’ view, perhaps we could fine-tune the
argument as follows:
1 . Deprivations constitute a harm only if they are felt deprivations (they cause one
to feel pain).
2. Death is an experiential blank.
3. Therefore, the goods of which we will be deprived by death do not constitute a
harm.
4. It is rational to fear the fact that we will be deprived of some good only if that
deprivation constitutes a harm.
5. If the goods of which we will be deprived by death do not constitute a harm for
us, then it is irrational to fear the fact that death will deprive us of goods.
6. Therefore, it is irrational to fear the fact that death will deprive us of goods.
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The reformulated version of the Epicurean argument is designed to show that fear of the
fact that death deprives us of goods is irrational, which, as I have suggested, is precisely
what some of us tend to worry about when we worry about death. If the argument is
sound, then those firmly held worries about death's deprivations are irrational, and we
should do our best to expunge these worries.
I suspect that an entirely different paper is required for an adequate refutation of
this argument, but I will say a few words about how one might attempt to respond to it.
In an attempt to show that the argument is unsound, most philosophers deny the truth of
PI. They argue that sometimes unfelt deprivations constitute harms. They maintain it
is not the case that a deprivation must be felt in order for it to count as a harm for a
person. In defense of this claim most cite examples of unfelt deprivations and rely on
our intuitive, pre-theoretical views about these cases.
30
I will say more about this
strategy in the next section when I discuss more contemporary arguments against the
rationality of the fear of death. I hope the remarks that I make will suitably convince
you that Epicurus’ principle is not on firm ground.
Contemporary Arguments
Rorty
In this section of the paper I will examine some contemporary arguments
designed to show that fear of death is irrational. I will claim, as I had in the previous
section, that the object presupposed by the arguments is the state of affairs that consists
of our own nonbeing, and that there are other and perhaps more interesting objects we
fear when we fear death. I will also look at modified versions of the classical
30
See Feldman (1992).
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arguments (versions that presuppose what I have been suggesting is a more interesting
object) and suggest that we have reason to doubt their acceptability as well.
I begin with Amelie Rorty’s discussion of the fear of death in “Fearing Death”
(Rorty 1983). Rorty’s central thesis is that, although fear of death is irrational insofar as
it is not a harm for the person who dies, it is rational (prudential ly rational) because it is
highly functional.
For while there may be good reasons for not fearing one’s own
nonexistence, there might still also be strong reasons for fearing it, as well
as for regretting one’s own death. I shall argue that it is proper to have
irresolvably conflicting attitudes towards one’s own death: it is
inappropriate to fear death and yet it is also inappropriate not to fear it, or
to attempt to cease fearing it (Rorty 1983, 175).
When Rorty makes this claim about fearing death she is ultimately making a
claim about fearing our own nonexistence (or as she calls it the ‘metaphysical fear of
death’). This she establishes at the very outset of the paper where she enumerates (and
rejects) a number of possible objects that people could fear when they fear death. As
Rorty points out in her paper, fear of death can be fear of (1) the permanent loss of the
goods; (2) the fact that death may put those whom one cherishes in harm’s way; (3) the
fact that life will go on without one; (4) the fact that one will no longer be able to
influence individuals’ opinion of one; and (5) of the unknown. According to Rorty,
however, it can also be the fear of one's own non-being:
All these fears seem to be fears of the harms that attend not only death
but other conditions as well. They are fears of what death brings rather
than fears of being dead. But evidently there are some who fear death as
such, who fear their nonexistence. It is the appropriateness of this fear
that I should like to examine: the fear of death as a fear of non-being,
rather than the fear of the various harms that attend death (Rorty 1983,
178).
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I am not sure whether there is a genuine argument in this passage, but it seems
as if Rorty is making an attempt at a rationale for her choice of object. One reason to
discuss the fear of death as the fear of one's own non-being, according to Rorty, is that
people sometimes fear that object when they fear death. Surely that provides us with
reason to investigate its appropriateness. I think that Rorty is right. If it is the case that
people do fear their own nonexistence when they fear death, then that is a very good
reason to think critically about the extent to which that fear is justified.
Rorty's second argument appears in her discussion of the fear of death as the
fear of the permanent loss of goods. She says that, “Some fear death as the permanent
loss of...the goods of life... But we can lose these goods... in other ways. This form of
the fear of death is then to be classified with the fear of senility, exile, ostracism,
ffiendlessness, the loss of our faculties... Death represents the limit of all these
diminishing and debilities: it has no special psycho-ontological status except as the
irreversible limit that compounds all these fears” (Rorty 1983, 177). Rorty seems to
reason as follows: suppose that when we fear death what we fear is the loss of the
goods of life. If this were the case, then the fear of death should be classified with fears
of other things that also result in the loss of the goods of life. That is, fear of death
would be classified with fear of senility, friendlessness, and so forth. When we classify
fear of death in this way, according to Rorty, death does not take any special status, or,
as she says, has no “special psycho-ontological status.”
31
But it is a mistake to deny
death of its unique status. Perhaps there is something about death that makes it unlike
states of friendlessness and senility, and this something is more than just the
31
I do not know what she means by “psycho-ontological status.”
65
“irreversible limit that compounds all these fears.” The only object that grants death the
special status Rorty seems to think that it has is death as the state of nonexistence.
Thus, we have reason to think that the most interesting way to discuss the fear of death
is as the fear of one's own non-being.
Criticism of Rorty’s Object
Rather than trot out the same arguments I raised against the Epicureans’ choice
of object, I will focus instead on what I took to be Rorty’s argument for the state of
affairs that consists of my nonexistence. Again, her main point was that death, unlike
senility and madness, has a special status, and so fearing death is not to be assimilated
with fearing senility and madness.
I am not convinced that we should not classify the fear of death with other fears,
such as the fear of madness or the fear of senility. While death is unlike these things
insofar as our biological self, in addition to our mental self, has stopped functioning, it
is very much like madness and senility insofar as what seems essential to us has stopped
functioning. It is not unusual to say of a person who has undergone serious
psychological changes that they have died. It is not clear to me, then, that death has a
special status that is not had by debilitations such as madness and senility. To suppose
otherwise is to put a premium on just being alive, and I am not convinced that just being
alive is what we really care about.
Rosenbaum
In “How to be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus” (Rosenbaum, 1986)
Rosenbaum also defends the claim that the most interesting object when we fear death
is the state of being dead. The alternative he considers, however, is the process of
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dying: “...The issue would be much less interesting if it were concerned with death
instead of being dead. What people seem to think bad is not the moment of death itself,
but rather the abysmal nonexistence of being dead. That, at any rate, is what they fear,
and that fear is what Epicurus wished to extinguish” (Rosenbaum 1993, 122). Unlike
Rorty, he has no argument for this claim.
3
' Also, unlike Rorty, he is aware of the
commonly raised objection that the Epicureans have simply missed the point. He, thus,
undertakes the project of reformulating the arguments so that they address the fear of
death’s deprivations rather than one’s own nonexistence. He argues that, even when we
assume that the object of our fear is the state of affairs that consists of our being
deprived of the goods of life, the fear is nonetheless irrational.
He offers two central arguments in defense of this position, the first of which is
based on the premise that the losses one suffers as a result of death are losses that one
cannot experience, and so are losses that do not constitute harms. He says, “We can
grant that what one /^/consciously experience can hurt one without granting that
what one cannot experience can hurt one. All (A) requires for an event or state of
affairs to be bad for a person, implicitly, is that the person be able to experience it at
some time, not that the person be aware or conscious of the causal effects at some time”
(Rosenbaum 1993, 127). Consider betrayals and infidelities. While we often do not
experience these states of affairs, we cou/d Rosenbaum counts these among the things
that are harms because we are capable of experiencing them. Deprivations that result
" De Sousa would argue that people are simply mistaken about the object of their fear
when they fear their own nonexistence. Fear requires that one be able to imagine, from
a subjective standpoint, what it is like to experience the object of one's fear. There is
nothing that it is like to not exist, so one cannot satisfy this requirement. Thus, one may
well be experiencing fear, but the object of his fear is not his own nonexistence. 1
discuss this argument in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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from an untimely death, however, are not like this. Seeing as the subject has gone out
of existence, the subject cannot experience them. Deprivations that result from death,
then, are not genuine harms for the person. 33
Rosenbaum also argues that the fact that losses through death are so unlike
standard cases of losses, we have reason to doubt that the losses through death
constitute genuine harms. “If being dead is a loss, it is so insufficiently similar to
paradigm cases of loss which are bad for persons that we need special reasons or
arguments why treating death as a loss enables us to reject [the premise]” (Rosenbaum
1993, 127). Ordinary losses, such as the loss of a limb or the loss of one’s mental
facility, are surely harms for the person who suffers their loss. One might claim that as
a result of such losses one is now in a state of being worse off than he had been prior to
the loss. If one were to suppose that death was a loss, he could not explain the loss by
appeal to the same considerations. For one is not in any state when one is dead. Thus,
in an effort to account for the death’s losses, one would have to posit an unusual, and
most likely ad hoc, principle.
I have a few remarks to make about Rosenbaum’s position. First, it is not at all
obvious to me that the losses suffered as a result of death are insufficiently similar to
paradigm cases of loss that are bad for persons. As I stated earlier, I would characterize
the losses that one suffers as a result of death as unfelt deprivations. Surely these things
form a category of harms for people. It might be the case that they are not the most
33
Notice that this principle is slightly different from earlier he principle advanced by the
Epicureans: a deprivation is a harm only if it is a felt deprivation. Some betrayals are
never felt but are nonetheless harms on Rosenbaum’s view as they could be felt; the
Epicurean principle implies, of course, that unfelt betrayals are not harms. While I do
not agree with either principle, I suppose I am more incline to accept Rosenbaum's.
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common harms that people suffer, but I do think that they constitute a genuine category
of harm. Second, I do not agree that the impossibility of experience is relevant to this
debate. Why think that the only deprivations that are genuine harms are those that are,
in principle, possible to experience? It seems strange to suggest that betrayals count as
harms because it is possible for the person to experience them (though he typically
never does), but the goods lost through death do not count as harms because it is
impossible for the person to experience these losses. If one is committed to the view
that betrayal is a harm, and that it is a harm for the person betrayed even if he is
unaware of its occurrence, then this person should also concede that one is harmed by
the fact that death deprives him of goods.
It seems, then, when we re-cast arguments against the fear of death so that they
address the fear of the fact that death deprives one of goods, it is still not obvious that
the fear is irrational.
Conclusion
In this chapter I reconsidered some of the arguments against fearing death with
the intention of showing that they are not entirely convincing. I have suggested that the
classical arguments, put forth by Epicurus and Lucretius, may miss the point.
Contemporary arguments do the same. Now, I grant that I have not shown that fear of
death is, indeed, rational. Rather, I attempted to cast doubt on some of the reasons often
given to illustrate the irrationality of the fear of death.
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CHAPTER 4
REDUCTIVE ACCOUNTS OF EMOTIONAL RATIONALITY
Introduction
In “Fearing Death" (Rorty 1983) Amelie Rorty makes the following claim about
the fear of death:
But even if it is not rational to fear death, it does not follow that we
should try to free ourselves from such fear. For while there may be
many good reasons for not fearing one’s own nonexistence, there might
still also be strong reasons for fearing, as well as regretting one’s own
death. I shall argue that it is proper to have irresolvably conflicting
attitudes towards one's own death: it is inappropriate to fear death and
yet it is also inappropriate not to fear it, or to attempt to cease fearing it
(Rorty 1983,175).
Some have argued that Rorty’s central thesis in “Fearing Death’’ is that the fear of death
is paradoxical: fearing death is both irrational and rational (or appropriate and
inappropriate). 34 If so, then Rorty is in the rather unfortunate position of having
defended a contradiction. In the first half of this paper I argue that this is an incorrect
characterization of her view. I show that, while her view may seem paradoxical, it is
indeed consistent. In the second half of the paper I turn to a slightly different criticism.
Pace Rorty, I believe that when one evaluates the fear of death, he should make use of a
“non-reductive” conception of emotional rationality.
3
' In this section I look closely at
34
See de Sousa (2003).
35
Throughout this paper I will often refer to “reductive” and "non-reductive” views of
emotional rationality. A reductive view is one according to which the rationality of an
emotion is explained in terms of familiar kinds of rationality, such as epistemic or
instrumental rationality. A view is non-reductive when it explains the rationality of an
emotion without making use of other types of rationality.
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arguments that Ronald de Sousa advances in support of the non-reductive thesis, and
show that they are defective in some important ways. I then develop my own reasons
for thinking that emotional rationality is not reducible to the more familiar types of
rationality. If I am right about this, then Rorty, as well as others, have brought the
wrong considerations to bear on the question of whether fearing death is rational.
36
Background Issues
In Chapter 3 I tried to show that it is important (and difficult) to identify the
object of one’s emotions. Recall that emotions are all intentional sates. They are object
directed; they are about something. That emotions take objects is easy to see: when I
am angry with friend for forgetting my birthday, it is clear that my anger is about
something. What that something is, however, is not so clear. Is my friend the object?
Is the state of affairs that consists of my friend’s forgetting my birthday the object? Is
the fact that this state of affairs has the property of being a case of hurtful neglect the
object?
I also said in Chapter 3 that identifying the object of our fear when we fear death
is equally problematic. When one fears death, he could fear the state of non-being, that
he will be harmed by the fact that death will deprive him of goods he otherwise would
have had, that his friends and family will be left to struggle without him, that he will no
longer be able to influence people’s opinions of him, and so on.
37
Rorty acknowledges
that there can be many things that we fear when we fear death, but if you recall, her
36
For historical examples of similar mistakes see Epicurus (1987) and Lucretius (1997).
Fora more contemporary example see Murphy (1976).
37
Most of these objects are states of affairs. 1 do not mean to suggest that most objects
of emotions are abstract entities. I believe that for some emotions, perhaps fear and
love, the emotion is often a relation between a person and a non-propositional object.
See Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of this issue.
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discussion of the fear of death presupposes a very specific object. She says, ”...There
are some who fear death as such, who fear their nonexistence. It is the appropriateness
of this fear that I should like to examine: the fear of death as the fear of non-being,
rather than the fear of the various harms that attend death” (Rorty 1983, 178).
In addition to clarifying which object her arguments presuppose, Rorty
addresses a second conceptual issue concerning the species of the fear of death
employed in her argumentation. To understand Rorty’s view on this, I will first
introduce a distinction that she draws between two different types of fear. She says,
Although we shall later turn to other sorts of fears
—
generalized anxiety,
fear without a specifiable object—we are initially primarily concerned
with a state of fear, experienced in a specific harm-avoiding way, fear
of... rather than fear that... Such fears presuppose apprehending an
object as dangerous or threatening in such a way that it generates some
sort of flight reaction, one that can be checked or overcome, although
usually with some difficulty.. .(Rorty 1983, 176).
Let us call these two types of fears ‘generalized-fear’ and ‘safeguarding-fear.’ If one
were to apply this distinction to the fear of death, as I believe Rorty does, one would
generate two different species of the fear of death: (1) the generalized fear of death
(Rorty refers to this as the “metaphysical fear of death”), and (2) the safeguarding fear
of death. According to Rorty, the metaphysical fear of death is . .the sort (of fear) that
a person might have when there is no clear and present danger, a fear she might have
sitting in her study and looking out of the window and brooding over the nature of
things” (Rorty 1983, 185). With respect to the safeguarding fear of death, I presume
Rorty means the type of fear that one experiences, for example, when one sees a light at
the end of the tunnel but suddenly realizes that the source of the light is the out-of-
control train careening towards him. Seeing this train would, most likely, result in some
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type of coordinated response behavior. Perhaps we would frantically attempt to get out
of the tunnel, eyes wide, hearts pounding, and palms sweating.
While I am not entirely satisfied with this distinction—one might complain that
a generalized fear is no fear at all considering that it has no object— I will simply agree
with her on the point that there are two different kinds of fear of death. Unfortunately,
her drawing of this distinction seems to do very little for her as she fails to state which
species she means to make use of in her thesis. Is she talking about the safeguarding
fear of death, the metaphysical fear of death, or both?
De Sousa (de Sousa 2003) claims that Rorty's thesis concerns only the
metaphysical fear of death, “The fear of death, as annihilation, she has boldly argued, is
both rat/ona/and irrational' (de Sousa 2003, 102). His interpretation ignores what I
have termed the ‘safe-guarding fear of death.’ I will discuss his view of Rorty’s
position later in the paper, and will show that, on either interpretation, Rorty’s view is
unacceptable.
Rorty’s Thesis
I quoted a passage earlier in which Rorty claims that it is inappropriate to fear
one’s non-being, and it is inappropriate not to fear one’s own non-being. The claim
made there, in addition to other claims made throughout the paper, suggest that Rorty
was advancing a paradox. For instance, Rorty states that, “Many have said, and I think
some have shown, that it is irrational to fear death” (Rorty 1983, 175). She also says,
“But if it is not rational to fear death, it does not follow' that we should try to free
ourselves from such fear. For while there may be many good reasons for not fearing
one’s own nonexistence, there might still also be strong reasons for fearing... one's own
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death” (Rorty 1983, 175), and she later says, “We shall see why it might be appropriate
and even rational to choose to be capable of the sort of fear that has, as one of its
consequences, a susceptibility to the fear of death, even when, on some particular cases,
that fear is incoherent” (Rorty 1983, 178). She also claims that, “However incoherent
and perhaps even harmful in itself, fear of death seems more efficient than an indefinite
number of particular fears we would have to have: fear of exposure in very low
temperatures, fear of dehydration, fear of this and fear of that” (Rorty 1983, 181).
In a 2003 paper, de Sousa revisits Rorty’s controversial view, and says the
following “A striking paradox proffered by Amelie Rorty will bring us back to the
question of the rationality of the fear of death. The fear of death as annihilation, she has
boldly argued, is both rat/ona/and'irrationa/. .
.
First, for the reason Epicurus gave, it is
indeed irrational to fear annihilation... Rorty’s quarrel with Epicurus, however, appeals
to a more fundamental biological perspective, stressing the fitness-enhancing function
of the fear of death. She argues that the fear of death is an inevitable concomitantof the
existence of dispositions to ‘functional fears.’ So, Rorty concludes, it is both rational
andirrationa/to/ear deat/j... ”(de Sousa 2003, 1 02-103). De Sousa later
acknowledges that the reasons for and against fearing death are incommensurate, and
that, on Rorty’s view, the “incommensurability is traced to the fact that the reasons to
fear and the reasons not to fear death belong to different perspectives, or indeed to
different orders of explanation. They relate respectively to proximate-psychological
and remote-biological facts...”(de Sousa 2003, 104). Whether or not de Sousa really
believes that her view is paradoxical is unclear. Since he never retracts his initial
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comments, perhaps he believes that the existence of reasons for and reasons against
(even if they are different types of reasons) are sufficient for a paradox.
Contrary to de Sousa, I think that Rorty does not assert a contradiction. Rather,
I think her point is that we can evaluate the fear of death on two different dimensions,
and when we do, we encounter something somewhat puzzling: we have reason to fear
death and we have reason not to fear death, and the reasons cannot be summarized to
generate an all- things- considered judgment. This reading of her thesis is supported by
her claiming that, “...the reasons for fearing death are not commensurable with those
for not fearing it: no summary weighted judgment is possible. Both views are
categorically valid, requiring full assent” (Rorty 1983, 176). Again, de Sousa seems to
agree with this, but he, nonetheless, also believes that this generates a paradox.
On Rorty's view, the incommensurability of the reasons is explained by the fact
that she evaluates the fear of death by appeal to principles that typically govern
instrumental rationality ^z%/epistemic rationality. In other words, she defends the view
that the fear of death is epistemically irrational, but instrumentally rational. If her
arguments are successful, then she has shown us that the fear of death is a peculiar
emotion, not that it is paradoxical.
Epistemic Rationality of Emotion
Rationality is often described as an epistemic concept. Be/ie/s
,
rather than
desires os actions
;
are subject to epistemic criticism. Without presenting a full-fledged
account of rational belief, I would like to suggest that emotions, when they have the
appropriate structure, can be evaluated for their epistemic rationality as well. In these
cases the epistemic rationality of the emotion "piggy-backs” on the epistemic rationality
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of the emotion's constitutive belief. Emotions are rational, then, just in case their
constitutive beliefs are rationally justified.
It is easy to see why this should be considered a “reductive” view of emotional
rationality. The rationality of the emotion is explained solely in terms of its constitutive
beliefs rationality. The emotion’s rationality is reduced to, or explained by appeal to, a
more familiar kind of rationality—epistemic rationality. That this account does not
assume that emotional rationality is suigeneris is, it could be argued, an appealing
feature of this account. We understand (or at least we think we understand) what it is
for a belief to be rational. If emotional rationality is explained by reference to a widely
understood concept, then it seems that we should likewise have a strong grip on
emotional rationality.
Moreover, this seems like a plausible way to explain an emotion’s rationality. It
is intuitively plausible to suppose that emotions are complex states made up of beliefs
plus feelings; emotions are rational when their beliefs are rationally justified. This is
surely the type of emotional rationality that Rorty had in mind when she said, “But
what could be meant by evaluating the appropriateness of an attitude, if not evaluating
the truth or validity of the belief it presupposes?”(Rorty 1983, 178). And also that, “It
seems all too easy to show that at least some fears of death—those that implicitly re-
introduce a subject to experience its own non-being—are irrational because they
presuppose an incoheren/ be/ief (Rorty 1983, 178 [my italics]). Although she never
formally states a criterion for the epistemic rationality of an emotion, I believe that the
following captures the central idea found in these quotations:
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ER: A token emotion. E, is epistemically rational if and only if E's
constitutive belief is epistemically rational.
Now, supposing that I have correctly formulated Rorty’s criterion for the
epistemic rationality of emotion, I have not yet shown that, on her view, the
metaphysicalTear of death is epistemically irrational. Considering that Rorty asserts
both that, “The anxious metaphysical fears castigated by the Epicureans... are indeed
irrational,” and that the belief at the heart of this fear is “the thought of experiencing
one’s own non-being...” (Rorty 1983, 187), it seems reasonable to conclude that she
would agree that the metaphysical fear of death is epistemically irrational. With these
remarks in mind, I suggest the following reconstruction of her main argument:
1. An emotion is epistemically rational if and only if its constitutive belief is
epistemically rational.
2. The constitutive belief of the metaphysical fear of death is not epistemically
rational.
3. If 1 and 2, then the metaphysical fear of death is not epistemically rational.
4. Therefore, the metaphysical fear of death is not epistemically rational.
PI is simply a restatement of ER, which, as I have stated, is a plausible interpretation of
Rorty’s view. Moreover, I suppose that if one were interested in evaluating emotions
for their epistemic rationality, one would do so by appeal to the criterion in PI . P2 is
slightly more difficult to explain. One problem with this premise is that it involves a
claim about the rationality of the belief that is a constituent of the type the metaphysical
fearofdeath. The truth of p2 requires the satisfaction of the following conditions: (1)
every token of the metaphysical fear of death must have a belief component, and (2) the
beliefs) specified in (1) must be epistemically irrational.
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It is easy to see that the first condition is met. There are no cases in which one
experiences angst about her inevitable annihilation, but forms no beliefs about that state
of affairs. This emotion just is the emotion that one experiences while she is sitting in
her study, thinking about the fact that she will no longer be, and feeling anxious as a
result of such thoughts. The second condition, which I think is also met, requires a bit
more argumentation. The constitutive belief of the metaphysical fear of death must be
an evaluative belief about the object, death. 38 For instance, it has to be the belief that
my own nonexistence will be harm/u/ox terrifying fox me while I am dead, or that I will
experience something dreadful while I am dead. As all such beliefs reintroduce a
subject of experience who no longer exists, all such beliefs are incoherent. Thus, the
second condition is met, securing the truth of p2. P3 is an application of the principle in
pi to the metaphysical fear of death; the metaphysical fear of death is indeed
epistemically irrational.
In this section I have tried to show that, when Rorty claims that the fear of death
is irrational, she means to say that the fear of death is epistemica/iy irrational. I have
also tried to develop her view, and reconstruct her argument in defense of this view.
While I find her reasoning for the irrationality if the fear convincing, I do not accept her
view about the rationality the fear of death. It is to this topic that I turn in the next
section of the chapter.
The Instrumental Rationality of Emotion
Rorty maintains that, while we have reason (epistemic reason) not to fear death,
we still have good reason to fear death. She says, for instance, that “However
38
This is a view that is advanced by philosophers who defend “cognitive theories” of
emotion.
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incoherent and perhaps even in itself harmful, the fear of death seems more efficient
than an indefinite number of particular fears we would have to have: fear of exposure in
very low temperatures, fear of dehydration...” (Rorty 1983, 181 [my italics]). A few
paragraphs later, in her response to the objection that the sheer recognition of danger
can play the motivational role that is played by the fear of death, she reiterates this
view. She is careful, though, to acknowledge that the following is mere “speculation:”
Suppose that the recognition of danger could directly motivate
safeguarding measures, without the intervention of an independent
motivational attitude like fear, but that it did so /ess ejficient/y and
effective/}’ than fear. Suppose that such recognition is more
discriminating and less disturbing than fear... but suppose that affectively
uncharged reactions to sudden unpredictable dangers are also slower and
less effectively mobilized. Then one might wish to be capable of the
fears associated with the danger of death, even though there were less
unpleasant ways of safeguarding oneself for standard minor dangers, that
do not require massive rapid reaction (Rorty 1983, 183 [my italics]).
Given these remarks, it should be obvious that Rorty is not advancing a paradox.
Efficiency has nothing to do with epistemic rationality. Very few people defend the
position that the efficiency of a belief is relevant to its epistemic rationality. If a belief
is efficient, it is not, thereby, epistemically rational. These properties, efficiency and
effectiveness, are more akin to a second, equally familiar, kind of rationality—
instrunienta/rational ity
.
Instrumental rationality is the kind of rationality that typically applies to actions
and desires, but for the sake of simplicity I will restrict my introductory remarks to the
instrumental rationality of action. Roughly speaking, an agent's action displays
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instrumental rationality if and only if it is a means to an agent specified goal or end.
3g
These goals or ends do not need to be valuable; they just need to be targets picked out
by the agent. Instrumental rationality, then, does not have a moral component. Thus, I
will allow actions towards vicious ends to be instrumental ly rational. If I have the goal
of robbing a bank, it is instrumental ly rational for me to familiarize myself with the
workings of the bank vault’s security system. A nobler end may be something such as
finishing a marathon. In light of this goal, it is rational for me to run several 18-20 mile
training runs. If I did not have this goal, it would be difficult to see how these actions
could be rational.
Perhaps the same is true of emotions. If I desire to be more open-minded, then it
is instrumental ly irrational for me to get angry whenever I am presented with a view I
dislike. Or, if I desire to get over a bad relationship, it is instrumentally irrational for
me to get overwhelmed with sadness whenever I think about my loss. Notice that this
notion of rationally, like the one before it, is also reductive. The rationality of the
emotion is again reduced to a more familiar type of rationality—instrumental
rationality. And, as was the case with the previous account, this reduction has the
advantage of making use of a notion that we (seem to) understand. I think it is fairly
clear what it means for something to be the means by which I can achieve some end; if
we criticize emotions in this way, then we, likewise, have a fairly strong grasp on what
it means for an emotion to be rational.
3v Some philosophers criticize the rationality of action by appeal to the action's utility.
According to these views, an action is rational when it maximizes agent-relative value.
I think that one can capture what Rorty wishes to say about the fear of death by appeal
to either instrumental rationality or agent-relative utility. I prefer to discuss
instrumental rationality; nonetheless, I believe that the same criticisms I make in this
section would apply equally well if were discuss the utility of the fear of death.
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I suggest that we formulate the criterion for the instrumental rationality of
emotion as follows:
IR: An emotion, E, of a person, S, is instrumentally rational if and only if E is
an efficient means to some end that S holds.
In my criterion, I stated that the means must be an e/fic/enr means. The reason for this
is that I did not want to suggest that anymeans to an end is instrumentally rational. If
there are two means to an end, one of which will achieve that end more quickly, then it
would be instrumentally irrational to choose the slower route. This is a very important
feature of the account, for it directly pertains to the way in which Rorty makes use of
this evaluative concept. Although Rorty never uses the term ‘instrumental rationality'
in her discussion of the fear of death, I think that we can easily translate her remarks
into talk of instrumental rationality. We can say that the fear of death is instrumentally
rational insofar as fearing death provides us with the best means by which we increase
the likelihood of our survival. The fear of death exhibits this type of rationality—unlike
the belief that something is dangerous, or the fear of being hurt—in virtue of its being
more effic/ennhm any of these other beliefs or fears. The passages I quoted at the start
of this section clearly support this interpretation of Rorty's view.
What is Rorty’s View?
My discussion thus far, unlike my discussion of the epistemic irrationality of the
fear of death, has made no presuppositions about the species of the fear of death under
evaluation. And. while I agreed at the outset to proceed under the assumption that
Rorty’s central thesis concerns the metaphysical fear of death, we may have to abandon
that supposition. The reason for this is that Rorty’s discussion of the instrumental
rationality of the fear of death suggests three possible interpretations: (A) the
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metaphysical fear of death is a necessary by-product of functional fears; (B) the
safeguarding fear of death is instrumental ly rational; and (C) the metaphysical fear of
death provoked us to pursue worthwhile activities.40
My reason for suggesting (A) as one possible interpretation is explained by the
following passage: “The anxious metaphysical fears castigated by the Epicureans—the
scholar's terror of his own non-being or that of the poet contemplating Chamonix or Mt
Aetna—are indeed irrational. We have suggested that these fears are by-products of
functional fears” (Rorty 1983, 186). Certain fears, according to Rorty, “...issue in the
fear of death” (Rorty 1 983, 1 80). 1 take her point to be that being disposed to
experience highly functional fears, fears that we would not want to be without,
inevitably leads one to experience the metaphysical fear of death. The metaphysical
fear of death, then, is im/rumen/a/fy rat/oaa/oxfunct/ona/insofar as it is a necessary
consequence of being disposed to experience other, very desirable, fears. As you recall,
this is de Sousa’s reading of her view.
It is unlikely, however, that (A) is true. First, I doubt that the metaphysical fear
of death is, indeed, a by-product of dispositions to other functional fears. Why should
one think that the disposition to functional fears “issues” in the metaphysical fear of
death? Rorty does not provide an adequate answer to this question. I suspect that
several people who are disposed to have functional fears do not necessarily brood over
the fact that they will no longer be. Thus, we have good reason to think that
40
1 do not think that this same worry applies to the epistemic rationality of the fear of
death. First, unlike the instrumental rationality of the fear of death, Rorty is very clear
about what species of fear she has in mind. Second, I suspect that there are some tokens
of the safeguarding fear of death that do not involve belief, so it makes sense to assume
that she is talking about the epistemic rationality of the metaphysica/fearofdeath.
82
dispositions to functional fears do no/ issue in the metaphysical fear of death. In my
opinion, even if this was what Rorty meant when she said that the fear of death is
rational, and even if this interpretation has the advantage of making her original thesis
more unified, it is so implausible that perhaps (B) is a more charitable thesis.
According to (B), the safeguarding fear of death is instrumental ly rational. I
believe that my introductory comments in this section provide adequate reason to
believe that this is a second, and equally worthy, interpretation of her project. Surely it
is not the case that the metaphysical fear of death is more “efficient than an indefinite
number of particular fears we would have to have: fear of exposure in very low
temperatures, fear of dehydration...” (Rorty 1983, 181). Perhaps, then, when Rorty
discusses the rationality of the fear of death she intended (or should have intended) to
make a remark about the safeguarding fear of death.
Rather than delve too deeply into whether this was Rorty's actually position, I
will go straight to my criticism. First, if this were the point that she was making about
the instrumental rationality of the fear of death, her central thesis would be this: the
safeguarding fear of death is instrumental ly rational and the metaphysical fear of death
is epistemically irrational. But her remarks throughout “Fearing Death”—that it is
inappropriate to fear death and inappropriate to cease fearing death—do not cohere very
well with thesis (B). For such remarks strongly suggest that she is evaluating the same
species of the fear of death. Perhaps this is a point in favor of (A).
Second, even if she intends to defend (B), her defense is very weak. In order for
the safeguarding fear of death to be instrumentally rational, it must be that other
emotions, such as anger, or other beliefs, such as the belief that something is dangerous,
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are not as effective as the fear of death at safeguarding a person against mortal damages.
She grants that this is an empirical question, but offers no empirical evidence in support
of the claim. Without any evidence, I see no reason to suppose that the motivational
role she assigns to the fear death is the one that it in fact plays. Or, alternatively, that it
is one that cannot be played by other fears, or by other attitudes.
Perhaps Rorty means to establish is (C), which is slightly different from (A).
According to (C), the metap/iys/ca/ ar of death is instrumentally rational insofar as it
provoked us to engage in worthwhile activities. The only passage that appears to
contain an argument for this comes at the close of the article:
But even if the fear of death leads to much folly, that doe not prove that
it always leads to folly, or that it only leads to folly. Fetishistic fears and
superstitious actions might even be beneficial, despite the care they give
us and the false beliefs they involve. One might ask: what else would we
be doing with our time? If we did not fear death, would there be a more
rational measure of how best to engage our interests and spend our time?
Consider the inquiries—astronomy, biology, psychology....that on an
Epicurean account might have begun with the fear of death (Rorty 1 983,
186).
It seems that the central point of this passage is that the metaphysical fear of death is
valuable insofar as it plays some role in the causal history of various scientific inquiries.
Perhaps she is assuming that individuals, when they contemplate their fate, will be
motivated to leave some sort of mark on the world. Being motivated in this way will
lead them to contemplate matters of great importance, matters that ultimately made a
profound impact on the shape of the world.
How might we understand this in terms of instrumental rationality? Recall my
statement of IR: An emotion, E, of a person, S, is instrumentally rational if and only if E
is an efficient means to some end that S holds. Although the concept of instrumental
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rationality is agent relative, so actions/emotions are rational for an agent given that
agent’s end, I suggest that it can also be understood as an agent neutral concept. If 1
specify ends in an agent neutral way, then 1 think we have room to make sense of the
claim that the metaphysical fear of death is instrumentally rational. Let us suppose that
the ends were thefartheringofscience, or increasedunderstandingofthe wor/d. Let
us also suppose that these ends were met through advances in astronomy, biology, and
so on. Ifwe agree with Rorty that these inquiries “began with the fear of death," then
we can see how the metaphysical fear of death is instrumentally rational. The
metaphysical fear of death was the motivating factor that provoked us to make
intellectual progress.
This interpretation of Rorty' s project has the virtue of making her main thesis
much more interesting: the metaphysical fear of death is epistemically irrational and
instrumentally rational. Unfortunately, I suspect that (C) is false. It is highly
speculative to suggest that the fear of death provided the motivation for the furthering of
scientific fields. I am not sure how, exactly, these areas were developed, but it seems
unlikely to me that they have their origins in the fear of death. In my opinion, then, the
argument Rorty gives for the instrumental rationality of the metaphysical fear of death
is weak and unconvincing.
The upshot of this discussion in this: even when we consider three different
interpretations of Rorty’s view, she has failed to make any convincing points about the
instrumental rationality of the fear of death.
1 now leave my criticism of Rorty’s position and turn my attention to a slightly
different project. I will argue that when we evaluate the fear of death, and emotions
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generally, for their epistemic and instrumental rationality, we run into various problems.
This gives us reason to abandon the reductive accounts of emotional rationality that
Rorty seemed to endorse in her paper, and instead develop an account of rationality that
applies specifically to emotions.
Reasons to Avoid Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches
De Sousa’s Arguments
In T/ie ftat/ona/fty o/Emot/on (de Sousa 1987), Ronald de Sousa tries to show
that emotional rationality cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of what he calls
‘cognitive’ and ‘strategic’ rationality. Although these two types of rationality are
roughly the same as what I have been referring to as ‘epistemic’ and ‘instrumental’
rationality, de Sousa defines them as follows:
(R6) A representational state can be assessed in terms of the value of its
probable ejfecfs (in the causal sense): this evaluates its stra/eg/c
rationality, or utility. By contrast, a state is cognitively rational if it is
arrived at in such a way as to be probably adequate to some actual state
of the world that it purports to represent (de Sousa 1987, 164).
If de Sousa is successful in showing that emotional rationality is reducible to neither
cognitive nor strategic rationality, then we have reason to think that the ways in which
Rorty criticizes the fear of death are unacceptable.
While I agree with de Sousa’s conclusions—emotional rationality cannot be
reduced to the paradigm cases of rationality— I do not think that the arguments he
advances in defense of these conclusions are very convincing. His overall strategy is to
show that, since emotions are not combinations of beliefs and desires, the criteria for
rational beliefs and desires cannot be the same criteria for rational emotions. He says,
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If emotions are just combinations of beliefs and desires...then the
principles governing their rationality would presumably be fully
accounted for by cognitive and strategic rationality. I have already given
two related arguments against this reductionist view: the problem of
hypothetical attitudes precludes emotions from being simply beliefs; the
variety of formal objects of emotions stops them from being identified
with either beliefs or desires (de Sousa 1987, 165).
His point is that, since emotions are not identical with, or reducible to, beliefs, desires,
or combinations of beliefs and desires, emotional rationality cannot be captured by
cognitive or strategic rationality. Call this argument “De Sousa's Non-reductive
Argument:”
1 . The principles governing the rationality of beliefs or desires apply to emotions
only if emotions are beliefs, desires, or combinations of beliefs and desires.
2. It is not the case that emotions are beliefs, desires, or combinations of beliefs
and desires.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that the principles governing the rationality of
beliefs or desires apply to emotions.
4. If 3, then the nature of the rationality involved in the assessment of emotional
rationality is neither cognitive nor is it strategic.
5. Therefore, the nature of the rationality involved in the assessment of emotional
rationality is neither cognitive nor is it strategic.
De Sousa devotes the majority of his discussion to defending P2. Rather than rehearsing
all of the arguments that he advances in defense of this claim, I will present two. I
begin with his argument that is designed to show that emotions are not beliefs, and then
move to his discussion of desire.
According to de Sousa, “the problem of hypothetical attitudes precludes
emotions from being simply beliefs” (de Sousa 1987, 165). He reasons that one cannot
entertain emotions in the same way that one can entertain beliefs, for entertainment is
all but endorsement, and to endorse something is just to believe it. not to emote it. By
way of explanation, consider the example de Sousa gives involving an indignant
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businessman who is angered by the fact that he has a female boss. Suppose that he tries
to convey his situation to you, and, although you are able to entertain various claims
about his situation (for the sake of argument) you cannot entertain his indignation.
...What are we doing when we entertain a possible belief? The answer
is that we are a// but endorsing some proposition. To endorse it is
simply for me to view it as true... But now what would it be to
entertain—without endorsing—a possible emotion? Not, surely, to do
all but endorse it. For endorsement is just another attitude. To endorse a
proposition is to simply be/ieve it—not to emote it, whatever that would
be” (de Sousa 1987, 156).
He has shown us that we can hypothetically adopt beliefs—we can all but endorse
them— but we cannot hypothetically adopt emotions. For it makes no sense to all but
endorse emotions since endorsement is like taking pro-attitude toward something, not
emoting it. In virtue of the fact that there is some feature that is had by all beliefs but
not by all emotions, emotions are not beliefs.
Although I grant that this is a convincing argument against the reduction of
emotion to belief, it is not clear to me that this implies that emotional rationality cannot
be reduced to cognitive rationality. De Sousa seems not to consider the possibility that
emotions, although not identical to beliefs, may have a necessary belief component. If
this is true, then one could easily reduce emotional rationality to cognitive rationality.
This is precisely what Rorty has done in her criticism of the fear of death. She does not
tdenti/yemotions with beliefs; rather, she makes the intuitively plausible assumption
that the metaphysical fear of death has a necessary belief component, and she then
reduces the rationality of the metaphysical fear of death to the rationality of its
constitutive belief. If one thinks that all emotions are necessarily constituted in part by
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beliefs about the object of the emotion, then one could easily adopt the view that
emotional rationality is explained by the rationality of the emotions' constitutive beliefs.
Moreover, even if one thought, as 1 do, that this view is false (that emotions are
not necessarily constituted in part by belief) it still has not shown that emotional
rationality never reduces to cognitive rationality. For surely some emotions are
constituted in part by beliefs, and in those cases it might well be reasonable to reduce
the emotions' rationality to the rationality of their constitutive beliefs. To show that a
reduction of this sort is unacceptable, 1 believe that considerations of unity must be
taken into account. What one must argue for, as 1 shall do shortly, is a unified account
of emotional rationality. That is, one must argue that the principles governing the
rationality of emotion should apply to all emotions; if there are principles that apply to
some but not all emotions, then those principles are unacceptable. Before I develop this
argument, however, I will address de Sousa’s views regarding strategic rationality.
De Sousa’s argument against the reduction of emotional rationality to strategic
rationality is difficult to decipher. He begins by introducing a distinction between
functional desires and emotional desires, where functional desires are constituents of
intentional actions, and emotional desires are constituents of (or are somehow related
to) to emotions. He says, “desire in itself, in addition to its connection with action,
sometimes has a phenomenological or emotional component. So we shall need some
criterion of rationality for that additional component of ‘emotional desire’” (de Sousa
1987, 166). Although it is not clear from this passage whether he takes emotional
desire to be a component of desire, or a distinct type of desire, let us assume that
emotional desires and functional desires are two different types of desire. Under this
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assumption, I think de Sousa's argument is that the only types of desires that are
appropriately criticized for their strategic rationality are functional desires. Emotional
desires require different principles of rationality. This is an important feature of his
view, so I will quote extensively from The Tariona/ity of.'Emotion:
What if someone says, ‘This attitude is irrational, because it's bad for
you?’ Parfit comments, ‘The fact that an attitude is bad for us does not
show that this attitude is irrational. It can at most show that we should
try to change this attitude...Grief is not irrational simply because it
brings unhappiness... ’(Parfit, 1984, 169). If you share this intuition, as I
do, then what is at question here is more than functional wanting. The
use of grief to illustrate something about desire shows that what Parfit is
concerned with is /he kindofdesire thai is appropriate/y assimi/afedto
an emoiion. If it is ever plausible to speak of an emotion as reasonable
or unreasonable, then we can do so regardless of its consequences or
those of any acts to which it might lead. The fact that something is bad
for us is definitely a reason (ceteris paribus) to avoid it. It is sufficient to
brand as irrational any action designed to procure it. But if, as Parfit
says, it is not enough to make the actual desiring of it irrational, then the
rationality of action is not a sufficient determinant of the rationality of
desire.... My aim here is only to point out that we can make sense of a
notion of rationality and of a notion of desire to which utility is
irrelevant” (de Sousa 1987, 167-168).
If you find Parfit and de Sousa’s line of thought convincing, then you should grant that,
at least in some cases, it makes sense to criticize attitudes without appeal to the utility of
holding those attitudes. This is surely the point that Parfit attempted to make by appeal
to the grief case— under certain circumstances it is rational to experience grief despite
the fact that experiencing grief is bad for one. Since experiencing grief is both rational
and leads to bad consequences, it must be that the emotion’s rationality is disconnected
from its utility.
If my distinction between emotional and strategic desires was correct—that they
are two distinct kinds of desires—then surely the types of desires that are “appropriately
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assimilated to an emotion” are emotional desires. Since emotions are like this, and thus
cannot be assimilated to the sort of desires that are connected with strategic rationality,
it is inappropriate to criticize emotions for their utility. Emotions require a different
type of rationality; strategic rationality just will not fit the bill.
Criticism of de Sousa
I have a few remarks and criticisms to make about de Sousa's line of
argumentation. First, 1 think that his appeals to our intuitions about grief are not very
convincing. One could reasonably claim that, although grief is unpleasant, overall it
produces more utility than would be produced ifwe did not experience it. Pain, in some
sense, is also like this. Both lead to unpleasant consequences, but, overall, perhaps we
are made better off by experiencing them. Thus, it is not clear to me that the rationality
of experiencing grief cannot be explained by the utility of experiencing grief.
Second, while I agree that there is a kind of rationality that is disconnected from
utility, it does not follow that emotions are to be evaluated by that kind of rationality.
Simply because it has been shown that there is a different way in which emotions can
be criticized, it is not thereby the case that we jv^^/i/criticize emotions by appeal to
that criterion.
In all fairness to de Sousa, it is possible that I have misunderstood his point.
Perhaps he is simply pointing out that there is a concept of rationality that is not
informed by utility, and it is this concept that he is interested in analyzing.
Unfortunately, this is not entirely consistent with the remarks he made in the quotation I
cited at the start of this section. Recall he said,
If emotions are just combinations of beliefs and desires... then the
principles governing their rationality would presumably be fully
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accounted for by cognitive and strategic rationality. I have already given
two related arguments against this reductionist view: the problem of
hypothetical attitudes precludes emotions from being simply beliefs; the
variety of formal objects of emotions stops them from being identified
with either beliefs or desires (de Sousa 1987, 165).
Here he expresses his intention to show that since emotions are not reducible to beliefs,
desires, or combinations of beliefs and desires, emotional rationality is not reducible to
strategic and cognitive rationality. If he intended to defend the weaker claim, he would
have no reason to argue for the non-reduction thesis. In other words, de Sousa is not
only trying to show that there is a third sense of rationality, but also that this third sense
is the sense that we should be interested in when we criticize emotions. I have tried to
show that the reasons he offers in defense of this are unconvincing.
More Arguments Against the Reduction
Although I find de Sousa’s line of argumentation dissatisfying, I do think that
his conclusions are correct. I close this section, then, by presenting and defending my
own reasons for this.
When I introduced ER, I claimed that evaluating an emotion for its epistemic
rationality requires that the emotion under evaluation have a belief component. The
philosophical view that each emotion has, as a constituent, a belief or some other
cognitive element is the cognitive theory of emotion. As I indicated in Chapter 2, there
are several different versions of the theory, but most are committed to two principles:
(1) every emotion is constituted, in part, by a cognition; and (2) an emotion is the type
that is it in virtue of its cognitive component. According to the cognitive theory, then,
the token episode of fear I experienced when I saw the train careening out control in my
direction was constituted (in part) by an evaluative belief about the train. Perhaps it was
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the belief that this thingmayharm me. And this was a token of fear, rather than
jealousy, because the content of the belief made reference to the possibility of a harm.
As I discussed this theory in great detail in Chapter 2, 1 will not go into great
detail here. 1 will, however, reiterate what I take to be the most convincing argument
against the theory. If the cognitive theory were true, then each emotion type—fear,
surprise, sadness, happiness, joy—-would follow a particular scheme, and each time the
type was tokened the token would take on the shape of its type’s scheme. Fear, as a
type of emotion, has the belief that something—in most cases the object of the
emotion—may be a harm as a constituent part. Each time a person tokens fear, she
believes that the object of her fear may be harmful. Yet it is sometimes the case that we
token fear without following the necessary scheme. We either experience fear in the
absence of this belief, or experience fear while positively believing that the object of
our fear is not harmful.
An everyday example will nicely illustrate my point: you awake in the middle
of the night and glance at your arm to discover that a black bug is crawling up it. You
flick the bug off of your arm, and then lay awake for hours dreading the possibility of
the black bug’s return. At no point during this time do you ever form the belief that the
bug may be harmful to you. In fact, you positively believe that the bug is not a harm to
you. Nonetheless, I think that it is obvious that you experienced fear at that time
—
your
heart was racing, your eyes were scanning the bed covers, you took steps to prepare
yourself for the bug’s return, and so on. The cognitive theory cannot account for this
token of fear since, according to my description of the case, you do not believe that the
bug may harm you. If the cognitive theory is false, and if criticizing emotions for their
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epistemic rationality presupposes the truth of the theory, then I think we have good
reason to avoid thinking about emotions from the epistemic perspective.
One could object to my criticism by arguing that, (1) I did believe that the bug
could harm me. but it was an unconscious belief; or (2) my argument, like de Sousa’s
argument, is too far reaching. Some emotions do have the appropriate structure to be
evaluated for their epistemic rationality, and those emotions can and should be
evaluated for their epistemic rationality. With respect to the first objection, I believe
that I adequately dealt with the move to unconscious beliefs in the Chapter 2. Without
already being convinced by the cognitive theory, then there is no reason to assume in
some cases that I had the appropriate belief.
There is a second problem with the move to unconscious beliefs. This move
seems to undermine part of the original motivation for positing the cognitive theory.
Philosophers made the move to cognitivism in an effort to explain how we can
determine whether an emotion is rational. On the supposition that the constituent belief
of the emotion is unconscious, however, then one may encounter problems when she
tries to evaluate the emotion for its epistemic rationality. For we do not know whether
she has the appropriate belief, and (if we are not already convinced by the cognitive
theory) we have no reason to assume that she has the appropriate belief. Since we do
not have access to her beliefs, we cannot know whether the emotion is epistemically
rational. This is not an outright refutation to the view; rather, it is an epistemological
worry about whether, in some cases, we can know the rational status of an emotion.
The move to unconscious beliefs bars us from knowing, and perhaps this is an
unacceptable implication of this move.
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With respect to the second objection raised above, one might complain that even
though not ^//emotions have a belief component, some do, and. perhaps it is
appropriate to evaluate those emotions for their epistemic rationality. In my opinion,
the reason to avoid thinking about emotions in this way is that very few token emotions
have a belief component. This is problematic. I think that we need to make use of a
umj?ea'\hQoxy of emotional rationality, and by that I mean that we need to make use of a
criterion that can apply equally well to all emotions.
If one does not offer a unified account of emotional rationality, then the onus is
on him to explain why we evaluate some token emotions for their epistemic rationality,
and other token emotions for their prudential rationality. Moreover, he must provide a
principled way to distinguish those emotions that are evaluated by appeal to one
criterion, from those emotions that are evaluated by appeal to an entirely different
criterion .
41
Without any such reasons, I think it is reasonable to demand that one's
theory of emotional rationality satisfy the unity requirement. If you share this
preference, then the fact that some and not all emotions can be evaluated from the
epistemic perspective gives you reason to avoid ever explaining emotional rationality in
terms of epistemic rationality.
What about instrumental considerations? This is a slightly more challenging
question. I suspect that when we criticize emotions, it is often the case that we appeal to
instrumental considerations. For example, we may encourage our friend to stop crying
41
The obvious answer, that only emotions involving beliefs are criticized for their
epistemic rationality, and all other emotions are criticized for their instrumental
rationality, seems not very satisfying. For the emotions that have the requisite structure
to be evaluated from the epistemic perspective can also be evaluated for their
instrumental rationality. In those cases, what reason do we have to prefer one type of
criticism rather than the other?
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over her cheating boyfriend because crying will not facilitate her recovery, or we may
tell a colleague that his anger over some unfair decision is silly as it will not make it any
more likely that he will get tenure. These seem to be very useful criticisms of emotions,
and they are certainly criticisms that most have undertaken at some point.
Even though I agree that we often think about emotions in these terms, I wonder
whether it is a mistake to do so. In standard cases of emotional experiences, individuals
have very little direct control over their emotional responses, and criticizing intentional
states for their instrumental rationality makes sense only if the intentional state under
evaluation is subject to direct agent control. For example, a person may know that it is
most in her own self-interest to be calm, happy, and pleasant while presenting her work
to an audience. Despite the fact that she knows this, her anxieties do not disappear
when she is in those situations. Since she does not have direct control over their
anxieties, it makes no sense to criticize them from the instrumental perspective.
Now, one could reasonably object at this point by pointing out that, while we
have little ^>v?r/control over our emotions, we do have indirectcontrol, and having
indirect control is what is required for criticizing states for their instrumental
rationality .
42
So, although it is true that one cannot directly will-away her anxieties in
the case above, she can take measures that will lead to the reduction of her anxieties.
Perhaps she can try to change her disposition to feel anxious in such situations through
some kind of cognitive therapy.
4: One could also argue that the ability to have control (even indirect control) over some state is
irrelevant to whether that state is to be criticized for its instrumental rationality. I am not
convinced that this is the case, however. I am inclined to think that states over which we have
no control are best desenbed as non-rational
,
and so are immune from any kind of rational
evaluation.
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I am not convinced, however, that having indirect control (rather than direct
control) is what is indeed required to make sense of criticizing states for their
instrumental rationality. I will now argue that perhaps it makes sense to criticize states
from a certain perspective (the instrumental or the epistemic) only if those states are
basedon considerations from that perspective. And that, moreover, only states over
which we have direct control are based on instrumental considerations. If one does not
have direct control over some state, this state is not based on instrumental
considerations. If not, then that state is not to be criticized from the instrumental
perspective. If I am right, then I have shown that we must have direct control over
some state if we are to criticize it for its instrumental rationality. And, since we do not
have direct control over our emotions, it is a mistake to criticize them for their
instrumental rationality.
First, if a state is not based on certain considerations, then criticizing that state
by reference to those considerations is mistaken. Consider: Actions are based on
instrumental reasoning; before I set out to perform a course of action, I attempt to
determine which course of action most efficiently satisfies some end of mine. The
course of action that should I perform is the course that is most in my interest. And, if I
perform a course of action that frustrates some end, then I can be criticized for acting
irrationally. Beliefs, on the other hand, are not based on instrumental considerations.
Beliefs are based on evidence, and so are to be criticized from the epistemic
perspective. If I hold a belief that is not supported by evidence, my belief is irrational.
It makes little sense to criticize actions for their epistemic rationality and beliefs for
97
their instrumental rationality. The reason it makes little sense is that beliefs are based
on evidence and actions are based on the utilities of performing the actions.
We must now determine whether being based on instrumental considerations
requires direct control. I am of the opinion that it does. For, in order for our actions to
flow from instrumental considerations, we must assume that several alternative courses
of action are available to us and that we have control over which course of action we
adopt. If one were determined to perform some specific course of action, it would
hardly make sense to say that action was based on instrumental reasoning. Suppose,
due to some outside force, an individual had only one course of action available to her.
Does it make sense to say that action was basedon instrumental reasoning? No. The
reason it does not is that one does not have direct control over that action. Thus, in
order for our action to be based on instrumental considerations, then, we must have
direct control over which course of action we take.
To summarize, I think a state is based on instrumental considerations only if one
has direct control over that state. Since it makes sense to criticize a state from some
perspective only if it is based on that perspective, and since a state is based on
instrumental considerations only if one has direct control over that state, it follows that
it does not make sense to criticize states over which we have indirect control for their
instrumental rationality. Emotions, then, are not to be criticized for their instrumental
rationality.
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Conclusion
In this chapter 1 have looked closely at Rorty's view about the rationality of the
fear of death, and argued that she is not in fact advancing a paradox as was suggested by
de Sousa. She is, instead, defending the view that the fear of death can be criticized
from two different perspectives, the epistemic and the instrumental. When we criticize
the fear of death from both perspectives, we generate reasons (epistemic reasons)
against fearing death, and we generate reasons (instrumental reasons) for fearing death.
This is an interesting, and consistent, interpretation of Rorty’s view. However,
evaluating the fear of death (and emotions, generally) requires a different species of
rationality. Pace Rorty, I believe that we have reason to reject the reduction of
emotional rationality to epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality. I believe that
we ought to adopt a unified account of emotional rationality; ER is not unified, and is
therefore unacceptable. While I thought that the reduction to instrumental rationality
was slightly more difficult to reject, I nonetheless believe that there are problems with
this reduction. We do not have the direct access to emotions that we may need in order
for it to be worthwhile to criticize emotions in this way. Moreover, this criticism tells
us only about the agent, and nothing about the world. If one is of the opinion that
emotions inform us about the world, the instrumental approach will be dissatisfying.
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CHAPTER 5
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF EMOTIONAL RATIONALITY
Introduction
I argued in Chapter 4 that any acceptable account of emotional rationality must
avoid the reduction of emotional rationality to more familiar types of rationality, such as
epistemic and instrumental rationality. If I am correct about this, if reductive accounts
are objectionable, then we are now left with the project of developing a non-reductive
account of emotional rationality. That is the subject matter of Chapter 5.
I begin this chapter by looking closely at two non-reductive accounts, both of
which seem to treat emotional rationality as an analog of true belief. These views hold
that emotions are representational states that present their objects as having specific
evaluative properties; emotions are true when their objects have the evaluative
properties they are represented as having. According to the first, defended by Justin
D'Arms and Dan Jacobson (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000), emotional appropriateness is
determined by the extent to which an emotion’s shape and size are fitting. This view,
however, is a mere sketch of a view. For D’Arms and Jacobson do not give an account
of the kind of structure an emotion must have in order for this evaluation to occur. The
second view, developed by Ronald de Sousa (de Sousa 1987), does provide an account
of the structure required to evaluate emotions for their appropriateness. According to de
Sousa, emotions are defined by reference to paradigm scenarios, which fix the standards
of success for the emotions. His account is novel and interesting, but I will argue it
suffers from some weaknesses.
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In the second half of this chapter, I turn my attention toward a different kind of
non-reductive view, one that treats emotional rationality not as an analog of true belief,
but rather as an analog ofjusri/iedbelief. The kind of emotional justification that
interests me does make use of the concept of emotional truth, however, so the first half
of this chapter plays a very important role in understanding the second. Roughly
speaking, I defend the view that emotions are justified when they are produced (or
caused) by processes that are apt to generate more ‘"true” than “false” emotions. My
view, then, takes its inspiration from externalist accounts of bel iefjustification.
Standard Account of True Emotions
D’Arms and Jacobson
Justin D'Arms and Dan Jacobson develop an account of emotional rationality
(they prefer ‘appropriateness’) that is a paradigm example of views that take emotional
rationality to be an analog of true belief. According to D’Arms and Jacobson’s view, an
emotion’s appropriateness is determined by its size and shape, where the shape refers to
the accuracy of the emotion's presentation, and the size to its intensity. By way of
illustration, let us suppose I resented my sibling’s favored status with my mother. My
resentment represents this state of affairs as having the evaluative property beingan
undeservedgood My emotion’s shape is correct provided that this is indeed true ofmy
mother’s relationship with my sibling. The size is correct provided that my resentment
is neither an over nor an underreaction.
For D’Arms and Jacobson, emotional fittingness does not depend on mora/or
prudenlia/considerations. They say, “One can ask a prudential question, whether it is
good for you to feel F; or a moral question, whether it is right to feel F; or one can ask
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the all-in question of practical reason. But none of these questions is equivalent to the
question of whether F is fitting in the sense relevant to whether its object X is <t>”
(D'Arms and Jacobson 2000, 71). Fittingness, then, is determined by whether the object
(X), which is represented as having an evaluative property (<t>), does in fact have that
property (whether it is <t>). They say, “Emotions present things to us as having certain
evaluative features. When we ask whether an emotion is fitting, in the sense relevant to
whether its object is <£, we are asking about the correctness of these presentations”
(D'Arms and Jacobson 2000, 72). To return to my example above, my resentment
presents the relationship between my mother and my sister as being a certain way—as
being unfair to me—asking whether the emotion is fitting on D’Arms and Jacobson’s
view, amounts to asking whether my emotion’s presentation ofmy sibling's relationship
with my mother is correct (not morally right or instrumental ly valuable).
I will call their view ‘APR’:
APR: S’s emotion, E, taken towards object, O, is appropriate if and only
if (1) The evaluative property that E presents O as having is indeed had
by O, and (2) E is neither an over nor an underreaction given O.
D'Arms and Jacobson claim that APR does not presuppose a particular view about the
nature of emotion. It requires only that, “the emotions have sufficient structure to
ground reflection on whether or not they fit their objects” (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000,
73). It is possible, then, to generate different species ofAPR by hypothetically adopting
different theories about the nature of emotion.
Let us suppose that the cognitive theory is true. On this supposition, the
requisite structure would be given in the form of a be//e/ Beliefs are representational
states, so when we experience emotions we represent their objects as having certain
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evaluative properties by forming be/iefs about those properties. On this species ofAPR,
emotions would be appropriate when their constitutive beliefs accurately represented
their objects. That is, when the evaluative beliefs about their objects were true. This
view, like one of the views discussed in Chapter 4, requires that we evaluate emotions
by appeal to their constitutive beliefs. The two views differ, however, in their criterion
for success. According to ER, success is achieved when the emotion's constitutive
belief isJustified On the cognitive species of APR, however, success is a matter of
trut/?. While the two views differ in this way, the cognitive species ofAPR still
presupposes that emotions have the structure required for this type of evaluation. As I
have already argued that some emotions do not satisfy the belief requirement, this gives
us reason to doubt the acceptability of this version of APR.
There is a second version that seems slightly more plausible. Suppose
perceptions provided the requisite structure for the evaluation. On this view, emotions
are still representational states since (according to the intentionalist theory of
perception) perceptions represent.43 According to the perceptual theory of emotion,
emotions are (in part) perceptions of value. An emotion fits its object, then, when its
object does in fact have the evaluative property that it is perceived as having. On the
most plausible version of this theory, perceptions are to be construed in the broadest
sense. Items included in this category will not be limited only to sensory perceptions.
Perhaps perceptions include things such as memories, thoughts about future states of
affairs, and imaginings. The reason for including such mental entities as perceptions is
43
As was the case in Chapter 1, however, it is important to avoid reducing perceptions
to beliefs. For if we accepted the belief theory of perception, this version of APR would
be equivalent to the version previously discussed.
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that several emotions are either backwards or forwards looking. In these cases there is
no material object for our sensory perceptions to register.
To return to the resentment case presented above, my resentment of my sibling
involves my perceiving her relationship with my mother as unfair to me. According to
the perceptual theory, I do not have to form the belief that the relationship is unfair;
rather, 1 only have to see it as being unfair. How this perception occurs is not entirely
easy to explain. Perhaps the property of being unfair somehow supervenes on lower-
level properties, where the lower-level properties in this case are properties of situations
that involve my mother and my sister engaging in activities that exclude me.
Objections
Although I find the perceptual species ofAPR interesting, I worry that D'Arms
and Jacobson's general approach to emotional criticism may be wrongheaded. While
they agree that they are stipulating the meaning of a technical term that is based on a
folk psychological understanding of ‘irrational emotion,’ they find such criticisms
common and (obviously) worthy of considerable attention. They say,
Talk of fittingness of emotions may sound recherche, but ‘fittingness’ is
simply intended as a technical term for a familiar type of evaluation.
Endorsement and criticism of emotions on grounds of fit is a crucial tool
of our ordinary thought about them, and of our folk psychology...The
crucial point is that we regularly give weight to considerations of fit, in
deliberating about what to feel—not just about envy, but also shame, and
pride, guilt and anger, fear, jealousy, etc” (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000,
72).
However. I am not convinced that we do, as a matter of psychological fact, regularly
engage in such criticism. I suppose we sometimes do. Perhaps more often, though, we
find ourselves thinking about whether an individual's emotion is warrantedor
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just(//et/^ If so, then it is worthwhile to provide analyses of those kinds of emotional
criticism. Moreover, talking only about emotional truth does not provide us with the
conceptual machinery to explain acceptable, but false, emotions. For example, D'Arms
and Jacobson's view implies that all emotional responses to fictions are inappropriate.
Pity is not an appropriate response to take towards the trials of Anna Karenina because
Anna Karenina is not actually pitiful; she is not actual at all. Gory horror films often
disgust us, and yet there is nothing disgusting about makeup and special effects. More
generally, our emotional responses to fictions present to us the objects of our emotions
(be it in the form of a perception, a belief, or what have you) as having certain
evaluative properties. And it is never the case that these fictional states of affairs have
the properties that they are presented as having because it is never the case that these
states of affairs are actual. Thus, APR implies that all emotional responses to fictions
are indeed inappropriate.
For one to find this objection worrisome, he will have to agree that at least some
emotional responses to fictions are appropriate, and one could outright deny that any
emotional responses to fictions are appropriate.
45
I am not convinced that that is an
acceptable position, however. While I agree that not all emotional responses to fictions
are justifiable, it seems intuitively plausible to defend the view that it is some/imes
rational to fear or pity fictional characters. Perhaps Anna Karenina is one such
44
Later in the paper I develop the thought that, given the special motivational role of
emotions, truth is too high a standard for the emotions.
45
For an interesting discussion of emotional responses to fictions see Walton (1978).
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character. If so, then D'Arms and Jacobson’s account, as well as other accounts that
take emotional justification to be an analog of true belief, is dissatisfying. 40
To be sure, as a view about the conditions under which an emotion is true
,
I am
inclined to think that something like their view, or perhaps a more developed view, is
correct. My point is only that, at the end of the day, I wonder whether this criterion is
the criterion that we are most interested in seeing that our emotions meet. I am not
convinced that it is. Thus I think it will be worthwhile to develop a slightly less
demanding account, one that implies that some emotions that do not accurately
represent their object are indeed acceptable. I later develop such an account, but in an
effort to better understand that account, I will first present de Sousa’s view.
De Sousa’s Account
De Sousa’s account, like the cognitive and perceptual versions of APR, seems
also to be a species of the type defended by D'Arms and Jacobson. De Sousa says,
“...An emotion is appropriate (or minimally so) in a given situation if and only if that
situation is relevantly similar to (can accurately be “gestalted” as) a suitable paradigm
scenario” (de Sousa 1980, 145). Emotions are appropriate when their invoking
situations (their objects) are relevantly similar to (fit) an appropriate paradigm scenario.
In his more recent work (de Sousa 2002), de Sousa restates the view as follows:
suppose that V 'refers to the target (the actual particular at which the emotion is aimed.
46
I later try to develop an account of appropriateness that can accommodate the
intuition that, at least in some cases, emotional responses to fictions are appropriate.
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that ‘/"refers to the emotion, and that the formal ob ject is the standard of success: “E
(/) is successful iff /actually fits E's formal object” (de Sousa 2002, 25 1 ).
47
Given that paradigms fix the formal objects, De Sousa’s view provides the
structure that was lacking in APR. That is. he not only tells us that emotional
appropriateness is settled by the extent to which emotions accurately represent their
objects (or as he states it, the extent to which targets fit the formal objects), but also fills
in the view by providing us with an account of what fixes the formal objects.
In the first half of this section, I will attempt to explicate de Sousa's view in
greater detail by clarifying notions such as parad/gm scenarios andforma/objects, in
the second half of this section, I will provide my critical commentary.
Paradigm Scenarios
De Sousa adopts the prototype theory of semantics, according to which terms
are defined by reference to mental images (paradigms), and objects are categorized
according to the extent to which they resemble a paradigm. Take the word ‘bird’ for
example. We have a mental image (picture) that is a prototype of a bird. We began to
develop this image as children, and as we had more experience with the world, our
paradigm presumably matured. Perhaps in the early stages of development our
paradigm of a bird was an image of a small flying animal with feathers, wings, a beak,
and twiggy legs. When we grew older, we most likely modified our paradigm so that it
allowed for the possibility of birds that lack the ability to fly. The term ‘bird’ is then
defined by appeal to the prototype. If a creature resembles that prototype, then that
47
It is important to note that, for de Sousa, formal objects are fixed by an emotion's
paradigm scenario. Therefore, the view presented in 2002 seems not to amount to a
genuine change in position.
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creature will be categorized as a bird. Some creatures will be obvious, while others will
be borderline cases.
One advantage of adopting prototype semantics is that defining and categorizing
takes place without the expectation that one must provide a definitional analysis of a
term. Entities are categorized in virtue of their resemblance to a paradigm, and not in
virtue of their satisfaction of a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions. The
well-known problems that confront defenders of conceptual analysis (such as the
impossibility of ever formulating a correct analysis) do not confront those who adopt
prototype semantics.
On de Sousa's view, emotion terms, like kind terms, are defined by reference to
paradigms. He says,
We are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by association
with paradigm scenarios. These are drawn first from our daily life as
small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to
which we are exposed. Later still, in literate cultures, they are
supplemented and refined by literature. Paradigm scenarios involve two
aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects of the
specific emotion-type...and second, a set of characteristic or “normal”
responses to that situation, where normality is first a biological matter
and then very quickly becomes a cultural one (de Sousa 1987, 182).
As it was with the bird case, we began to develop these mental images in early
childhood by looking to our caretakers for guidance concerning what objects we should
pay attention to, and what responses we should undertake when presented with such
objects. We then clustered events together—like goes with like—such that episodes
that have similar objects and produce similar responses will have the same label. Later
in life we sharpen these scenarios, so as to include and exclude certain situations and
responses. This sharpening is generally the result of interacting with art, literature, film.
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and so on. On de Sousa's view, however, emotion prototypes are not simple images in
the mind; rather, they are complex entities (still mental entities) that are made up of
standardinvokingsituations zs well as standardresponses.
De Sousa maintains that paradigms not only draw our attention to specific
features of a situation, but also inform our conclusions about those situations. We “see”
our environment through our paradigms. He says, “Once our emotional repertoire is
established, we interpret various situations we are faced with through the lens of
different paradigm scenarios. When a particular scenario suggests itself as an
interpretation, it arranges or rearranges our perceptual, cognitive, and inferential
dispositions” (de Sousa 2003, 9). Consider: you encounter a rabid dog on a desolate
country road. The dog leaps out of the dense forest and motions as if he is going to
attack you. Your focus is drawn to specific characteristics of the dog and the situation:
his arched back, his deep growl, his exposed teeth, and the isolated environment. The
features that you focused on elicited a fear response in virtue of the fact that the fear
scenario suggested itself as a possible interpretation of the situation. Paradigms, then,
make sa/ient specific features of a case. They determine what aspects we pay attention
to, and what we ignore. Emotions, for de Sousa, are “determinate patterns of salience
among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies” (de Sousa 1980,
137).
I think, as a matter of psychological fact, we do have paradigms associated with
emotions, they do “color” the way that we see the world, and our “emotional
repertoires” are determined by our unique experiences, our histories, our preferences,
and so on. The fact that de Sousa introduces paradigms into his theory of emotional
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rationality has the desirable implication that two people in the same circumstances can
have different, but equally appropriate, responses. When I walk alone through a poorly
lit parking garage, certain features ofmy situation will become salient to me. My eyes
scan the garage in search of suspicions vehicles or people; if I see a parked van in a
darkened comer, 1 grow anxious, afraid, and perhaps run to my car. When I reach my
car, I lock all of the doors and windows and quickly exit the garage. Allan, on the other
hand, does not find the presence of the van disquieting, and he ignores it. He strolls
leisurely to his vehicle, oblivious to his surroundings.
In this case, Allan and I are in the very same circumstances (the parking garage),
but we both have very different, and in my mind equally appropriate, responses. De
Sousa's view can nicely accommodate this fact: the situation resembled my paradigm of
fear, but did not resemble Allan’s paradigm of fear. Perhaps poorly lit garages and
suspicious-looking vans are situations in my paradigm, so that when I am confronted
with such things my attention will be drawn to them and my responses will include
standard flight responses. For Allan, though, the state of affairs described above does
not resemble the scenarios that constitute his paradigm of fear. Since an emotion is
appropriate when the eliciting situation objectively resembles the paradigm, and since
the state of affairs involving the dark garage objectively resembles my paradigm of fear
but not Allan’s, my fearing the situation is rational while Allan's indifference to the
situation is also rational.
Having adequately explained paradigm scenarios, I now turn my attention to
formal objects.
1 10
Formal Objects
For de Sousa, all mental states have standards of correctness, and these
standards are given by the states' formal object. Thus truth is the formal object of
belief, and good is the formal object of desire. They are properties that mental states
aim at, and they are essential to mental states' definitions. Emotions, likewise, have
formal objects. Their objects, however, are not singular. For there are as many formal
objects as there are emotion types. The formal object of fear isfrightening, the formal
object of disgust is disgusting, and so forth.
Now, recall my second statement of de Sousa’s view: suppose that V ’refers to
the target (the actual particular at which the emotion is aimed), that ‘^’refers to the
emotion, and that the formal object is the standard of success: “E (/) is successfrt/iff /
actually fits E's formal object” (de Sousa 2002, 251). 1 indicated that, while this is a
more recent statement of his account of emotional rationality, I do not believe that it
amounts to a genuine change in position. The reason for this is that paradigm scenarios
fix the formal objects of emotions:
In sum, the role of paradigm scenarios in relation to emotions is
analogous to ostensive definition of a common noun. Their role can be
sharpened by relating it to the principles of rationality elaborated in
chapter 6. According to (Rl), formal objects define a state’s criterion of
success. Where the state is an emotion, its formal object is fixed by a
paradigm scenario, which defines an axiological quality (de Sousa
1987, 184).
When de Sousa says that paradigm scenarios “fix” the formal objects of emotions, I
suppose he means that the properties of being disgusting and being frightening
somehow supervene on, or manifest from, the situations and standard responses
contained in the paradigm scenarios of disgust and fear, respectively. Perhaps the
properties that constitute the paradigm scenarios are thought of as “lower-level
properties” and these properties give rise to the “higher-level” evaluative properties,
such as the property of being frightening and disgusting.
I believe that we can now see how the pieces are meant to fall together. Our
emotional repertoire is made up of several paradigm sets (each corresponds to an
emotion type). The paradigms essentially fix the meaning of emotion terms (de Sousa
says the meaning is fixed in the same way that an ostensive definition fixes the meaning
of a noun term), and thereby fix the standards of success. I suggested that the higher-
level properties, such as being frightening, supervene on the lower level properties that
comprise the paradigm sets. When an object that elicits an emotion has met the
standard, when it objectively resembles the paradigm (or, when it fits the formal object)
the emotion is rational.
Objections
One concern with this view is that, for de Sousa, formal properties are response
dependant, making account of formal properties circular. The rotting apple is
disgusting by virtue of the fact that we are disgusted by it; my colleague’s success is
enviable by virtue of the fact that I envy her.48 The disgusting just is whatever disgusts
me, and the enviable just is whatever I envy. On this assumption, moreover, our
emotions are never incorrect; for these evaluative properties come into existence as a
result of our emotional responses.
Mikko Salmela (Salmela 2006) elaborates on the notion of formal object in an
effort to respond to the objection that the response-dependant account of formal
48
It has been suggested that being dangerous is one exception to this (Salmela 2006).
properties is circular. He says, “All particular objects that cause fear in us are
represented as frightening in our experiences of fear, but those objects are actually
frightening only if they merit fear. A formal object is not merely a perceptual property,
but also the norm by which each emotion type defines its own standard of fittingness, as
de Sousa points out” (Salmela 2006, 386). De Sousa also says that, “The appearance of
tautology is misleading, because the attainment of success for emotions—the actual fit
between the object or target of the emotion and its formal object—depends on a vast
holistic network of factors which transcends my actual response”(de Sousa 2002 260).
1 agree that the objection from circularity is based on a misreading of de Sousa's
view. On the interpretation of his view that I find most plausible, emotions are typed
by the way in which their objects are perceived, and are appropriate when the objects
have the properties that they are perceived as having. De Sousa seems to agree, at least
in his earlier work, when he says that, “True irrationality of emotion involves the
perception of a situation in terms of a scenario that it does not objectively resemble” (de
Sousa 1987, 188).
While his view is not genuinely circular-- there are other factors that contribute
to an object’s objective reality-- it is nonetheless somewhat perplexing. For he still
maintains that our emotional responses contribute something to an object’s reality, but
he does not say what that something is. In other words, there seems to be a tension in
his view: emotions are rational when their objects have the properties they are perceived
as having, but they have the properties they do (in part, at least) because of our
emotional responses to them. If de Sousa’s view is to be at all plausible, he must
explain the role that our emotional responses play in determining whether and what
evaluative properties are had by the objects of our emotions.
There is a second, and more troubling, problem with his view. The problem
concerns the fact that the standards by which he criticizes emotions are fixed largely by
culture. De Sousa acknowledges a very similar problem when he says that his account
“appears to suggest that the rationality of an emotion is fixed irretrievable of its origins
in socialization and that nothing can affect the appropriateness of an emotion provided
the evoking situation fits the paradigm” (de Sousa 1987, 186). He responds to this
charge by claiming that our paradigms can be challenged by the presence of new
information, that they are forever changing, and that we should “let our emotions be
appropriate to the widest possible range of available scenarios” (de Sousa 1987, 187).
He also claims that, “A concept learned in a given context is not the end of the matter.
It does not mean that the concept cannot be revised and refined; that our understanding
of it cannot be deepened to the point where we are able to ask without contradiction
whether it is appropriate to the paradigm itself’ (de Sousa 1980, 144).49
While de Sousa has explained how our paradigms change, I think more needs to
be said about the standards by which we assess competing scenarios. Suppose my
paradigm of fear is inconsistent with a socially accepted paradigm. Am I to assume that
my paradigm is, in a sense, mistaken, in virtue of its being out of step with the socially
accepted paradigm? Moreover, the process by which we replace one paradigm with
another seems to require that we have access to our own paradigm, and that we have
49 To be honest, I cannot see how this could be the case. If emotion terms are defined in
the way that de Sousa claims they are, how could one possibly ask “without
contradiction” whether the paradigm is itself correct.
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access to other paradigms. While 1 do think that I do have something like a paradigm of
fear. I am skeptical of the assumption that 1 have introspective access to it. How. then,
am 1 to test and possibly adjust my paradigm? I also think that he needs to say more
about what constitutes the “widest possible range of scenarios.” If a situation resembles
one paradigm, but not another, how are we to determine whether or not the emotion is
appropriate? Suppose a situation resembled my paradigm of fear, but not the socially
accepted paradigm of fear. Is my emotion, therefore, inappropriate? Can it not be the
case that the social paradigm is mistaken as well?
These questions do not outright refute de Sousa's view. In fact, de Sousa had
presented his view in such a way that it will be extremely difficult to construct a totally
satisfying argument against it (this, perhaps, gives us reason to reject it).
30
I have raised
the questions only because I think that de Sousa needs to do more by way of explaining
his view. Now, although I am skeptical of some aspects of his approach, I do find some
features of the view extremely attractive, and I will later try to incorporate these
features into a view ofmy own.
Emotional Justification
One feature of de Sousa’s view that I do not find appealing is that he seems to
develop an account of emotional rationality that is an analog of true belief (success). I
believe that it is worthwhile to consider a different kind of view, one that treats
emotional rationality as an analog ofjustifiedozXxti rather than true belief.
Patricia Greenspan (Greenspan 1984) attempted to develop such an account in
Reasons andEmotions. For Greenspan, emotions are complex states consisting of (1)
so
In other words, all this talk of paradigm scenarios, biological, cultural, and personal
factors is all very vague. His view, it seems, is just very difficult to pin down.
feelings of comfort/discomfort about (2) the thought that some evaluative proposition
holds. She says, "‘Let me propose, then, that we look at emotions as compounds of
two elements: affective states of comfort or discomfort and evaluative propositions
spelling out their intentional content. Fear, for instance, may be viewed as involving
discomfort at the fact—or the presumed or imagined fact (I shall say “the thought”)
—
that danger looms” (Greenspan 1988, 4). She refers to the evaluative component of
the emotion as the “internal object,” since it is the object of the affect; the external
object is the ordinary object of the emotion. Emotions are justified when the
evaluative proposition (the internal object) is justified. For Greenspan, this involves
being keyedinto a signi/icantperception. At the close of the chapter “Perceptual
Warrant” Greenspan says, “In this chapter... I have defended a notion of
appropriateness set up tojusti/y the eva/uative component as a generally adaptive
reaction to a significant subset of evidence” (Greenspan 1988,106 [my italics]).
For Greenspan, though, emotional warrant does not entail belief warrant. If the
thought is justified, the belief is not thereby justified as well. Consider: I may be
suspicious of the shifty businessman because I picked up on perceptible behavioral
cues during our phone conversation that are good indicators of untrustworthy
behavior. My suspicion is, roughly, discomfort about the thought that the
businessman is untrustworthy. While my suspicion is justified by this perception, it
does not necessarily follow that the belief that /he businessman is untrustworthy is
justified. Perhaps my evidence base is too narrow to justify the corresponding belief.
Moreover, if I later learned that the businessman is perfectly honest, my suspicion was
still an appropriate response at the time. It was "rationally warranted asan initial
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reaction ^j'what I hear on the phone. It is not just an unders/andah/e emotional
reaction; it is one that fits ‘significant perception,' even if not ‘the facts’”(Greenspan
1988 , 89 ).
It should be clear that, pace de Sousa, the considerations Greenspan brings to
bear on emotional warrant do no/ include considerations of “success.” Whether an
emotion fits the facts (whether the object of the emotion is as the emotion represents it
to be) has no impact on whether the emotion is justified. For there are some cases
where emotions simply happen to fit the facts, but surely these emotions should not
count as justified. Suppose, for example, I am (unknowingly) in a wooded area where
hunters are likely to shoot irresponsibly. Perhaps I am on a hunting trip near the home
of Dick Cheney. I, however, suffer from the regrettable delusion that people are
hiding in the woods, waiting for the opportunity to shoot me. Even though 1 am
experiencing discomfort about the fact that I am likely to be harmed, and it is true that
I am likely to be harmed, my fear on Greenspan’s view does not count as justified.
The reason it is unjustified is that my emotion acciden/a//y {\its the facts: the
connection between my emotion and the facts is the wrong kind of connection.
Emotions such as these, according to Greenspan, are analogous to unjustified true
beliefs.
Whatever limited sort of appropriateness we might be inclined to ascribe
to my fear in this case, it clearly does not involve ra/iona/ fittingness to
the facts. It would seem to be analogous to the accidental truth of an
unjustified belief. ..So (appropriateness) seems to require the truth of the
perceived facts: ‘'perceptual” warrant one might say, of the sort that
makes truth to the facts nonaccidental, thought it may still fall short of
full evidential warrant, of the sort that we require for beliefs (Greenspan
1988
,
84 ).
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I think that Greenspan is correct here. I believe that we have reason to think not
only about whether an emotion has correctly represented its object, but also about
how the representation came about. Unfortunately, her positive view, that emotions
are justified when they are keyed into a significant perception is far too
underdeveloped to adequately present. In her introductory remarks, she says:
First I shall focus on the appeal to nonevidential ‘standards of
significance' in assessing warrant for emotion (i). Next I shall examine
the role still played by the evidential standard (ii). I shall end by
attempting to bring together both sorts of standards in a nonquantitative
criterion of appropriateness, framed in terms of belief warrant by allowing
for a practical weight on the evidence for the evaluative component of
emotion (iii) (Greenspan 1988, 85).
It appears that she intends to make use of two different standards (an evidential and
non-evidential standard), but she never adequately explains what these standards
amount to. She says that the evidential standard is like the standard used in belief
justification. Perhaps this is cashed out in terms of the kind of evidence we have for
our beliefs. The non-evidential standard refers to the extent to which an emotion
tendency is genera/iy adaptive. She says, “’General adaptiveness’... will be used to
refer to the instrumental value of an emotion tendency, as distinct from the value of an
instance of emotion in the particular case at hand (Greenspan 1988, 9). It is unclear
however, whether an emotion tendency is, for example, the tendency to fear harmful
objects, the tendency to fear bears, the tendency to fear bears that are in my tent, and
so forth. Without explaining this notion better, I think that we have reason to doubt
the value of its application.
Even ifwe could clearly give clear analyses of the evidential and non-evidential
standards, there is a second worry: it is unclear how we are to adjudicate conflicts in
the two standards. Consider a case she talks about at great length: a broker calls, and 1
am immediately suspicious of him. Greenspan maintains that my suspicion is
unwarranted insofar as there is no “significant perception” to ground my emotion.
For my emotion is the result of several negative past experiences with brokers, and
this alone does not qualify as a justifler. “My experience [with brokers] may lead me
to attend to this general reason for mistrust but does not lend it any greater evidential
weight... Indeed, even several bad experiences with brokers might not be sufficient to
warrant suspicion withX...’’(Greenspan 1988, 93). Greenspan's point is that my
suspicion is unjustified insofar as it is not causally connected with the behavior of the
present broker. My limited interactions with him do not permit me to base my
emotion on, or ground my emotion in, something that 1 perceive about him.
I find her treatment of this example somewhat perplexing. On the one hand, she
introduces non-evidential standards as justifiers for emotions, and yet when they seem
to come into play, which I believe they do in the broker case, she denies that they
justify emotions. Suppose that the tendency to distrust brokers has significant
instrumental value for me (the emotion tendency displays general adaptiveness). If
so, then mistrusting the broker is surely justified. It is justified by the non-evidential
standard that Greenspan herself introduced. We are now left wondering how to
adjudicate between the evidential and non- evidential standard. Does one trump the
other? If so, when? Without answers to this, I find her account difficult to accept.
An Alternative Account of Emotional Justification
An Externalist Approach
In this section of this chapter, I develop a slightly different account of emotional
justification. I exploit the commonly made distinction in epistemology between
internalist and externalist accounts ofjustification, and suggest that when we are
interested in evaluating emotions, justification should take an externalist flavor.
On an externalist approach, emotional justification does not require that one be
able to provide, on reflection, justifiers for her emotion. Let us suppose that ordinary
emotional justifiers are, for example, the causes of emotions, the objects of emotions,
the agent's perceptions of the situations, and the agent's character traits. On my view,
one's emotions can be justified even if one cannot produce by reflection ordinary
justifier for her emotions, /tern. You arrive at a party with some friends, only to find
your nemesis sitting in the comer, sipping a glass of chardonnay. You spend much of
the evening avoiding your enemy, but an encounter is inevitable. When you finally
speak to her, she makes some snide remarks about your taste in wine, and then she
walks away to talk about you to her friends. A few minutes later, when you are alone
outside, you begin to cry.
Let us suppose that, if I were to ask you whether you could introspect and
provide a justification for your emotion, you would say that you did not know why you
were so upset. You dislike this person, and so do not care about her opinion of you.
You cannot say on reflection why you had such an intense reaction. Your friends and 1
could tell you that the reasons for you emotion are obvious: your nemesis was at this
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party, she made rude comments to your face, and she made rude comments about you
behind your back. My point is that, although there are justifiers for your emotion, you
do not have access to those justifiers (for whatever reasons). This lack of access does
not imply that your emotion is unjustified. We might think that you are self-deceived,
out of touch, or oblivious; but surely those things do not make your sadness any less
justified.
To explain why your emotion is justified, 1 will now introduce a second thesis.
According to this thesis, emotions are justified when they are produced or sustained by
a reliable emotion producing method or process. For an emotion producing process or
method to be reliable, it must be the case that this mechanism has the propensity to
produce more “right” emotions than “wrong” emotions. If a process or method has a
propensity to produce mostly “true” emotions, then emotions produced by that
mechanism are justified even if untrue. 51
Now, what constitutes an emotion producing method or process is a thorny
issue. In Chapter 2, 1 discussed Prinz's perceptual theory of emotion, and in this
discussion it was suggested that there are specific emotion producing mechanisms.
Others have defended this view as well (LeDoux 1986). While I am obviously inclined
to think that it is true, I will not attempt to resolve that problem here. I will assume,
however, that the processes may include (but are not limited to) the object of the
emotion, and emotion-specific modules in the brain.
In light of this thesis, let us now reconsider the case I described above involving
your crying at the party. What accounts for the fact that your sadness (perhaps it was
51 To forestall any worries, I say more about true and false emotions later in this
chapter.
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anger?) was justified is that it was produced as a result of a process or method that is apt
to produce more true emotions. Archenemies at parties that trigger sadness response are
surely parts of processes that are apt to produce more “true” than “false” sadness
responses. Thus, fits of sadness that are a result of methods or processes that begin with
such events are justified.
It is easy to see that we can explain why other emotions are justified by appeal
to the same considerations. Suppose you are engaged in a conversation with someone
who you find, for some unknown reason, distasteful and untrustworthy. Perhaps he is
exhibiting very subtle behavioral cues that you have subconsciously noticed, and as a
result you are suspicious of his behavior. Again you cannot give reasons for your
suspicion, but you are, nonetheless justified in your suspicion. I have proposed that this
suspicion is the result of a process that begins with registering the presence of cues that
are strongly correlated with untrustworthy behavior.
Greenspan Revisited
There are obvious similarities between this view and Greenspan’s view. We are
both interested in justification, for example, and we both think that perception plays a
significant role in that justification. Moreover, even though Greenspan is unwilling to
adopt an externalist account of /^//justification, she seems to endorse an externalist
account of emotional justification. She says.
Where their [emotions’] perceptual sources are no/ clear, rough
reliability, of the sort exhibited in the present case, without ability to
state even a partial justification, will not yield adequate warrant for the
corresponding belief. But I do want to say that it allows for appropriate
emotion, in view of the limitations...on emotional focus and control. In
short, emotions are properly less ma//eab/e than beliefs in response to
further evidence or to the recognition that further evidence is needed
(Greenspan 1988, 88).
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Part of Greenspan's defense for the claim that emotions are limited in this way relies on
the special motivational role played by emotions. Our emotions, unlike beliefs, do not
wait for evidence. Rather, they are “unqualified" responses to perceptions; they occur in
the absence of sufficient evidence, and they often persist in the presence of
countervailing evidence. The reason they do this is that emotions need to prepare us for
whatever events are taking place in the world.
Now, I agree with Greenspan's externalist approach, and I agree that emotions
are designed with the express purpose of motivating behavior; I do not agree that
emotions must be grounded in a significant perception. Instead, I think that they have
to be caused in the right way. For example, I think that generalizations from past
experiences can justify emotional responses to situations even if the emotional
responses occur in the absence of a “significant perception.” The case involving the
broker is an example where this holds true. I think that my suspicion of the broker is
justified in virtue of the fact that I have had several negative experiences with brokers in
the past. This emotion is caused by some process that involves the learned knowledge
that brokers are apt to mislead me. 52 I contend that our “emotional repertoire,” which
was built up out of person histories and experiences, has significant bearing on whether
an emotional response is justified. It is in this respect, then, that I believe my view is
similar to de Sousa's view.
52 One might complain that I too am being overly vague: do I learn to mistrust suspicion
people, mistrust brokers, or mistrust brokers that call me on the phone? To be honest, 1
am not sure how specific these objects have to be. I leave this difficulty for another
paper.
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However, 1 am willing to admit that there are some cases in which we
incorrectly learn an emotion. Phobias or negative emotional responses to minorities,
homosexuals, or disabled persons, are all examples of incorrectly learned emotions.
Some learned emotions, of course, are learned correctly. And I believe that specific
emotional episodes that are caused by correctly learned emotions are justified. How are
we to determine whether a learned emotion is a correctly learned emotion? One way to
cash out this notion is in terms of reliability— an emotion is correctly learned provided
that the emotion type is apt to “get it right” more often than not. In my opinion,
emotional responses that are the result of correctly learned emotions can be justified,
even if the emotion is not caused by or grounded in a “significant perception.”
In summary, I believe that when we are interested in emotional justification, we
should adopt an externalist approach. (1) Emotions can be justified even if one cannot
provide on reflection reasons for her emotion and (2) the justification is explained by
the fact that the emotions are produced by processes that are apt to produce more true
than false emotions. Moreover, I believe that emotional responses that are the result of
“learned” emotions, which are often like character traits, can sometimes be justified.
The emotional experience that was brought about as a result of a learned emotion is
justified in only those cases in which the character trait was learned correctly.
Emotional Truth Revisited
Notice this thesis implies that emotions are, in some sense, true. In this final
section I will try to present an account of what I mean by ‘true emotions,’ which is an
adaptation and modification of D'Arms and Jacobson's account. If you recall, D’Arms
and Jacobson defended the view that emotional appropriateness was an analog of true
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belief, and that an emotion is appropriate provided that its shape and size are accurate
representations of the emotion’s object. I think that this is right. However, I think that
their account is underdeveloped. Even though D' Arms and Jacobson acknowledge the
role that an emotion’s size plays in the assessment, they (as well as others) do very little
by way of providing the conditions under which an emotion's size is appropriate. In my
opinion, though, when we go wrong emotionally, the error is often in the size rather
than the shape of the emotion.
Consider: Jane is extremely terrified of flying. She often experiences anxiety
filled days and nights during the weeks leading up to her travels. When Jane does
manage to make it on the plane, she must take several relaxants in an effort to calm her
nerves. In this case, we have good reason to think that the shape of Jane’s emotion is
accurate. Surely there is some possibility that the flight will end in disaster and Jane
will be harmed. It should be obvious, though, that Jane has gone wrong emotionally. I
believe that we can locate the error in the size or the intensity of her emotion. It is an
overreaction. How might one explain this?
Proximity
1 think that there are at least three considerations that are relevant to this
question. First, the size should depend in part on what I will call the proximity the
object. An object's proximity is determined by its temporal and spatial closeness to the
agent at the time of the emotion. For example, future harms are temporally more distant
than present harms. Thus, it is appropriate to have a more intense fear reaction to the
harm that is present. If there are two harms (of equal intensity and duration) that you
are to experience, one at t and the other at some time later than t, then it is appropriate
125
for your fear of the harm at t to be more intense than your fear of the harm at some time
later than t. This seems intuitively right. Suppose that at time 1 1 am supposed to have a
root canal, and at some later time (time t+1) I am to undergo electro-shock therapy. I
will stipulate that the amount of pain I suffer during one is equal to the amount of pain I
suffer during the other. I will also stipulate that the time of the root canal is closer to
the present time than is the time of the electro-shock therapy. According to my view, it
is appropriate for my fear of the root canal to be more intense than the fear ofmy
electro- shock therapy. 53
Well-Being
A second consideration that impacts whether the size of an emotion is
appropriate is determined by the extent to which the object has an effecton the agent s
overa// we//-be/ng. Intense happiness about goods that are to have a significant impact
on my well-being is appropriate, but intense happiness toward goods that have a minor
impact on my well-being are inappropriate. Likewise, intense anger about the loss of a
minor good is inappropriate, while intense anger about the loss of a significant good is
fitting. If I am offered a job that I desperately need only to find out later that the
funding was not approved, intense anger is surely appropriate. Alternatively, if 1 am
offered a (funded) job that I would enjoy having and that would contribute significantly
to my well-being, then intense happiness is surely appropriate.
' 3
Although I have used a comparative example to illustrate my point, I do not mean to
suggest that this is necessarily a comparative notion. If you were to experience a harm
in the very far distant future, but no harm until that point, a very intense fear reaction
would be inappropriate.
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Likelihood of Object’s Obtaining
One might object to this second condition by arguing that there are some events
such that if they were to occur they would have a significant impact on my well-being,
but the likelihood of them occurring is very small, in which case intense happiness is
not appropriate. This can easily be resolved by my third constraint. According to this
constraint, the appropriateness of an emotion’s intensity depends importantly on the
/i/ce/f/?oodof its object obtaining. We often chide people for being intensely terrified of
some event that is very unlikely to happen, but if it were to happen, would merit an
intense emotional reaction. I suspect that intense fears of flying fall neatly into this
category. In these cases, the emotion’s shape is accurate— it accurately represents its
object—but the emotion is, nonetheless, out of proportion. It's too much given that the
likelihood of a crash is so low.
Notice that these constraints do not apply to all emotional reactions. The last
constraint, for example, is relevant only to future directed emotions. If I am intensely
disgusted by the rotting apple in my pantry, then the likelihood of this object’s
obtaining is 1 . To evaluate the appropriateness ofmy disgust’s intensity, one will have
to consider conditions one and two above. I would also like to add that these
considerations are not meant to be the final word on this issue. I introduced them only
because I thought that the intensity of an emotion is a largely ignored, and yet an
important, consideration.
Conclusion
In this Chapter I have tried to develop a view of emotional justification that
takes its inspiration from externalist accounts of beliefjustification. On my view.
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emotional justification does not require that one be able to look within and find
justifiers for her emotions. In some cases, emotional justification is simply a matter of
whether or not the emotion was produced by a process or mechanism that is apt to
produce more ‘true’' than “false” emotions. While this view is similar to Greenspan's, I
believe that I am slightly more permissive in what processes are reliable; I believe that
emotional episodes that are the result of correctly learned emotions are justified.
Finally, as I have made reference to “true” and “false” emotions, I closed by trying to
develop the view of emotional truth introduced by D’Arms and Jacobson. While I think
that it is useful to have accounts of both emotional truth and justification, I find that the
special motivational role of emotions—that they are rapid coordinated responses
—
makes it the case that our theorizing about emotional criticism should focus on
justification rather than truth.
My second reason for preferring theories of emotional justification rather than
truth is that these theories implied that emotional responses to fictions are always
inappropriate. I disliked that implication, and I promised at the start of this paper that
my account ofjustification could explain why emotional responses to fictions are
justified. I now offer that reason:
I believe that when we respond emotionally to fictions we see the fictional event
as if it were real. We, in a sense, are engaged with the lives of the characters in the
stories. I suspect that the mechanisms that trigger emotions are not very good at
discriminating between actual and fictional triggers, however. The mechanisms that
give rise to sadness over the death of a loved one are the very same mechanisms that
give rise to sadness over the death of Anna Karenina. Since emotional responses to
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fictions are, presumably, caused by the very same mechanisms that give rise to true
fears and sadness, they are justified. Is this a problem? I think not. For surely we do
not want our emotional triggers to be extremely discriminating; moreover, 1 think that a
lot of “emotional calibration’' takes place through our interactions with fictions.
Now, what is not justified, are extreme responses to fictions. I believe that some
of the restrictions I placed on the size of an emotion can account for this. Since fictions
do not have any real bearing on our well-being, extreme responses are inappropriate.
The idea is that mechanisms that give rise to very intense emotional responses to
fictions will not be reliable: they get it wrong more often than they get it right. Thus,
pitying Anna Karenina is truly justified; sinking into a deep depression and
contemplating suicide over the death of Anna Karenina
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CHAPTER 6
RECONSIDERING THE FEAR OF DEATH
Introduction
While I have said many things about the rationality of emotions, generally, I
have said very little about the rationality of the fear of death, specifically. My goal in
this final chapter is to fill that void. I begin by looking closely at the concept of
rationality presupposed by other philosophers (historical and contemporary) who
discuss the propriety of fearing death. In light of my earlier work, I try to show their
arguments are not satisfying. They evaluate the fear of death by appeal to unacceptable
kinds of rationality. Even in cases where I agree with the conclusions of their
arguments, my reasons for reaching that conclusion differ from their reasons. As I am
more inclined towards non-reductive views of emotional rationality, I examine the
verdict these views yield regarding the appropriateness of the fear of death.
54
I hope to
show that, on at least one construal, the fear of death is indeed justified.
Rationality and the Fear of Death
The Epicurean view on rational emotions is unlike any view I have discussed
thus far. It might be thought that the Epicureans believed the fear of death to be an
epfstemica//y irrational emotion, and nothing more. This, however, is an inaccurate
characterization of the actual Epicurean position on the fear of death. The Epicureans
did indeed have something like that in mind, but the meaning that they gave to
54
Although I did present arguments against de Sousa’s view in Chapter 5, I do think
that it provides a novel and interesting accounts of emotional rationality. I think it is
worthwhile, then, to see what his views implies about the rationality of the fear of death.
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‘irrational’ (Epicurus preferred ‘empty’ in this context) was unique. According to
Epicurus, the fear of death is an empty fear- a fear that presupposes a false belief that is
detrimental to the believer. For Epicurus, not all emotions constituted by, or caused by,
false beliefs are also empty; only those emotions whose false beliefs are dangerous for
the believer are empty emotions." ' Julia Annas describes the concept of empty
emotions as follows:
Emotions thus require beliefs (whether as causes or parts of the emotion)
and it is an important part of the ethical theory that many of our desires
and emotions are thus dependent on beliefs which are false and. in the
case of practical beliefs, ‘empty,’ that is, not just false, but, because of
their falsity, harmful and dysfunctional to the person (Annas 1992, 193).
Epicurus’ warnings against fearing death, then, are based on the thought that the fear of
death involves a false belief (either as a constituent or as a cause), and this belief
provokes individual believers to engage in harmful activities. At A/EN 124, Epicurus
says the following about death and the desire for immortality: “Hence, a correct
knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life a matter for
contentment, not by adding limitless time [to life] but by removing the longing for
immortality ” {AfEN, 124). When we understand that we cannot be harmed by our own
annihilation, our desire for immortality will extinguish, as will several other troubling
desires that accompany that desire. “He who has learned the limits of life knows that it
is easy to provide that which removes the feeling of pain owing to want and make one’s
whole life perfect. So there is no need for things which involve struggle” (E/;e
Erincipa/Doctrines. 21). The “struggles” include activities men engage in with the
55 The reason I say ‘caused by’ or ‘constituted by’ is that there is little evidence of a
theory of emotion in Epicurus’ work. It is not clear from the extant writings whether
beliefs caused emotions, or constituted emotions.
expectation of staving off death and ensuring their own immortality. When one has the
correct attitude towards death, he no longer desires his own immortality and thereby no
longer pursues these worthless and futile activities. Abandoning the pursuit of those
activities will then allow a person to live a more tranquil and peaceful existence.
Contemporary Epicureans seem not to work with Epicurus’ notion of rationality.
Modem day Epicureans, like modem day philosophers, tease apart Epicurus’ concept of
rational emotion (empty emotion) to generate two distinct kinds of emotional
rationality: epistemic and instrumental. Recall that Rorty criticized the fear of death by
appeal to its epistemic and instrumental rationality. While she adopted half of the
Epicurean position-- she agreed the fear of death presupposed a false belief-- she was
silent about whether the false belief itse/f'ms, harmful. Rather than discussing the
belief that constituted the fear of death, she instead evaluated thefearingsi death,
asking whether it was instrumental^ rational. While she did try to distinguish herself
from Epicurus by defending the view that the fear of death “did not always lead to
folly,” it should be noted that the Epicureans never argued that they£zHed to folly. For
them, it was the belief involved in the fear. Her thesis, then, is not a direct challenge to
the second component of the Epicurean position.
Whether it is a challenge or not, however, is irrelevant to my main concern. I
am worried that Epicurus, Rorty, as well as others who write philosophically about the
fear of death, have presupposed the wrong notion of rationality.
56
Since I believe that
56
Jeffrie G. Murphy claims, for example, “A prudent fear of death is perfectly
rational. By prudent fear of death I mean simply (a) one that provokes people into
maintaining a reasonable (though not neurotic compulsive) diligence with respect to
living the kind of life they regard as proper or meaningful...(b) one that is kept in its
proper place” (Murphy 1993, 56). Murphy clearly makes use of the instrumental notion
132
emotional rationality should not be reduced, 1 will focus my efforts in this chapter on
the non-reductive theories of rationality presented in the Chapter 5.
Is Fearing Annihilation Ever a True Emotion?
The object presupposed by the Epicurean arguments is the state of being dead.
If you recall, I discussed this in great detail in Chapter 3. While I argued that there are
other (and perhaps more interesting) objects that we fear when we fear death, there are
some who do fear their own annihilation. It will be worthwhile, then, to look closely at
the way in which non-reducf/ve views of emotional rationality treat the fear of one's
own nonexistence. For it would be very interesting, indeed, if one could demonstrate
that, on some plausible theory of rational emotion, the fear of annihilation is rational.
With respect to the truth of one’s fear of death, I believe that it is fairly easily
shown that the fear of one’s annihilation is false. According to standard view of
emotional truth, emotions present their objects as having certain evaluative properties;
emotions are true provided that (1) the objects do in fact have the properties that they
are presented as having; and (2) the size is fitting. Let us suppose that our fear of
annihilation presents our own nonexistence as being harmful, dangerous, and so on, that
is, presents our own nonexistence as being such that, when we no longer exist, we suffer
some harm. Surely this is an inaccurate presentation of the state of being dead: I do not
exist when I am dead, so this state can be neither good nor bad for me. The fear of
anniMation is indeed &fa/se emotion.
of rationality in his assessment of the fear of death. Seeing as his view is strikingly
similar to two of the three possible interpretations that I gave to Rorty’s view about the
instrumental rationality of the fear of death, I will not linger on his position.
133
Before I consider whether the fear of one's nonexistence is justified, I will say
something about de Sousa's view. For, although de Sousa's view might be a species of
the view that takes emotional rationality to be an analog of true belief, it is so unlike the
theory of emotional truth that I have been discussing that it is worthy of its own separate
treatment. On his view, emotions are typed by their perceived resemblance to a
paradigm, and are rational when their invoking situations objectively resemble said
paradigm. De Sousa’s view, then, can easily explain why wefearour own
nonexistence: when we contemplate our own annihilation, it brings to mind the
situations that constitute the paradigm of fear. We then see our own nonexistence as
resembling these situations. Even though his view can nicely explain how it is that we
fear death, does it imply that our fearing death is rational?
I suspect that it does not. There is nothing that it is like to be dead; our own
nonexistence is a state of nothingness. It does not, therefore, objectively resemble the
objects that make up our paradigm of fear. The fear of being dead is indeed irrational
on de Sousa's view.
While it seems clear to me that this is the verdict de Sousa’s theory yields, in a
recent paper (de Sousa 2003), he argues that the entire project of criticizing the fear of
death for its rationality may be hopeless. While he agrees that an emotion’s
appropriateness depends on the objective reality of the emotion’s object, he also
contends that our emotional reaction contributes\o> the object’s objective reality. His
concern is that philosophical ruminations about the fear of death do not aid us in
escaping this circle.
Whether the favoured attitude is dread (Larkin), authenticity and
selflessness (Tolstoy), longing (Freud) or Olympian equanimity
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(Epicurus) all of these demand to be grounded in relevant facts about
what death ready is... What is the right emotional attitude to some
phenomenon depends on the objective truth of the phenomenon. But the
converse also holds: our emotional reaction to it... is itself partly
constitutive of that objective reality. To what extent can philosophical
analysis like that of Epicurus or a meditation like Tolstoy's get us out of
the circle? Can it actually form the basis of a criticism of an emotional
attitude? If it can. it must be on the basis of some independent principle
of rationality focusing not on any intrinsic quality of appropriateness-to-
a-given-intentional-object, but on some transition or relation, something
like an inferential principle which, if violated, will lead to some sort of
absurdity. And it seems that any such putative principle of rationality is
likely to fall between two stools. Either it will find roots in biology that
cannot figure as contests of desire; or else it will rely on the flimsily
cantilevered intuitions of free-floating phenomenology (de Sousa 2003,
110- 111 ).
If there is a genuine circle, as de Sousa suggests that there is, then it must be the
case that our emotional responses towards death constitute the entire objective reality of
death: death just is the way that our emotions represent it to be (I assume he is talking
about what evaluative properties death has). If this is so, then it is impossible to merely
investigate the nature of death in an effort to determine whether our emotion is
appropriate, for the very nature of death is determinedbyour emotions. He suggests we
look instead to “something like an inferential principle” that will find its roots either in
biology or phenomenology. I am not sure what kinds of principles he has in mind here,
perhaps they are something like this: whenever/am inanewandunexpected
environment, /wi/ii/y to take in andprocess as much new information as/can; or
whenever/am confrontedwithsomething hot, /wi//avoidit. My surprise and aversion
responses are appropriate, then, when the antecedent is satisfied, that is, by virtue of my
having followed this principle. My surprise and aversion are not appropriate, however,
by virtue of some intrinsic quality ofmy emotion's objects.
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The problem with death, according to de Sousa, is that biology and
phenomenology cannot ground inferential principles such that, if we were to follow
them, our fear of death would be rational. Biology cannot ground the inferential
principles seeing as our ancestors were unable to conceptualize their own annihilation.
“Natural selection couldn’t have detected dread of non-being as such in our pre-
linguistic forebears. Instead, it will have selected for all kinds of dispositions to fear in
the face of dangers, some of which would have been lethal in fact, but none of which
could be apprehended as such” (de Sousa 2003, 106).
With respect to the phenomenology of fearing death, he is unwilling to accept
the thought that the “flimsily cantilevered intuitions of free-floating phenomenology”
could provide grounds for an inferential principle. Since neither can provide an
adequate ground for inferential principles, there is no way to criticize the fear of death.
In addition to not having the appropriate principles of rationality to criticize the
fear of death, de Sousa also argues that the fear of death, itself, is problematic. He says,
“Fear demands that I apprehend its object from a subjective point of view, from my own
standpoint. But in the case of death that means I can’t really imagine what I allegedly
fear. For nothing can count as imagining something from my own standpoint, if there
can’t be such a thing as my own standpoint in the situation I supposedly imagine” (de
Sousa 2003, 107). He concludes from this that, whenever we think that we are fearing
death (our own nonexistence), we are simply mistaken about the object.
1 have several points to make about this attack on the project of criticizing the
fear of death. First, de Sousa is interested only in critical evaluations of the fear of
annifti/ation. I doubt that the objections he raises here apply equally well to the other
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objects that we fear when we fear death, such as death’s deprivations. I suspect that, if
our fear of death is the fear of goods lost rather than our own nonexistence, we can
easily provide a biological grounding for the fear of death. Surely we could look to our
evolutionary ancestors and find the ability to adequately conceptualize loss. If this is
correct, if de Sousa's arguments apply only to the fear of death as the fear of
nonexistence, then perhaps those persuaded by de Sousa can still find the project of
evaluating the fear of death a worthwhile project. The project, of course, will consist of
evaluating the fear of the deprivations that death brings.
Even if I am wrong, even if de Sousa’s arguments do apply equally well to the
fear of death as the fear of the loss of life’s goods, I am not convinced that his reasoning
is entirely successful. While I agree that an emotion's fitness to its object (its truth) is
settled by the object's objective reality, I do not think that our emotional responses to
the object are relevant to this assessment. Whether or not an object is frightening,
disgusting, and so on, is not determined by or impacted by whether anyone is frightened
or disgusted by it. Surely not a//of the objective features of an emotion's object are
relevant to assessing the appropriateness of emotions taken towards it. Perhaps only the
object’s evaluative characteristics are relevant. Surely the presence or absence of these
properties does not depend on whether or not 1 have an emotional response towards the
cn
object. I deny, then, that it is impossible to break out of de Sousa's circle.
57 De Sousa in fact agrees that the objective reality of an emotion’s object is not
exhausted by our responses to it. He says, “But while the domain of values is not
independent of the facts about conscious beings, it is neither simply projected from, nor
ever exhausted by, the actual repertoire of human emotions” (de Sousa 2002, 285). To
be honest, then, I am not sure why de Sousa even raises this objection to the entire
project of criticizing the fear of death for its rationality.
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To return to the original questions of this section: I do think we have good
reason to believe that, on any construal of ‘true emotion' fearing the state of affairs that
consists of one' own nonexistence is a false emotion. 1 have suggested however, that
when evaluating emotions at least, perhaps we should be less concerned with whether
the emotion accurately represents its object, and more concerned with whether the
emotion isJusrified. It will be worthwhile, then, to investigate whether and to what
extent the fear of nonexistence is justified, even if false.
Is Fearing Annihilation Ever a Justified Emotion?
According to the view of emotional justification that I am inclined to accept,
emotions are justified when they are the results of reliable emotion producing processes
or mechanisms. It is difficult to determine, however, what this theory implies about the
fear of death as the fear of one’s own non-being. As the object is the state of affairs that
consists of my own nonexistence, it cannot play a role in the causal sequence that led up
to my fearing death. It must be some mental entity, some though or imagining, that is
the causal impetus for this fear. What can we say about causal processes that begin
with such mental entities and terminate in our having an emotion? Are these processes
reliable?
Well, yes and no. I suspect that the contentof our imagination plays a large role
in determining the reliability of the process (not just that the process began with an
imagining). People with wildly outrageous imaginations do not have justified emotions
simply by virtue of the fact that it was produced by their imagination; alternatively, I
would not be so quick to conclude that people who have emotional reactions to
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imaginings are being emotionally irrational. With respect to the fear of death, though, 1
am inclined to think that causal processes that begin with objects such as imaginings
about the state of nonexistence and terminate with one's fearing death may not be
reliable. The reason for this is that the fear of death, the metaphysical fear of death, is a
highly cognitive emotion. It is the fear of death that we have when brooding over the
fact that, some day, we will no longer be. To get one to the state of agitation about
one's own nonexistence, it must be the case that the thought lingers. It is not a quick,
reflexive fear that comes about when confronted with a potentially fatal situation.
Considering the fact that it has this feature, that it is the object of much thought, I am
reluctant to admit emotions such as these to the collection of emotions that are produced
as a result of reliable mechanisms. We are left to conclude then, that the fear of
annihilation is not justified (not that it is unjustified).
I realize that this is a somewhat weak explanation. In fact, it could be argued
that my view about the fear of death should be conditional: if the fear of annihilation is
the result of a reliable emotion producing mechanism, then it is justified. Without the
appropriate empirical evidence there is no reason to have any particular belief about the
antecedent of the conditional. It could also be argued that my account of emotional
justification applies to emotions that are less cognitive, that is, emotions that do not
involve so much mental attention. For more cognitive emotions, perhaps a different
theory ofjustification is more fitting.
I agree that much of what I have said here requires further investigation. I do
think, however, that I have proposed a reasonable hypothesis. I suspect that emotions
that take states of affairs such as the state of affairs that consists of my being in danger
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after i am dead as their object are not the product of reliable mechanisms. These
emotions are not justified. With respect to the claim that my view does not apply to
emotions that are more cognitive in nature, 1 am not entirely convinced that it does not.
Perhaps the emotions that are more cognitive have specific mechanisms, but these
mechanisms are more complex than the mechanisms that give rise to less cognitive
emotions. That the mechanisms are more complex does not give us a good reason to
think that my view does not apply. And, as I believe that theories of emotional
rationality must satisfy the unity requirement, 1 am inclined to think that all emotions
can be criticized by appeal to view I am defending.
Considering that it seems as if no theory can generate the conclusion that the
fear of one's own nonexistence is appropriate, I will urge one to accept the conclusion
that, under any reasonable construal of ‘rational emotion,’ the metaphysical fear of
death is irrational.
Fear of Death’s Deprivations
Despite this conclusion, some people still believe that fearing death is rational.
I proposed earlier that one way to accommodate this intuition is to presuppose a
different object of fear, namely the state of affairs that consists of one being deprived of
goods she otherwise would have had. If one wishes to adopt this position, then she is
left with the task of explaining not only why goods lost through death are bad for one,
but also whyfearing'W is rational.
With respect to the second issue, let us suppose that a fear response is correct
(that it accurately represents its object) when the state of affairs at which it is aimed is
harmful, dangerous, threatening, and so on. This account of correct fear presupposes a
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certain view about the nature of fear: experiencing fear requires, at least, that one
perceive the object of one’s emotion as having the properties just mentioned.
This is a reasonable start, but some modifications and qualifications are
required. For example, one might think that fear presents its object as being afa/ure
harm. Thus, only those harms that are to take place in the future are harms that we/ear.
Perhaps we are sad about, rather than fear, past harms, dangers, threats, and so on. If
so, then fear is true when its object is a future harm. One might also think that fear
represents its objects as being an uncertain\\dxxx\^ I fear that the dog may harm me,
but I do not fear the pain that I am currently experiencing. In an earlier chapter I
discussed the worry that one can be uncertain about past harms, and so can fear past
events. If the police ring in the middle of the night, it could be argued that Iy&7Athat
my child has been in a terrible accident. 59 I am not convinced that we fear this state of
affairs. I think it is more fitting to say that we are worried that our child may have been
in a crash. For the purposes of this work, it is enough to say that fear represents its
object as being a potentially future harm, danger, and so on. If so, then forfear\o> be
the correct emotion to take towards death, then it must be shown that death (as a
deprivation) is (at least) an evil.
My focus in this section is on precisely that issue. I talk exclusively about the
deprivation account of the evil of death, which seems the most common among current
day defenders of the view that death is an evil.
60
Before discussing the deprivation view,
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See Gordon 1980.
?9
1 would like to thank Fred Feldman for making this useful point.
60
For defenders of the deprivation view see Nagel (1979), Fischer and Brueckner
(1986), Haji (2000), Silverstein (1993). McMahan (2002) defends a modified
deprivation view.
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however, I will briefly lay out the conceptual assumptions that are shared by most who
write on the evil of death.
First, the question at issue is not whether one’s death is sometimes bad for one's
family, friends, colleagues, and so on. In most cases, it is bad for them. The question at
issue, rather, is whether death is ever a harmfor theperson who d/es. The reason this is
such a troubling and controversial issue is that, if you answer in the affirmative, you
must explain how a state of affairs can be a harm for a person despite the fact that the
person cannot experience the state of affairs. As I discussed in Chapter 3, some might
grant that some states of affairs that we do not experience, such as unknown betrayals,
are bad due to the fact that, if we were to experience them, they would cause us to
suffer. Notice, however, that the same cannot be said of death. It is not the case that, if
we were to experience death, it would cause us to suffer. For death, which is the state
of affairs that follows the completion of the process we call ‘dying,’ is an experiential
blank. There is nothing that it is like to be dead.
Fred Feldman (Feldman 1992) resurrected the deprivation position by drawing
an important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic harms. He argued that, while
death is not intrinsically harmful, it might be extrinsically harmful. By way of
illustration, consider the following example: while cooking in the kitchen with my
sister, I reach for something on the counter and accidentally knock the cooking stone off
of the counter. It lands on her big toe; she is writhing in pain. Consider the following
two states of affairs: (1) the state of affairs consisting in my sister’s feeling pain on that
day; and (2) the state of affairs consisting in the cooking stone's landing her big toe.
142
Both are bad. The feeling of pain is bad in the sense that it is bad in itself.
61
It is bad
not because of what results from feeling pain, rather, it is bad by its very nature. The
stone's falling is not bad by its nature. Surely we can imagine another possible scenario
in which her big toe was just to the left of the stone, thereby escaping its crushing
impact. The reason that the second state of affairs is bad is that it caused the sensation
of pain. Call the first sort of badness ‘intrinsic badness' and the second ‘extrinsic
badness.’
Although most would accept this distinction, some might find the way in which
deprivation theorists understand the concept of extrinsic badness highly contentious.
According to them, some states of affairs are extrinsically bad despite the fact that they
do not ultimately cause one to suffer any pain. 62 Fred Feldman defends this claim by
appeal to the following consideration: suppose that a young woman who has a natural
aptitude for poetry, never cultivates her talent as she was bom in a strange country that
prohibits women from reading and writing. She dies never having realized that she had
this ability, and so feels nothing as a result of the fact that she was deprived of the joys
of poetry. Nonetheless, Feldman maintains that this deprivation was extrinsically bad
for her. He says, “Some things are bad for us even though they are not themselves
painful experiences, and they do not lead to any painful experiences” (Feldman 1992,
138). Things could be bad for us because they make the intrinsic values of our lives
lower than they otherwise would have been. On the deprivation view, then, we can be
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Most discussions on the evil of death assume that some version of hedonism is true,
which maintains that pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad (and pleasure
intrinsically good). I will make a likewise assumption in this paper.
See Feldman ( 1 992). Fischer ( 1 997) and Haji (2000) for an endorsement of this
claim.
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intrinsically worse off as a result of the occurrence of a state of affairs, even if we can
have no experience of the state of affairs, and can have no experience of the
consequences of the state of affairs.
It should now be obvious, given the deprivation view's understanding of the
concept of extrinsic badness, how death can sometimes be bad for the person who dies.
A person's death is sometimes extrinsically harmful for him because he is intrinsically
worse off as a result of his premature death. And we explain his being intrinsically
worse off by appeal to the goods (pleasures) lost, the goods he otherwise would have
had if death had not occurred when it did.
A deprivation theorist, then, would most likely agree that the following is true:
S’s death at t is a harm for S iff S would have been intrinsically better off if S were to
die at some time later than t. Notice that, thus far, deprivation theorists have said
nothing about whether death merits distress insofar as it deprives one of goods. Since
deprivation theorists think that death is a genuine harm, surely they would agree that it
merits distress, and so would also endorses this additional principle: if a state of affairs
deprives a person of goods, then that state of affairs merits fear, sadness, worry, or some
other negative emotional response. In other words, deprivation theorists make the move
from a state of affairs' depriving a person of some good (being extrinsically bad), to that
state of affairs’ meriting distress.
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PI . Any state of affairs that deprives a person of goods he otherwise
would have had is genuinely evil (it is worthy of distress).
P2. Death sometimes deprives a person of goods he otherwise would
have
had.
C. Therefore, death is genuinely evil in cases where it deprives a person
63
This move is most clearly made by Feldman (1992).
144
of goods he otherwise would have had.
Kai Draper in (Draper 1999 and 2004) has argued that this line of reasoning is
faulty by pointing out that pi is false. Draper asks that you consider the state of affairs
that consists in your not being loved by millions of people. He stipulates that, if you
had been loved, you would have been extraordinarily happy, so happy that you would
have been better off than you are. Unfortunately, it is not the case that you are loved by
millions of people. You are worse off than you otherwise would have been. Many
would agree that, in some sense of 'harm.’ you’ve been harmed by this deprivation: you
are worse off than you otherwise would have been. You could coolly and calmly accept
this deprivation, not get worked up about it. and nonetheless agree that it is a harm.
Unfortunately, the deprivationists cannot avail themselves of this option. For they seem
to believe that ^//deprivations are genuine evils. They, the deprivationists must provide
a principled way for making this distinction. The argument:
PI . If the deprivation account of the evil of death is true, then all extrinsically bad
states of affairs merit distress.
P2. If all extrinsically bad states of affairs merit distress, then my failing to be loved
by millions merits distress.
P3. It is not the case that my failing to be loved by millions merits distress.
C. Therefore, it is not the case that the deprivation account of the evil of death is
true.
According to PI, if the deprivation account is true, then all extrinsically bad states of
affairs merit distress. The deprivation view explains the evil of death by appeal to goods
lost; that is, it concludes that death merits distress from the premise that death deprives
one of goods (is extrinsically bad). Since this principle is most naturally understood an
instance of a more general account of when any state of affairs merits distress, it seems
that the deprivationist is committed to the truth of the more general claim as well.
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Earlier I proposed that this might sound something like this: if a state of affairs is
extrinsically bad for a person, then it merits fear, sadness, worry, or some other negative
emotional response. Therefore, PI is true.
P2 is a straightforward conditional claim—if all extrinsically bad states of
affairs merit distress, then my failing to be loved by millions merits distress. For this to
be true I will have to assume that that the intrinsic value ofmy life would be greater if I
were loved by millions than if I were not so loved. This seems like a plausible
assumption. If all extrinsically bad states of affairs merit distress, and as this
deprivation is extrinsically bad, then being deprived of their love merits distress. P2 is
secured.
P3 seems true. Consider all of the states of affairs that we count as meriting
distress—being deprived of food for a week, losing a limb, losing a home to a fire,
failing to get our dream job, and so on—surely we would not want to include on this list
the state of affairs consisting in my failing to be loved by millions. P3, then, is secured.
Traditional deprivation accounts, as they stand, are inadequate; one cannot infer
that something is a genuine evil meriting distress from the fact that it is extrinsically
bad. To quote Draper:
An argument from deprivation ought to show that death is a genuine evi/
in the sense of being something that merits horror or dread or sadness or
despair or disappointment or some other negative emotional response.
And there is a logical gap between the premise that death is
comparatively bad and the conclusion that death is a genuine evil in this
sense (Draper 1999 390).
In (Draper 2004) Draper presents a novel account of the evil of death that he
believes not only explains why death is sometimes bad for the person who dies, but
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does so without implying that all extrinsically bad states of affairs merit distress. To
motivate his view, Draper has us imagine the life of Rip van Winkle. According to
Draper, Rip van Winkle, who slept most of his life away, is denied a good human life. 04
Surely this deprivation merits self-interested distress even though it did not cause any
positive harm to Rip van Winkle. According to Draper,
...Any event that denies a human being a good human life merits self-
interested distress on the part of that person. For the desire to have a life
that, by the standards appropriate to one's own species, is a good one is a
paradigm of a rational desire; correspondingly, dissatisfaction is a rational
response to being denied such a life (Draper 2004, 111).
Thus, if a state of affairs deprives a person of living a good human life, then that state of
affairs merits distress. I take Draper’s view to be as follows:
DV: An event, E, merits distress on the part of an agent A if E deprives
A of a good human life.
DV generates the correct results in cases where the deprivation view seems to have
counterintuitive implications. Imagine an elderly person, who has lived a very
satisfying life, dies at the age of 80. I will stipulate that this person had a rewarding
career, a loving family, and was regularly engaged in activities that gave him great
pleasure and satisfaction. I will also stipulate that, although his life had brief episodes
of pain and sadness, when he died his life had a positive net value for him. As death did
not deprive him of a good human life, Draper’s view does not imply that his death
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Regarding the concept of a good human life. Draper says the following: “Following
Kant rather than Aristotle, we could argue (at least most) human beings are worthy of a
life that has substantial value for them, and we could define a good human life
accordingly.”(Draper, 2004, 112)
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merits distress.
6:1
Suppose that if he had not died he would have lived one day longer,
which would have increased the overall intrinsic value of his life. The deprivation
account, which has us compare the value of his life at the time of his death with the
value that his life would have been if he had not died, implies that his death was a
misfortune. I am inclined to think that it was not a misfortune, even a very tiny
misfortune. He had his fair share of life, and there is nothing untimely or premature
about this death. That he was deprived of an additional month seems insufficient reason
for his death’s being a misfortune.
Though this view accommodates our intuitions about the example above, it
cannot explain why death is sometimes bad in cases where there is no possibility of a
person's living a humanly good life. Draper is aware of this flaw, and he reformulates
the view to accommodate this problem. He says the following:
Suppose, for example, that Sam's life prior to his legal problems was so
miserable that his life as a whole would have had net disvalue for him
even if his brother had not killed him and so prevented his last years from
being quite good. Then Sam’s death at the hands of his brother did not
prevent him from receiving a good human life—there was no possibility
of that—but did prevent him from receiving a human life that was less
bad than the one he in fact received...we should say that it merited
dissatisfaction on Sam’s part to have been prevented from coming closer
to receiving such a (a humanly good) life (Draper 2004, 1 13).
In light of this consideration, I propose the following modification to DV:
DV2: An event, E, merits distress on the part of an agent A if either (1) E
deprives A of a good human life, when having a good human life
was possible; or (2) E prevents A from living a life that is less bad
than the life A lives when it is impossible for A to have a good
65
Strictly speaking, his view is silent about this case. It neither implies that his death
merits distress nor does it imply that his death does not merit distress.
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human life.
Draper apparently believes that this account of the evil of death does not fail for the
reason that the deprivation view fai led— it does not imply that my not being loved by
millions and my not having the strength of Hercules merit distress.
As 1 stated earlier, I believe that DV2 is inadequate for two reasons: it falls prey
to Draper's own counter-examples, and it is incomplete. First, imagine a case in which
it is possible for a person's life to have an overall positive net value, but this possibility
can be actualized only if the individual is loved by millions. Let us suppose that this
person is a megalomaniac, and his only goal in life is to have the love of all of his
people. Anything short of that will result in its being the case that the overall value of
the person's life has a negative net value. I will also make the intuitively plausible
stipulation that it is possible (broadly logically possible) that millions love the person.
Let us suppose that, as a matter of fact, millions do not love the person. His life has a
negative net value. The reason it has a negative net value is that millions did not love
him. Since the first clause ofDV2 states that an event, E, merits distress on the part of
an agent A if E deprives A of a good human life when having a good human life was
possible, DV2 implies that failing to be loved by millions merits distress.
One might argue that DV2 has the right implication in this case-it is truly
unfortunate for him that he failed to experience the love of millions. For as I stipulated,
his primary goal in life was to be loved by millions, and since his failure at this resulted
in his life’s having an overall negative net value, distress is an appropriate response. If
you are convinced by this objection, then I offer a modified version of the objection.
Suppose your life would have an overall positive net value for you only if you had the
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strength of Hercules, three wishes granted by a genie, and so on. You do not have the
strength of Hercules, and so fail to lead a humanly good life. Again, Draper's view
implies that this deprivation merits distress, and again, I think that it shows his account
is false.
With respect to the second clause of DV2, I believe that it can be shown false by
appeal to similar considerations. Suppose there is a person who is such that the value of
her life is so low that, regardless of what transpires, her life cannot have an overall
positive net value for her. Since it is impossible for her to have a humanly good life,
any event that prevents her from living a life that is less bad than the life that she lives is
an event that merits distress.
Let us consider the event of her failing to be loved by millions of people, or,
perhaps, failing to have the strength of Hercules. Surely, we can imagine that, if she
were to experience their love, her life would be less bad than it actually is. If DV2 is
true, being deprived of their love merits distress on her part. However, no one believes
(particularly Draper) that such events merit distress.
Perhaps Draper could reject the line of reasoning employed here. He might say
that when we are talking about a humanly good life, and what prevents or encourages
such a life, the sorts of things under consideration will be restricted to those harms and
benefits that can reasonably occur in a human life. Since being loved by millions is not
something that can reasonably occur in a human life, or at least not in most human lives,
failing to be loved by millions (even if it was a necessary condition for a person's living
a humanly good life) does not count as a misfortune. He might also claim that the
second clause does not have this implication for precisely the same reason. Whatever
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sorts of things make a human life less bad when it is not possible for it to be good will
be restricted to those things that can reasonably befall a human life.
It should be obvious that this line of reasoning will not rescue Draper's account,
for it is difficult to say what harms and benefits are reasonable in a human life. Are
they those harms and benefits that one reasonably expects to receive? Or is there an
objective list of reasonable goods and harms that befall a human life? Draper would
surely reject the first suggestion. He recognizes that one could, when in a bad epistemic
situation, reasonably expect to receive goods that are such that, if one were denied those
goods, the deprivation would not merit distress. “Given your peculiar epistemic
situation, you may reasonably expect to fulfill your dream to grow wings and fly, but it
seems improper to describe your (objectively) inevitable failure to do so as worthy of
disappointment” (Draper 2004, 109). Perhaps the second suggestion-that there is an
objective list of goods and harms that can reasonably befall a human life—can rescue
DV2. Although Draper could make this move, it is equally available to the
deprivationist. A deprivationist could likewise claim that the deprivations that merit
distress are only those goods on the list, and he could stipulate that being loved by
millions and having the strength of Hercules are not on this list. Making this second
move, then, fails to show that Draper's account is in fact preferable to the deprivation
account.
As for the second problem with Draper's positive account, Deprivationists might
argue that there are some deprivations that merit distress, but DV2 fails to explain why
that is the case. Consider again the example of the woman bom during a time at which
women were not permitted to pursue poetry. Deprivationists claim that being deprived
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of poetry is a misfortune for the woman; it is a genuine misfortune in the sense that it
merits distress, regret, sadness, and so on. DV2 cannot account for this claim because
this deprivation neither prevented her from living a humanly good life nor did it prevent
her from living a less bad life when a humanly good life was impossible. Since at no
point does Draper suggest that he has provided both necessary and sufficient conditions
for when an event is a harm for a person, I suppose that this is not so much an objection
as it is a complaint. Draper's account is incomplete. It would be very easy for Draper
to add yet another condition in order to account for this harm, but how many conditions
will he have to add to account for all of the different types of harms? At some point
surely it will seem ad hoc.
Where does this leave Draper? First, DV2 falls prey to Draper's own counter-
examples. Second, since the deprivation account accommodates our intuitions in cases
like the one discussed above, it is not clear to me that DV2 has any advantage over the
deprivation account. Therefore, the work that Draper has done to provide us with a way
of separating out the deprivations that merit distress from those that do not merit
distress puts us in the same place where the deprivation account put us: in need of, as
Draper says, “a rationale for distinguishing those negative evils that merit self-interested
distress from those that do not” (Draper 2004, 111).
If individuals are interested in discussing whether the fear of death is a true fear,
this conversation will leave them dissatisfied. While I think that something like the
deprivation account of the evil of death may be true, it still needs considerable work.
Moreover, even supposing that deprivationists can adequately formulate their position, I
am not convinced that it has been shown that death is a true emotion. For, as I
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suggested at the outset, fear is a correct emotional response to take towards states of
affairs that are harmful, dangerous, threatening, and so on. While it may well be the
case that death can be a harm for the person who dies, it is surely not dangerous.
For a state of affairs to be dangerous, I think that it must be the case that it is
life-threatening. It would be a strange use of ‘dangerous' indeed, if (to use Feldman’s
case) being deprived of the opportunity to compose poems were dangerous for the
young woman. A state of affairs can be harmful and not dangerous; dangerous and not
harmful; or harmful and dangerous. Thus, even if death is extrinsically bad for us, it is
not life threatening. We are already dead, so how could it be a threat to our life? Since
death (the state of affairs that death deprives us of goods) does not satisfy this condition,
it is untrue to say that death's deprivations, even if harmful, are dangerous. Since
death’s deprivations do not meet this requirement, fearing death is indeed a false
emotion.
For those unwilling to relinquish the view that fearing death can be appropriate
(in some sense), I believe that there is room, in spite of what I have just argued, for a
reasoned defense of this position. De Sousa’s view, unfortunately, may not provide us
with this room. The reason for this is not this fearing death’s deprivations requires that
one adopt an impossible perspective, as was one of the problems with the fear of
annihilation. For what is required to fear death's deprivations is the ability to imagine,
from a subjective standpoint, what it is like to be deprived of the goods of life through
death. Even if one never suffers any pain as a result of these deprivations, even if one
has no experience whatsoever of these deprivations, I believe that de Sousa's
requirement is still satisfied. I can imagine how my life would be if 1 were to die
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tomorrow, and I can also imagine how my life would be if 1 were to live deep into old
age. If 1 were to compare the two, I would surely be able to appreciate, from a
subjective perspective, that one life is likely to be better than the other. I can thus
imagine what it would be like for a premature death to deprive me of goods I would
have otherwise had. The fear of death as the fear of death’s deprivations, then, does not
involve a mistake about the object.
The problem with de Sousa’s view, instead, is that it is uncertain whether the
object—my being deprived of life’s goods through death—ever objectively resembles
the paradigm of fear. De Sousa never indicates what scenarios constitute the paradigm
of fear; he says that they are first a matter of biology, and then they become largely
cultural. Given some of his remarks, however, I believe that he would agree that the
properties o f be ingfrightening, dangerous, and harm/u/are all examples of the second-
order properties that attach to the scenarios in the paradigm of fear. Situations that have
these properties resemble the paradigm of fear, and are thereby rational to fear. If the
state of affairs that consists ofmy being deprived of life’s goods through death has
these properties, then fearing death’s deprivations is rational.
Does this state of affairs have these properties? Let us suppose, for the sake of
argument, that the deprivation view has been suitably modified to accommodate the
objections raised by Draper. Death, in some cases at least, is a harm of deprivation.
Even ifwe grant this, epistemic restrictions forbid us from providing a definitive answer
to question of whether or not ourown deaths deprives us of goods. We do not know
what the value of our lives would be if we were to die at a later time. Thus, we do not
know w hether dying earlier rather than later results in the intrinsic values of our lives
154
being lower than they otherwise would be. Since we do not know this, we just cannot
determine whether one's death resembles the scenarios that make up the paradigm of
fear insofar as one's death is a harm .
66
This is an epistemic worry about whether we can /cnon\ of our own lives, that a
premature death will deprive us of several goods that we otherwise would have had. If
you are not moved by this worry, perhaps will find this second worry problematic. For,
even supposing that one's own death is a harm, and so resembles the paradigm of fear
in this respect, are we to conclude that the fear of death is rational? I am not certain that
we can. There are other second order properties that make up the paradigm of fear, and
I have argued that death’s deprivations do not have these properties. Death, then, does
not ^ryb^jyVresemble the paradigm of fear. And since the resemblance relation was
left undefined, there is no hard and fast way to determine whether the resemblance
relation holds .
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In conclusion, even if death were a harm for the person who died, and
even ifwe ignored epistemic worries regarding the badness of our own deaths, it is still
unclear whether death's deprivations resemble the paradigm of fear.
Is the Fear of Death’s Deprivations Ever Justified?
I have recommended that we adopt a view of emotional rationality that allows
for the possibility ofjusnyiedfa/se emotions. The reason I was willing to grant that
emotions can be justified even if false is explained by the special motivational role
66
This is not to say, of course, that it is indeterminate. I am just saying that I cannot
determine it. Now, one could simply give a conditional answer to the question about
the rationality of the fear of death: if one’s death is a harm insofar as it deprives one of
good, and if its being like this implies that it objectively resembles the paradigm of fear,
then fearing one's death is appropriate.
67 An Epicurean, of course, would outright deny that death’s deprivations objectively
resemble the paradigm of fear, and would conclude that the fear is irrational.
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played by emotions. Emotions are often quick coordinated responses. They do not wait
for evidence, nor should they be expected to do so. Given this feature of emotions, we
have good reason to be less interested in the extent to which emotions accurately
represent their objects, and more interested in the extent to which they are justified .68
On my view, emotional rationality is understood in the same way that
externalists understand the justification of belief. Emotions are justified (even if untrue)
insofar as they are outputs of reliable processes, where the processes are mechanisms
that have their roots partially in biology, and partially in individuals’ own experiences.
It is my hope to show that processes that give rise to the fear of death’s deprivations are
indeed reliable.
Now, as was the case with the fear of annihilation, there is a problem with the
temporal location of this object (the state of affairs that consists ofmy being deprived of
the life’s goods). It is a future state of affairs, and unless one is willing to accept
backwards causation, it cannot be a part of the causal role. In an effort to resolve this
difficulty, let us again suppose that the entity that plays this causal role is a mental
entity. It is my imagining all of the goods of which I would be deprived should I die
sooner rather than later. It is my imagining that I will lose out on some extremely
important life events. Is the process that begins with such thoughts and gives rise to the
fear of death reliable?
First, I will assume that there is some causal process that leads to the output of
an emotion. I am not sure what this process is, exactly, but I am inclined to think that
This is not to say, of course, that we never criticize emotions for their “truth.” It is
indeed a familiar type of emotional criticism. My point is only that this is not the on/v,
or the mostpern'/ienf, way to criticize emotions.
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there are somewhat primitive emotion producing modules in the brain that, when
properly stimulated, set in motion a series of complex coordinated responses. When we
learn the meaning of emotion terms, we calibrate these modules. What was largely a
matter of biology now becomes a matter of one's own interactions with the world.
Now, when one fears death's deprivations, his fear module is stimulated no/by some
external perception, but rather by some thought: the thought or belief that he, by dying
sooner rather than later, will be deprived of goods. Perhaps this thought is a species of
genus of thoughts: thoughts about deprivations and losses generally. It is reasonable to
suppose that these thoughts are parts of causal processes that bring about the fear
reaction. Let us also suppose that fears of losses are generally reliable. Even if a loss is
not in fact a harm for a person, or even if a person has no experience of the loss, let us
assume that, in general, losses and deprivations are bad for people. On this assumption,
fearing losses and deprivations (or at least what we believe to be a loss or deprivations)
“gets it right” more often than not.
I grant that this is mere speculation, but I think that I am right. Since processes
that begin with losses and deprivations and give rise to fears are reliable, and fearing
death is one species of these processes, the fear of death is an emotion that is the result
of a reliable process. The fear of death, on this view, is indeed justified.
Conclusion
In this final chapter I have looked closely at the way in which others have
criticized the fear of death, and have shown that they have presupposed an inappropriate
evaluative concept. I then tried to illustrate what non-reductive views of emotional
rationality said about the fear of death. As the fear of annihilation, I believe that all of
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the views yielded the same result: fearing the state of nonexistence is indeed irrational.
However, the results were somewhat different for the fear of death's deprivations.
While I believe to have shown that this fear of death is not a true fear, I do think that we
have reason to believe that it is justified. On my own view of emotional justification, I
have shown how this can be so. The fear of death is a species of the genusfearof
/osses anddeprivations. I have suggested that when the fear-producing module in the
brain is stimulated by actual losses and deprivations, or even thoughts about losses and
deprivations, the resulting emotion will “get it right” more often than not. Since the
fear of death is a species of these fears, I believe that the fear of death is, itself, justified.
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